[Maruf]

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Barrister M.B.I. Munshi has written a book titled "India Doctrine" that has gained immense popularity among the political and strategic analysts of South Asia. He is already in the process of publishing an updated version of "India Doctrine" which will include even more information on India's long term ambition in the region and beyond.

Zaman bhai, one of the administrators of BDSDF, has graciously agreed to upload "India Doctrine" to this thread so that the readers of this forum can gain an insight into the foreign and defence policy of India that they have been following to further their military and political ambition in South and South East Asia.

[akzaman]

CONTENTS


BANGLADESHI AUTHORS
1. M.B.I. MUNSHI

i. The India Doctrine - Preface

ii. The Emergence of India and the Policy of Reunification (Part 1)

iii. The 1971 War of Liberation and After (Part 2A)

iv. The 1971 War of Liberation and After (Part 2B)

v. The Circle of History (Part 3)

vi. The Betrayal of Bangladesh (Part 4)

vii. The Aftermath (Part 5A)

viii. The Causes of the CHT Insurgency (Part 5B)

ix. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the CHT (Part 5C)

2. KHODEZA BEGUM

x. Indian move to establish United India through United Bengal

3. BRIGADIER GENERAL SAKHAWAT HUSSAIN (Retd.)

xi. China-India-US Strategic Tangle - Challenge for Bangladesh

xii. Himalayan Revolution – Testing Time for Nepal

NEPALESE AUTHORS
4. NISHCHAL BASNYAT

xiii. Nepal: The Himalayan chaos & the unsung Indian involvement

5. MADAN PRASAD KHANAL

xiv. Maoist Insurgency – India’s Incendiary Device in Nepal

6. SANJAY UPADHYA

xv. India’s Policy Tenet in Nepal

7. DR. SHASTRA DUTTA PANT
xvi. The Untold Pains of Nepal

xvii. Maoists and India

SRI LANKAN AUTHORS
7. ROHAN GUNARATNA & ARABINDA ACHARYA

xviii. India’s Role in the Ethnic Crisis in Sri Lanka

[akzaman]

SYNOPSIS AND BIOGRAPHY

M.B.I. Munshi
The several chapters written by this author covers the relations between India and East Pakistan/Bangladesh from 1947 to the present. It attempts a historical and geo-strategic appraisal of relations between the two countries but also offers a more wide ranging analysis involving the Indian external intelligence services (RAW) operations in Bangladesh and outside. The chapters cover some of the most important events in East Pakistan/Bangladesh history in which India has had an interest and where there is evidence available of its aggressive and hegemonic tendency towards its smaller neighbour. The principal themes of the chapter are the issues of Indian domination and control over Bangladesh and the methods and tactics that have been used to undermine the nations sovereignty and territorial integrity and the example of the CHT is extensively and thoroughly discussed. The central idea or concept of the chapters is to show that the Indian design is not limited to simply harming the economic interests of the nation but also has a historical and intellectual underpinning that comes from the thoughts and writings of Jawaharlal Nehru and Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar amongst others. The idea of a United India (or an Akhand Bharat) is still a goal of Indian policy making in South Asia and several examples have been provided by the author to support his thesis that was originally published in 2001.

He was born on 5 August, 1972 in the town of Kaliganj in Greater Jessore (now Jhenidha). His father at the time had recently graduated out of Rajshahi Medical School (1968) and was practicing medicine in various districts of Bangladesh. His mother is the eldest daughter of Late Mian Abdur Rashid a renowned businessman and politician of Pakistan and then later of Bangladesh. In July 1973 at the age of 11 months Mr. M.B.I. Munshi was taken to England as his father decided to pursue postgraduate studies leading to a FRCS degree. The entire family remained there (including his sister) together for another 24 years until Mr. Munshi returned to Bangladesh in November 1996. During his stay in London he completed his education including a postgraduate degree in law from the London School of Economics (1994) and then qualified as a Barrister passing his examinations in 1996 (Lincolns Inn – Called 1997). His family still resides in England where his father now practices orthopedic surgery as an Associate Specialist at the Queen Elizabeth II hospital in Hertfordshire. On his return to Bangladesh he obtained his license to practice as an advocate of the High Court in 1998 and is a junior to Senior Advocate Khan Saifur Rahman. He also teaches law at the London College of Legal Studies in Panthapath and Gulshan as well as at other institutions providing the London University LLB external course. His articles have been published nationally and internationally and he has been a frequent contributor to several internet discussion groups over the last seven years. He has also been involved with numerous social, welfare and legal organizations in Bangladesh and elsewhere.

Brigadier General M. Sakhawat Hussain (retd)
Brig. Gen. Sakhawat had kindly written two chapters for the book. The first deals with geo-strategic issues involving India, China and the USA. His focus is primarily on India’s design in South Asia and it’s growing involvement in the Indian Ocean. He surveys these issues with a Bangladesh perspective in mind and discusses the options for policy makers in this country and also provides certain recommendations to counter Indian manouvres in the region. He has also incuded an entire section on the Northeast conflict in India.

His second article is on the recent upheavls in Nepal which he visited prior to the writing of the chapter and he offers some valuable insights into India’s role in that country. His background is very impressive –

Commissioned in Pakistan Army 1966 from Pakistan Military Academy, Kakul

Joined Bangladesh Army in 1972

Commanded a sector of Bangladesh Rifles.

Attended and graduated from United States Command & Staff College (USACGSC) Ft Leavenworth, Kansas, USA-1981-1982.

-Commanded Brigade and served as Director in Army Headquarters.
-Attended and obtained Masters in Strategic Studies (MSS) from Qaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad and qualified from National Defence College, Pakistan obtained symbol ndc.
-Commanded two Infantry and Artillery brigades, served as Director in various capacity in the Army Headquarters, Dhaka.
-Served in Chittagong Hill Tracts as Brigade Commander.

Books in Bangla:

1. Bangladesh: Raktakta Adhay- 1975-81
2. Janaganer Raj Kumari Diana:
3. Antarjatik Shantrasher Iti Katha: Afghanistan Hote America
4. Tel Gas Nabaya Upnibeshbad: Kabul Hote Baghdad.
5. Dokhin Asia o Bangladesher Nirapatta
6. Madhya Prachay Shangghat: Bartaman o Bhabishat.

Mrs. Khodeza Begum
In this chapter there is an extensive discussion on the policies being pursued by the Indian government that is detrimental to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bangladesh. She analyses the concept of a United Bengal that has featured in some of the Indian political literature in recent years. She has also summarized the tactics and strategies adopted by the Indian government and its intelligence agency to undermine the unity of Bangladesh and to inculcate the population of the country with a perspective adverse to the nations integrity.

Khodeza Begum is an assistant professor in political science, Girls Ideal Laboratory Institute, Dhaka.

Dr. Shastra Dutta Pant
Dr. S.D. Pant has contributed two chapters to the book. In his first chapter he deals with a multitude of issues affecting relations between Nepal and India. He identifies several specific areas in which India has interfered in the internal affairs of the country and also discusses the external pressures exerted on Nepal by India through the media and finance agencies and donors aligned with that country. In the second of his articles he analyses the role India has played in the Maoist insurgency in Nepal and the political intrigues (engineered by RAW) that this has caused between the political parties and the King who was recently deposed.

Dr. S.D. Pant is a prolific writer and has several books to his credit. He is also involved with many social and educational organizations operating in Nepal.

Nishchal Basnyat
Nishchal Bansyat is a Nepali writer with a prodigious talent who has graciously contributed one chapter to this project. In an elegantly written piece he briefly points out the present problems facing Nepal (principal among them appears to be India) but does not dwell on these drawbacks but tries to offer a solution for Nepal which seems to mean putting some distance between it and India at least in diplomatic and political terms. He offers an interesting method to challenge the status quo in Nepal and also has proposals to change the mindset of the country’s politicians.

As the son of a career diplomat, Nishchal M.S. Basnyat, a native of Nepal, and was raised in New York City, Kathmandu, Hong Kong and Paris. He is currently studying in La Sorbonne (Paris) but is a full time undergraduate student of economics at Harvard University. He is a Senior Editor for the Harvard South Asian Journal and is a founding member, Vice President and Political Chair for the Harvard Nepali Association. Basnyat’s writings constitute political satires and hard-hitting political criticism. He was the founder/editor of Nepal’s first all English music magazine ‘Tab Archive’. His published articles have been published in National newspapers like Nepali Times and his writings are often found in the most popular news websites like Nepalnews.com.

Madan Prasad Khanal
M.P. Khanal in his single chapter provides a historical overview of the Nepal-India relationship starting from 1947 onwards. He offers contrasts with the situation in Sikkim and argues against adopting a similar approach by Nepal’s politicians which eventually led to annexure by India. He points out the methods that have been adopted by India to bring Nepal into its control and influence. He also focuses on the Maoist insurgency and the personalities and background of the leaders that run the outfits and their relationship with India.

He has an MBA from Tribhuvan University in Kathmandu and divides his time between Nepal and the United States on project work as a writer/researcher. His contributions have appeared in People's Review weekly published from Kathmandu and a few Web magazines like Scoop and News from Bangladesh.

Sanjay Upadhya
Sanjay Upadhya takes a more historical internationalist look at India-Nepal relations bringing in the influences exerted not only by India but also China, the British and the United States and how these interventions have brought the unwelcome interference of the Indian government into Nepali affairs. Unlike the other writers on Nepal he introduces a security element into his discussion and offers examples of how Indian security requirements are not necessarily compatible with Nepal’s own security concerns and the maintenance of its sovereignty and national integrity. He details the techniques used by India to impose its strategic plan upon the government of Nepal which has been in many cases too complaint and how this also fits in with the Maoist insurgency.

Sanjay Upadhya is a freelance journalist and writer from Kathmandu with two decades' experience in the field. A Fulbright Scholar who earned an MA in journalism from New York University, Mr. Upadhya has worked as an editorial writer for Khaleej Times in Dubai and The Rising Nepal in Kathmandu. In addition, he has worked for The Times of London as Nepal correspondent and for Inter Press Service as Gulf analyst. Mr. Upadhya has contributed the chapter on Nepalese politics "State of Nepal," published in 2002 by Himal Books in Kathmandu. He has appeared on BBC radio and television as guest analyst. Currently based in Michigan, USA, where his wife is studying, Mr. Upadhya is working on a book on Nepal's troubled experience with democracy between 1990 and 2002. He frequently appears on BBC Radio's Nepali Service as a commentator on U.S. affairs and has been writing for publications in Nepal.

Rohan Gunaratna & Arabinda Acharya
Both writers collaborated to produce a single chapter on the Sri Lankan attitude to Indian interference or as the authors themselves put it, “India’s involvement in Sri Lankan ethnic imbroglio has been one of the most controversial, ironic as well as tragic aspects of New Delhi’s foreign policy.” While concentrating on the Sri Lankan situation the writers also manage to draw in examples from Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal and Bhutan to back up their case on Indian aspirations in South Asia. Of significance is the Indian involvement in the protracted and apparently insoluble conflict with the Tamils. The chapter also involves a geostrategic appraisal of Sri Lanka and its growing relationship with China and Pakistan.

ROHAN GUNARATNA is an Associate Professor and Head of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies; Senior Fellow at the Combating Terrorism Center at the US Military Academy at West Point; Honorary Fellow, International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, Israel. Previously, he was Principal Investigator, UN Terrorism Prevention Branch; Co-Director, UN University Project on Managing Contemporary Insurgencies; and Principal Investigator, Qinetiq Project on Terrorist Information Operations, Ministry of Defence, UK. Gunaratna co-chairs the NATO-PfP Working group on Combating Terrorism since 2002 and serves on the Steering Committee of the George Washington University's Homeland Security Policy Institute since 2004

He is a consultant to the World Terrorism Encyclopedia; author of over 100 papers and reports on terrorism; and the author of eight books including an international bestseller Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (Columbia University Press, New York, 2002).

A Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts, Dr Gunaratna holds a Masters degree in international peace studies from Notre Dame, US, and a Doctorate in international relations from St Andrews, UK. In 2002, he was appointed Chairman of the NATO-PFP Working Group on Counter Terrorism.

ARABINDA ACHARYA is a Visiting Associate and Manager, Strategic Projects at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies. He is also the Research Coordinator for Centre for Peace and Development Studies, India. Arabinda was External Research Associate, York University Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies University of Toronto and a Visiting Research Fellow, Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS) Colombo, Sri Lanka.

Arabinda has published a number of articles and reviews in journals such as South Asia in the Nuclear Era, Asian Defence and Diplomacy (Kuala Lumpur), Vol. 7, No. 12, (December 2000), Human Security In Asia Pacific: Puzzle, Panacea or Peril? CANCAPS Bulletin No. 27, November 2000, Shadow Over the Subcontinent: South Asia Goes Nuclear- a Look at Security, George Town Journal of International Affairs; Vol. II, No. 1 (Winter/Spring 2001), Engaging China In South Asia Harvard Asia Quarterly, Vol. V, No. 3, (Summer 2001), “Promoting Human Security in South Asia Through Multilateral Cooperation,” Dipankar Banerjee, (ed), SAARC in the 21st Century: Towards a Cooperative Future, (New Delhi, India Research Press, 2002), “Targeting Islamist Terrorism in Asia Pacific: An Unending War,” Asia Pacific Review, November 2004, “The Al Qaeda Training Camps of Afghanistan and Indonesia,” The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes, James JF Forest, ed. (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2005), “Terrorism and Regional Security: Deconstructing the War on Terror in Asia,” in Global Terrorism: Genesis, Implications, Remedial and Counter Measures, The Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, 2006, “Countering the Global Islamist Terrorist Threat,” The Korean Journal of Defence Analysis, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, Spring 2006, and co-author of Conflict and Terrorism in Southern Thailand, Marshall Cavandish Academic, Singapore, 2005

[akzaman]

THE INDIA DOCTRINE

PREFACE

This essay was originally written and published on the internet about six years ago (during the last Awami League regime) without an effective response or counter argument to rebut my original charges against the Indian government past, present and possibly future – especially if their inclinations towards Bangladesh and other South Asian nations continue along the same stream. This paper was written as a rejoinder to a gentleman in London (probably of Indian extraction, as far as I could surmise from his name and political inclinations) who challenged my assertion that India had hegemonic and imperialistic designs for the subcontinent or in other words a pretension to an Akhand Bharat (i.e. Unified India).

The subject of this essay primarily relates to events that have affected Bangladesh but also includes references to other nations in South Asia that have had similar experiences with India. It was claimed by the responder in London that India had never publicly proposed such a policy and so we should not jump to such unsubstantiated and far-fetched conclusions that India indeed has such a policy or has ever followed such a policy in the past - a very twisted logic considering the dynamics prevailing in South Asia for the last fifty years. In this regard, there is also now the increased possibility that India will take advantage of any war in the Middle East or in Korea to harass and victimise Bangladesh and even resort to armed aggression in an effort to reduce or even confine our population which is considered a vital matter for India’s present ruling elites and their perceived national security interests.

During the second edition of this article written in 2003 there had been widespread speculation that the present government in Bangladesh (an alliance of the BNP and Jamaat-i-Islami Party with two smaller factions of nationalist and Islamic representations) will be toppled and replaced with an administration that is more India centric and pliable to their domineering and expansionist tendencies. All these attempts had fortunately failed but with the 2007 Parliamentary elections before us there appears a renewed effort to impose an authority structure that would be sympathetic to the Indian demand for transit rights and export of gas. Both of these demands are unacceptable to Bangladesh as they would compromise our national integrity and security as well as drain one of our most precious natural resources with no actual benefit to the country since the price proposed by Indian companies (such as Tata who claim to want to use the gas solely to power their own industries inside Bangladesh once their investments have been approved by the government but there is no guarantee they will not exert pressure on a future administration to export gas to India at discounted rates) for the purchase of natural gas is well below international market values and the terms proposed for an agreement will have negative economic implications for the country but in an election year ‘informal’ deals could be made by the present government or the opposition parties to ensure a victory with India’s blessing. It would appear then, that goodwill to our large neighbour requires the sacrifice of Bangladesh’s own national interests to the larger requirements and demands of the Indian consumer and final submission to the security requirements and considerations of their armed forces and civilian government and anything less is simply not good enough – there is no longer even a pretence to reciprocity.

For these reasons, it has been suggested to me that my article ‘Akhand Hindustan’ should be republished in book form considering the more intense and aggressive posturing of the Indian government after the fall of the Awami League from power and the success of the BNP in the October 2001 elections in Bangladesh. With the possibility of a BNP-Islamic combine again achieving success at the polls in 2007 there is an increased likelihood of interference not only from India and its Awami League ally and stooge (since it is essentially through this party that India operates but it does have many other front organisations functioning in Bangladesh) but also from the Europeans and Americans through the vehicle of the Tuesday Group and human rights and donor institutions.

The European Union members have been the worst offenders in this regard anointing themselves the sole experts and legitimate spokesmen on the state of Bangladesh democracy and political affairs and drawing the country closer to confrontation and disharmony with their ill-advised pronouncements that distinctly favour the pro-Indian agendas of certain political parties. With this diplomatic inducement the Awami League is rejecting the constitutional process for selecting and appointing the Chief Advisor to the Caretaker government and pressing on with its insistence on the resignation of the Chief Election Commissioner. In this latter case, however, the CEC has made some controversial decisions in regard to the electoral roll that has brought widespread condemnation from different quarters but it remains unclear whether this has more to do with internal conflict and dissension within the Election Commission itself or is in fact a reasonable attempt at inclusion of new voters for the forthcoming elections in very trying circumstances. In either case, it will probably have no effect on the acceptability of the CEC to the opposition Awami League or any new appointee that does not fit the AL profile and will provide further opportunities and incentives for India try to influence the election outcome.

These incidents are merely the political and diplomatic signs indicative of what we can expect in the coming months if not in the years ahead which has necessitated the updating of this paper into its present form and context to provide an interpretation of events at this critical juncture in the nation’s history. For those readers familiar with this essay I have decided to keep the original form of the article published in 2001 except for a few alterations and a preface and of course the change in the title which essentially incorporates the notions of an ‘Akhand Hindustan’ or an ‘Akhand Bharat’ and retains the connotations that these two concepts intend to imply but most importantly the idea of an ‘India Doctrine’ of expansionism and hegemony in South Asia would be more readily understood in the West. The updated narrative of this story will now include contemporary materials and documents relating to events and incidents that occurred after the writing of the 2003 edition of this paper and which also now comprises several additional topics incorporated into 3 completely new parts.

INDIAN REACTION

It would seem even the Indian High Commission has now become aware of this essay and is immensely concerned by the political import and popularity of this series which was implied in the manner of departure of the former Indian High Commissioner Mani Lal Tripathi in 2003. At the farewell dinner prepared in his honour by the Awami League on 24 October 2003 he said,

“There is, however, a feeling in India that even parties and leaders here, who have a pragmatic appreciation of the importance of good relations with India, are reluctant to acknowledge and advocate it in public. It is as if the India-friendly tag is something to be embarrassed about, something to be shunned. Baseless accusations of subservience to India, hurled at one another, seems to have become a popular pastime in the domestic political arena here. This is a matter of much disappointment.

God has been kind in blessing our country with adequate territory. We do not covet even a square inch of the land in our neighbourhood. We pose no threat to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Bangladesh. Our people were therefore pained when some one in the Government here publicly commented that India still believes in 'Akhand Bharat' (undivided India), annexing territories from the Khyber Pass to Chittagong and from the Himalayas to the Indian Ocean. Such comments are irresponsible. Such talk is reprehensible.”

That His Excellency was able to make such a speech in Bangladesh at a gathering organized by a political party in his honour with the numerous accusations he leveled against this country I do not share his surprise that people in Bangladesh are suspicious of India. With continuing deceptions over India’s River Linking Project and pressure over transit rights and gas exports, with still outstanding disputes on the Tin Bigha Corridor, Muhuri Char and Talpatty Island and - the ultimate symbol of India’s complete disregard for Bangladesh concerns - the Farraka Barrage construction, there appears little scope for India to endear itself towards Bangladesh, at least in this century.
THE PROPAGANDA WAR

The onslaught carried on against Bangladesh and other countries in the region by the Indian press and media assisted by the international news networks only added support to my view of Indian domination and control of South Asia. The visit of Sheikh Hasina (in November 2002) to India and her reception there along with the vicious comments of L.K. Advani and India's foreign minister Yashwant Sinha about Islamic fundamentalism in Bangladesh and terrorist dens confirmed my suspicions of a conspiracy. These reprehensible remarks by the senior Indian Ministers were tolerated by the former prime minister who did not raise any protest or cut short her sojourn which gives the impression of complicity and even tacit approval to these polemics and diatribes. This interpretation of the Indian criticisms of Bangladesh (that of a planned and concerted design to influence political events in the country) was also supported to some extent by prominent journalists in Bangladesh:

“…a section of the Indian press, presumably prompted by a quiet Indian RAW agenda, built up a propaganda dossier about Al-Qaeda activity in Bangladesh by planted reports from time to time. Contributors to the Western media clandestinely visited Bangladesh to confirm those reports and made sensational headlines by stories published in Time, Far Eastern Economic Review, Wall Street Journal, etc. A contractor for Channel Four TV in the United Kingdom sent a clandestine team to film staged scenes of Al-Qaeda agitation in Bangladesh. That team’s intent has been foiled by police intervention, the foreign members of which have now been expelled from the country after due process of law. They were reportedly found to be guided by Indians, Bombay-based, as well as by Sheikh Hasina’s connections, Dhaka based.”

It should be noted that Sheikh Hasina again visited India in September 2005 essentially to workout ways and means to ensure the victory of the AL and its allies in the next national elections to be held in 2007. It is assumed that Sheikh Hasina was briefed about Indian strategy and advised on the methods of exploiting the BNP government’s problems with a resurgent JMB (Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh) and their failure to apprehend the members of this terrorist organization which they had miserably failed to do after almost two years of prompting. The conferring of the Mother Teresa Award on Sheikh Hasina has again afforded a new opportunity for the Indians to initiate further consultations with the former Prime Minister on a coordinated plan for the 2007 elections and to try to make relations between the two countries appear more acceptable to Bangladeshis which now seems a forlorn ambition and also utterly hopeless. They may also presumably discuss the issue of unrest and violence in the RMG sector, which was rumoured to have been orchestrated by a foreign hand - for use in the forthcoming election campaign by the Awami League party - and possibly to ignite further unrest in case the AL is again defeated at the polls or even prior to such an eventuality.

That India is now in the process of implementing its strategy is revealed by the unrest in the RMG sector that was preceded by a commentary in the Washington Times by Arnaud de Borchgrave who uncritically parrots the propaganda line of the Indian government. It should, however, be of real concern since the article discloses an alignment between India and the US neoconservatives and Israeli intelligence which has broad implications for South Asia and the Muslim world. If Mr. Arnaud de Borchgrave had simply accused Bangladesh of the stale accusations of Islamic militancy there would be no reason for apprehension but he continues.

“ In a well-planned demonstration of trans-Atlantic solidarity, a high-level European Union delegation timed its visit to coincide with Mrs. Rocca's -- and gave Bangladeshi leaders the same message: Stick to fair elections in October of this year or face some unpleasant though unspecified music. The opposition Awami League said the Election Commission and provisions for a caretaker government have already been gerrymandered to favor the ruling BNP and its Islamist props.

Suicide bombings and grenade assassinations are more common in Bangladesh than in Israel, Gaza or the West Bank. But they seldom are reported. Time magazine's South Asian bureau chief was banned from the country after a 2002 article exposed the government's lackadaisical response to a buildup of Islamist terrorists with links to al Qaeda.”

Now that the leadership of the JMB has been apprehended and the dismantling of their command structure is nearly complete an apology from the Washington Times and Mr. Arnaud de Borchgrave is long overdue. What is particularly noteworthy about this episode is the assertiveness of a Bangladeshi diplomat in the United States, who responded to the above commentary in a prompt and crisp manner with the following statement,

“Bangladesh has contained and eliminated extremists from a sense of its own deep commitment to this objective and to ensure social harmony. This was clearly demonstrated at the recent Conference on Interfaith Harmony in Dhaka.

The Bangladesh government's action in fighting terrorism, both through domestic measures and by joining all international efforts, has been widely recognized. President Bush has said as much in a recent letter to Bangladesh Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, delivered personally by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christina Rocca.

Thus, for Mr. Borchgrave to say the U.S assistant secretary of state flew to Dhaka at the end of January to convey U.S. alarm to government leaders coupled with a stern warning" of "sanctions under the U.S. Terrorist Financing Act" is nothing but sheer fantasy, specially when he himself was not physically present in Bangladesh. Not only did the U.S. assistant secretary convey her government's appreciation, she described Bangladesh "as a shinning example of one of the few Muslim democracies,” adding "Bangladesh stands out as a model in this part of the world."”

Now that the government has finally made a concerted effort to dismantle the JMB terrorist structure in Bangladesh the Awami League has again refocused the debate onto the election process and there has been little or no commendation from India on the arrest of the top leaders of the JMB. The Tuesday Group has also turned away from the issue of Islamic terrorism to the holding of free and fair elections, although, their intervention can be said to exceed their diplomatic mandate and authority as already detailed above.

NEW ALIGNMENTS

Since the writing of the original Akhand Hindustan article in 2001 the geo-political strategic scenario in South Asia has dramatically shifted in favour of India. With Presidents Bush’s visit to India in early March 2006 and the signing of the nuclear agreement between the two countries it would appear that Bangladesh is now at a distinct disadvantage.

The manner in which President Bush is pushing for this deal demonstrates certain desperation on America’s part, especially considering that, “India is one of only four countries that have refused to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—a treaty endorsed by 188 nations. Thumbing its nose at the world, India has conducted nuclear tests and has developed what experts believe to be 50 to 100 nuclear weapons. Under the terms of the NPT, the export of nuclear technology is banned to nations that don’t accept international inspections of their nuclear programs. In addition, U.S. law prohibits the transfer of nuclear technology to a country that rejects full international safeguards. U.S. law also bans such technology transfer to a non-NPT country that has conducted nuclear test explosions.”

This exceptional favouritism shown to India necessarily undermines America’s case against Iran and the agreement has already been criticised for its apparent impairing of the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as shown above. Pakistan has been the most vociferous opponent to the deal claiming that it would lead to regional destabilisation initiating a costly arms race and that Pakistan should also have been provided with the same facility given to India. Within the United States there has been apprehension that the deal would have negative implications for nuclear non-proliferation efforts on a global scale. According to one expert the deal would not require India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty nor would it commit India to an early cessation of the nuclear arms race, as Article Six of the NPT requires other recognized nuclear states. Others have commented that by treating India as an acceptable nuclear partner and continuing to treat Pakistan, Iran and North Korea as ‘nuclear pariahs’ has the potential of creating a very insecure and unstable world.

The specific terms of the agreement are of little importance for this essay but in brief it may be mentioned that the deal commits India to separating its civilian nuclear facilities from its military nuclear facilities, declaring civilian facilities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and placing them under IAEA safeguards, and signing an Additional Protocol. According to one analyst, the deal allows India to build as many nuclear weapons as it wishes with its own nuclear supplies and operate un-safeguarded facilities for producing and stockpiling unlimited amounts of fissile material for its weapons program.

This has been confirmed by the Council on Foreign Affairs (CFR) in a Council Special Report (CSR) which contends that India has not excluded the, ‘possibility of testing its own weapons should other states test theirs first. India has agreed to submit fourteen of its twenty-two nuclear reactors to international inspections, but it has kept the remaining eight potentially available for producing nuclear weapons material, has made no definite commitments whether future reactors will be inspected or used for weapons production, and has made no promises to end its production of nuclear weapons material. In contrast, the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, and China, the officially recognized nuclear weapons states under international law, have stopped producing nuclear weapons material.’

Many Indian commentators have already described this as a boon for India’s budding nuclear industry and without any real drawbacks to its future development which seems to be the conclusion of the CSR also. The agreement signifies a sea change in relations between India and the United States and has been touted as a strategic partnership intended to thwart China’s growing political and military influence in Asia. The powerful and highly influential Council of Foreign Affairs in another report authored by Esther Pan acquaints us with the motivating factors behind this deal,

“China's rise in the region is prompting the United States to seek a strategic relationship with India. ‘The United States is trying to cement its relationship with the world's largest democracy in order to counterbalance China,’ Ferguson says. The Bush administration is ‘hoping that latching onto India as the rising star of Asia could help them handle China,’ Sokolski says. But other experts say the growing economic relationship between China and India is so critical to New Delhi that its interests in China cannot be threatened or replaced by any agreement with the United States. Indians "have no interest whatsoever in trying to contain China because they believe this could be a self-fulfilling prophesy, and their whole policy is to seek the best possible relationship with China," Robert Blackwill, a former U.S. ambassador to India, said at a Council meeting February 23. Other experts worry U.S. nuclear aid to India could foster a dangerous nuclear rivalry between India and China. Though India has a strong interest in building economic relations with China, New Delhi is still wary of China's military rise in the region.”

This apparent marriage of convenience between America’s neo-conservative policy makers and India’s Brahmin elite , principally in order to curtail and contain China’s might, has the added potential to incite India’s Nehruvian ambition to push ahead with its program for an Akhand Bharat in South Asia. Although the Nehruvian vision saw a socialist ideology tagged on to this design the change in economic outlook of India today augments the concept of Akhand Bharat with a capitalist industrial-military machinery to further facilitate this goal. That India could exploit the contradictions in the US National Security Startegy (NSS) and Defence Department’s Quadrennial Defense Review (Q.D.R.) to advance its projected vision of an Akhand Bharat was made glaringly obvious by Washington’s decision to invite India to appoint military officers to liaison posts in the US Strategic Command (Stratcom).

Probably more ominous for Muslims in South Asia is the highly secretive military cooperation between India and Israel which has direct bearings on India’s attitude to its own Muslim population and that of Pakistan and Bangladesh. With India establishing full diplomatic ties with Israel in 1992 and staging a red carpet reception for the then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in 2003 demonstrates the depth of understanding of the two nations which probably also derives from the Zionist quest for a greater Israel and India’s cherished dream of an Akhand Bharat.

It may just be coincidence but both nations are democracies that have both employed an overtly racist and chauvinist policy towards their Muslim inhabitants involving not only forcible seizure of land but also a violent and often brutal subjugation of their dispossessed populace. Similarly, they both effectively project the image of being the wronged party in their disputes with their Muslim population and conveniently label them terrorists when they have the audacity and courage to protest.
A Few Remarks on U.S. – India Nuclear Diplomacy

There are still some commentators in both India and the United States who question the assumptions on which the nuclear agreement is based. If the deal were to fall through by a rejection in the US Congress the primary reason would certainly be mutual distrust which has already shown signs of resurfacing after Russia proposed to sell nuclear fuel to India and doubts have also been raised over the country’s relations with Iran which has now become the most recent target of American hawks vying for another war in the Middle East. These seem to be the principal factors in the stalling of the nuclear agreement in the US Congress and this delay in the approval process could last until early next year (2007).

It should also be pointed out that Congressional approval is only one of the hurdles that have to be met before the deal is officially completed and finalized. A formal nuclear cooperation agreement (or implementing agreement) will have to be negotiated providing a legal framework for nuclear commerce between the two countries and the US administration must then convince the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) that it should relax their rules which now prevent most types of nuclear trade with India. Both of these obstacles could introduce further objections and grounds for suspicion within the US (and in India) as to the terms of these arrangements and how far it satisfies American security interests in Asia and their concerns about nuclear proliferation globally.

On the Indian side doubts have been raised by a provision in the implementing agreement that confers to the United States the legal right to halt nuclear cooperation if India tests a nuclear weapon. India wants assurances that the flow of technology, including reactors and fuel, will not be interrupted which would require the deletion of this particular clause. A few analysts on the political left in India have also predictably and irrelevantly objected to the driving forces behind contemporary US foreign policy in attempting to aggressively reshape the world by military force rather than by persuasion. Another concern in some intellectual circles in India has been that America would loath to compromise on its preeminence as an industrial military power and therefore try to prevent the emergence of a potential rival or alternative power centre and the agreement has merely provided a convenient pretext for America’s control on India’s superpower potentiality and ambitions.
What all of these theories and analysis fails to grasp is that India’s political elites have already bought into the Neo-conservative program and see the opportunity for its extension in South Asia in the form of Akhand Bharat where India can exercise full-spectrum dominence over its immediate neighbours in all relevant strategic areas. That America will retain overall control on developments in South Asia can be implied from the expected US application for observer status of the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation but it can be safely assumed that India will be allowed wide discretionary powers in dealing with its neighbours and ultimately bringing them within the neoconservative fold.

This alignment of purpose and of ideologies between the US and India was explicitly admitted to in the CSR (mentioned above) where the authors of the report identify China as being the common threat to both democracies and more importantly that any suspicions that may still exist between the two countries would, ‘not only weaken overall relations with India, but also prompt the fall of India’s pro-American, minority government, which recently suffered significant defeats at the hands of its anti-American left-wing rival in state elections, and hence lead to the demise of the nuclear deal.’ In all liklihood the US Congress will, therefore, approve (in an amended form) the nuclear deal and precipitate a new and more dangerous phase in South Asian affairs that has the potential to engulf the rest of Asia and probably the world in a conflict of ideologies and interests.

The only thing standing in the way of such a calamity is a radical shift in India’s attitude towards the US and an unforseen realignment of forces and interests in Asia with India relinqushing its ambitions to be the preeminent power in the region (i.e. making way for the other Asian giant) which seems at this point highly unlikely. This impression is underscored by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s absence from the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit held in June of 2006 as, ‘New Delhi has been improving its relationship with Washington, and believes Russia and China want to use the SCO mainly as a platform from which to launch diplomatic attacks against the United States.’ This only further confirms the belief that the destinies of both the US and India are now inextricably linked with South Asia as the new playground for both these major powers with the latter taking on a policing and regulatory role but certainly not surrendering its vision for the establishment of an Akhand Bharat unifying the area under its control and domination.

THE UNITED STATES POLICY SHIFT

The policy shift towards India came as a palpable shock to Bangladesh with the United States decision to put it and four other countries under more stringent immigration rules that were being enforced after the September 11 attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon. This was a humiliating dénouement for Bangladesh caused by India’s repeated allegations of Al-Qaeda and Taliban elements in the government and terrorist training camps within our territory.

India with a population of 1 billion which includes a sizable 200 million Muslim minority had been excluded from this registration process while Pakistan and Bangladesh found itself targeted. This should make policy makers in these countries ponder whether the United States is encouraging India to further its territorial designs as there does not appear to be any other reason for such discriminatory practises especially with India’s track record in Kashmir and Gujarat. From another perspective, it may be suggested that the United States does not consider India a threat due to its successful subjugation of its Muslim population mentioned already.

With this clear abetment by the Bush administration in India’s rough handling of Muslims there is an incentive for the Congress led government to become increasingly aggressive and expansionist as it has already enthusiastically taken on the mantle of neo-conservatism in South Asia. The implication of this trend can be found in a review of Moudud Ahmed’s book ‘Crisis of Development – The Case of Bangladesh’, by Prof. Emajuddin Ahmed (Former Vice-Chancellor of Dhaka University) who has laid out the dilemma that now faces South Asian nations,

“Moudud knows it very well that this is an age old story of the Indian society. One may recollect what an eminent RSS leader Madhav Sadashiv Golwalker said when the BJP was not even born: “Hindustan is the land of the Hindus and is the terra firma for the Hindu nation alone to flourish … Today India’s vision has gone past South Asia; its aim is now to have “Predominance” established and the Indian Ocean rim. For having this end achieved it does not need cooperation; rather India needs its neighbouring countries as its extended frontiers so that the depth of its offensive and defensive exercises become stable.”

Unless these warnings are taken seriously by the military strategists and policy makers in Bangladesh the country may find itself in the same position as Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka who have all become the latest victims of a joint Indo-US effort to restructure their internal political make-up and organisation and which will probably not be in the national interests of these target countries or even meet the hopes of their people. In some cases even the territorial integrity of these countries have come in for reappraisal through the inciting of ethnic, religious or regional divisions to promote groups that they view as more favourable and sympathetic to their geo-strategic designs for South Asia.

In the case of Pakistan, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) has found sufficient evidence to accuse Washington and NATO, ‘of turning a blind eye to alleged Indian efforts to stoke an insurgency in Baluchistan. New Delhi denies meddling in Baluchistan. ISI officials are also convinced that US and Afghan officials are allowing Indian spy agencies unparalleled access and influence among the Pashtun tribes in southern Afghanistan, from where they supposedly are conducting operations designed to destabilize Pakistan.” To prepare for such a similar eventuality in Bangladesh (which could happen in relation to the CHT) the political leaders should act in conformity with the suggestion made by Maj. Gen. Syed Ahmed in the Bangladesh Army Journal and reproduced in part by Probe magazine,

“Our geo-strategic realities demand that we take into consideration the balance of power situation of South Asia and prepare accordingly. To stand against a formidable enemy, a small state cannot afford to renounce the possibility of making alliance with other larger states. Enemy’s enemy is a friend: such wisdom remained the basis of military alliances and the balance of power game through the history of warfare. In the struggle for survival, Bangladesh will definitely exploit all the available opportunities; in that the possibility of alliance also remains open.”

This approach has become crucial to Bangladesh’s survival in light of the Indo-US nuclear deal and military cooperation between India and Israel which places all nations within the South Asia region in an existential dilemma. The sensible approach for Bangladesh would be to exploit its strategic advantage and geographical location to attract friends that have a mutual interest in seeing the peace and security of South Asia maintained against an expansionist ideology that threatens to engulf the entire region in an endless war for supremacy and reunification that bears similarities in its passion and zeal to Hitler’s quest for lebensraum.

END NOTES & REFERENCES

Akhand Bharat for the western reader is basically the policy for reunification of the subcontinent according to the pre-1947 borders that would include the entire geographical area of Pakistan and Bangladesh. For some, Akhand Bharat refers to an even earlier period in Indian history that would encompass an area that also includes Afghanistan and parts of present day Myanmar. All these territories would come under the suzerainty of New Delhi. Akhand Bharat also has political connotations that bears similarities to western imperialism and envisions India’s political control over all the countries mentioned above and also Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives.

Subramanian Swamy – The Demographic Detonators (Organiser - Vol. LVII, No. 40, New Delhi, April 16, 2006)

Khawaza Main Uddin – Tata group, govt inching closer towards deal (New Age - May 20, 2006); Tanim Ahmed – Only proactive negotiations to ensure a ‘win-win’ Tata deal (New Age May 12, 2006); Anu Muhammad - Projects and Wish List of Tata in Bangladesh (May 5, 2006); Staff Reporter – Deal with Tata suicidal for nation (The New Nation - May 27, 2006); Khawaza Main Uddin – Tata proposals one-sided: civic forum (New Age – May 28, 2006); Hasnat Abdul Hye – The Return of Tata (New Age – May 28, 2006); Star Business Report – Tata proposal threat to energy security (The Daily Star – May 28, 2006); Staff Correspondent – Govt urged not to sign deal with Tata (New Age- May 30, 2006); Staff Correspondent – Govt cautioned over low gas price (The Daily Star – May 30, 2006); Shahnaj Begum – Expert Committee has no idea about Tata’s revised offer (The Independent – June 3, 06); Sunita Paul – Mamun’s Khwab and TATA deal (Asian Tribune – June 6, 2006); Justice Golam Rabbani et al – Investment proposal from the House of Tata (New Age – June 6, 2006); Md. Asadullah Khan – Looking beyond the conspiracy theory (The Daily Star – June 7, 2006); Khawaza Main Uddin – Response to Tata offers unlikely before govt takes over (New Age – June 17, 2006); Editorial – Tata’s offer: Government must negotiate effectively (New Age – June 19, 2006); Ibrahim Shalek – Tata’s revised proposal and gas price (New Age – June 19, 2006)
Col. R. Hariharan (Retd.) – Bangladesh Walking the Talk (SAAG March27, 2006); G. Parthasarathy - Rhetoric Divorced from Reality (South Asia Intelligence Review March 27, 2006); Philip Bowring – Neighbourly Talk in South Asia (IHT March 24, 2006); Alok Bansal - Khaleda Zia's Lackadaisical Visit and the Way Ahead (Asian Tribune March 26, 2006); Wilson John - Why Khaleda came to India (Rediff.com March 24, 2006); Zia visit a failure? – Hindustan Times (March 25, 2006); Water sharing is much more important – New Nation (March 22, 2006); Khaleda leaves but key issues unresolved – Business Standard (March 23, 2006); Hasnat Abdul Hye – The Visit (The New Nation March 26, 2006); Pallab Bhattacharya – ‘Indo-Bangladesh relations get a boost during Khaleda’s Delhi visit’ (The Daily Star – March 31, 2006); Mohammed Amjad Hossain – Bangladesh-India relations enters constructive phase (The Daily Star – 1 April, 2006); Smruti S Pattanaik - India-Bangladesh Relations After Khaleda's Visit (IPCS – April 7, 2006); Sadeq Khan – Attitudinal change in India, but same mindset in RAW (Holiday – April 14, 2006); Abdul Quader Chowdhury - Walking the talk between Dhaka & Delhi (Holiday – April 14, 2006); S. Zaman Chowdhury – Bangladesh-India relations: is a turning point in sight? (April 21, 2006); Daily Star Correspondent – Dhaka’s terms not acceptable to India (The Daily Star – May 17, 2006); Abdul Quader Chowdhury – Mutual cooperation can be beneficial (Holiday – June 9, 2006)
See parts 3-5

Khawaza Main Uddin – EC envoys talk tough (New Age – 9 May 2006); Diplomatic Reporter – Agami Nirbachon Hoba Bangladesher Shonga Europer Shomporko Nidharok (Ittefaq – May 9, 2006); Sadeq Khan – Civilian coup being masterminded by Indo-European quarters (Holiday – May 12, 2006); Mahendra Ved – US taking keen interest in Bangladesh’s ‘dance of democracy’ (DailyIndia.com – June 19, 2006); Editorial – Diplomats should express their views through proper channel (Holiday – June 23, 2006)

I may now include the Tipaimukh Dam to the long series of insults and devious underhand tactics that India has resorted to in its relations with Bangladesh. Staff Correspondent – Tipaimukh Dam to cause disastrous effect on environment (The Daily Star – June 6, 2006); Sanat Muckerjee - Anti-Tipaimukh agitation reaches New Delhi (The Independent – June 7, 2006). Also see Shiabur Rahman – Bitter disputes with India, Myanmar feared (April 21, 2006); Lailufar Yasmin – Bangladesh-India Tussles (South Asian Journal – July/September 2004); Khaled Ahmed – South Asia’s unresolved Disputes (South Asian Journal - January/March 2005); Syed Shahid Husain – India’s River Linking Plans (South Asian Journal – January/March 2005); Medha Patkar – River Linking – A Millennium Folly? (NAPM – 2004); Khaled Ahmed – Hindrances to Cooperation (South Asian Journal – August/September 2004); Ikram Sehgal - Reverse Swing (Probe Magazine – Volume 4 Issue 43 April 21-27, 2006); Staff Correspondent - Murder of Bangladeshis by BSF goes on unabated (New Age – May 10, 2006); Brig. Gen. Shahedul Anam Khan - Managing Our Borders (The Daily Star – May 11, 2006); Editorial – For an environment treaty (The New Nation – May 25, 2006); Sudha Ramachandran – India Bangladesh fight against the current (Asia Times – June 8, 2006)
Sadeq Khan – ‘BD can’t slacken alert in diplomatic and security fronts’ in Holiday December 13, 2002; See also ‘India is causing trouble’ by Philip Bowring – International Herald Tribune Wednesday, January 22, 2003); Praful Bidwai ‘Grave crisis in South Asian ties: Neighbours as enemies.’ The Daily Star: February 17, 2003; Sheela Bhatt - ISI now outsources terror to Bangladesh (Rediff.com March 21 2006); Pramod Kumar Singh - Bangla terror to top talks with Khaleda (India Monitor March 14 2006); Chris Blackburn - The Threat of Bangladesh (FrontPage Magazine March 13 2006); Wilson John - Contours of a new terror matrix (The Pioneer March 26, 2006); Sadeq Khan – Attitudinal change in India, but same mindset in RAW (Holiday – April 14, 2006)

Mohammed Zainal Abedin - Sheikh Hasina's trip to India: Religious or Political? (September 29 2005))

UNB – Hasina to receive Mother Teresa Award on June 24 (The Daily Star 0 June 5, 2006); Paritosh Paul – Missionaries of Charity disclaim Mother Teresa award (PROBE News Magazine – June 17, 2006)

DS Correspondent – Ties with neighbours should not be an issue of domestic politics (The Daily Star – June 23, 2006); Staff Reporter – Hasina’s Delhi visit raises questions (The New Nation – June 23, 2006); Staff Correspondent – Hasina won’t receive award in Kolkata (The Daily Star – June 24, 2006); UNB – Hasina not to attend Mother Teresa Award ceremony (New Age – June 24, 2006); Pallab Battacharya – Hasina holds talks with Sonia, Pranab (The Daily Star – June 24, 2006); UNB – Hasina talks bilateral issues with Indian leaders (New Age – June 24, 2006)

See Part 1 of this essay

Arnaud de Borchgrave – Cry for me, Bangladesh (Washington Times February 18, 2006); See also Geoffrey York – To leaders of Bangladesh, terrorism is a foreign worry (The Globe and Mail - March 29, 2006); Arvind Adiga – A Democracy is Shaken (Time Magazine – August 30, 2004); Alex Perry – Reigning in the Radicals (February 28, 2005); Aravind Adiga – State of Disgrace (April 5, 2004); Swati Parashar – Engage Bangladesh before it is too late (April 4, 2006)

ISN – Bangladesh militants sentenced to death (ISN Security Watch - May 29, 2006); Anisur Rahman Swapon – 7 top JMB leaders to die for killing judges (New Age – May 30, 2006); DS Correspondent – 7 JMB linchpins handed death in Jhalakathi (The Daily Star – May 30, 2006)

Sheikh Mohammed Belal - Bangladesh strikes back (Washington Times March 5, 2006); Zainul Abedin – Fake stories of illegal intrusion of the Bangladeshis in Assam (NFB – June 6, 2005); Staff Correspondent – ‘No evidence on Bangladeshis’ involvement in terrorism’ (New Age – August 14, 2005); Mohammed Zainul Abedin – ‘Unholy designs to harm Bangladesh using Islamic militancy as pretext’ (Watchbd.com – March 14, 2005); Sadeq Khan – Attitudinal change in India, but same mindset in RAW (Holiday – April 14, 2006); Najibur Rahman – Afghanistan Hoba Kano (Daily JaiJaiDin – June 9, 2006). Similarly, in response to several highly motivated new reports that emanated during 2004 and 2005 on the trepidations of the JMB and Islamic militancy in Bangladesh I have written several articles including 1. ‘Freethinkers Regularly Silenced in Bangladesh; 2. Islamic Militancy – The Likely Reaction to Indian Domination; 3. The Next Islamist Revolution – The Unlucky Candidate; 4. Motivated Journalism and International Intrigue – The Story of Sheikh Abdur Rahman and the JMB; and 5. ‘Interrogation of an Islamic Militant’. All these articles I think provide a consistent thread starting from the second edition of this article written in 2003 up to the present.

Lawrence S. Wittner - Gandhi, Bush, and the Bomb (History News Network February 27, 2006); Sharon Squassoni – India’s Nuclear Separation Plan: Issues and Views (CRS Report for Congress March 3, 2006); Leonard Weiss – A high-stakes nuclear gamble (LA Times December 30, 2005); Rajan Menon - A nuclear deal, warts and all (LA Times March 7, 2006); David Shelby - U.S. Seeks To Bring India into Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime (US Department of State – 22 March 2006); Doug Lorimer - US Nuclear Hypocrisy (Green Left Weekly – March 23, 2006); Ajey Lele - Nuclear Indulgence to India: Will US Congress Relent? (IPCS – 22 March 2006); Editorial – The Indian Nuclear Deal (New York Times – April 7, 2006); SMH Bokhari – The glitch in the Indo-US deal (The News International – April 10, 2006); George Perkovich – A Realist Case for Conditioning the US-India Nuclear Deal (Carnegie Endowment – May 15, 2005)

U.S.-India nuclear deal to affect stability in South Asia: Pakistan (Xinhua Online – March 23, 2006); US-India nuclear deal to lead region to destabilization: Pak (PakTribune – March 24, 2006); Pakistan wants US to match India nuclear deal (Forbes.com – March 2, 2006); Shireen M Mazari - The Bush visit: premature euphoria (The News International March 1, 2006); Sherry Rehman - A new South Asian order in the making (Dawn - March 9, 2006) Simon Cameron-Moore - ANALYSIS - U.S.-India ties play on Pakistani insecurities (Reuters – March 7, 2006); Diplomatic Correspondent – Separate civil, nuclear facilities, says Burton (The Hindu March 1, 2006); Jawed Naqvi - No Compromise on N-Strike Ability: India (Dawn – February 28, 2006); Sharbani Banerji - Against the Indo-US Nuclear Deal (ZNet – March 21 2006); David Krieger – India, Iran and US Hypocrisy (National Catholic Reporter – March 24, 2006); M.P. Bhandara – Breaking the ‘hyphen’ (Dawn – April 2, 2006); Sandeep Pandey – An ominous deal (The News International – April 2, 2006); Masood Haider – Aziz reiterates call for civilian nuclear package (Dawn – April 6, 2006); Editorial – Minimum Deterrence (The News International – April 6, 2006); Barhanuddin Hasan – Realiging Relationships (The News International - April 6, 2006); Staff Reporter – Concern expressed at Indo-US nuclear deal: Deterrence satisfactory: NCA (Dawn – April 13 2006); Ahmed Rashid – US-Pakistani relations in downward spiral (ISN – May 18, 2006)

Dan Robinson – Opponents of US-India Nuclear Deal Urge Bush to Reconsider (GlobalSecurity.Org 27 February 2006); Jagpreet Luthra - Doubts dog US-India nuclear deal (Al Jazeera March 25, 2006); Jim Lobe - Nuclear pact with India seen as surrender (The News International – March 8, 2006); Editorial: Bush's India deal a backward step (Toronto Star March 7, 2006); Thomas L. Friedman – Letting India in the Club? (New York Times March 8, 2006); Editorial - Nuclear apartheid (March 23, 2006); Fred Kaplan – The Presidents Indian Fantasy (Slate – March 1, 2006); Jimmy Carter – America’s dangerous deal with India (gulfnews.com – April 2, 2006); Richard Haass – India, Iran and the case for double standards (Taipei Times – May 16, 2006); Michael A Levi & Charles D. Ferguson – US–India Nuclear Cooperation (Council on Foreign Relations – June 16, 2006); Paul Richter – Bush’s India Plans at Risk (LA Times – June 2, 2006); Khalid Hasan – ‘US-India nuclear deal will result in pressure on Israel’ (Daily Times – June 18, 2006)

Sharon Squassoni – India’s Nuclear Separation Plan: Issues and Views (CRS Report for Congress March 3, 2006); Esther Pan – The US-India Nuclear Deal (Council on Foreign Relations – Updated 24 February 2006); Carnegie Endowment - Ashley J. Tellis: Key Figure in the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal; People Behind the Deal (Times of India, March 3, 2006); Those Who Made the Deal Happen (Indian Express, March 4, 2006); All the PM's Men (Hindustan Times, March 5, 2006); Michael A Levi & Charles D. Ferguson – US–India Nuclear Cooperation (Council on Foreign Relations – June 16, 2006)

Leonard Weiss – A high-stakes nuclear gamble (LA Times December 30, 2005); Gary Thomas – India’s Nuclear Deal (Voice of America March 10, 2006); Commentary – The Credibility Question (News Insight 28 February 2006); Special Correspondent - FBTR, PFBR to be outside safeguards (The Hindu March 8, 2006); Esther Pan – The US-India Nuclear Deal (Council on Foreign Relations – Updated 24 February 2006); Robert J. Einhorn – US-India nuclear deal falls short (San Francisco Chronicle – March 17, 2006); KS Manjunath & L Venkateshwaran - Separation Plan of Civilian and Military Nuclear Facilities: Next Steps (IPCS – April 3, 2006); The Times of India – ‘India can make 50 nuke war heads a year’ (June 18, 2006); Ashley J. Tellis – Atoms for War: U.S. Indian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and India’s Nuclear Arsenal (Carnegie Endowment Report – June 26, 2006)

Michael A Levi & Charles D. Ferguson pg. 4

K Subrahmanyam - N-deal: Boon for India, US, world (Rediff.com March 9, 2006); Kushal Jeena – Analysis: Impact of Bush’s India Visit (United Press International – March 24, 2006); Dr. Subhash Kapila - Unite States: President Bush’s Visit to India (2006) Reviewed (SAAG – March 3, 2006); Khalid Hassan – Indian-American community lobbying hard for nuclear deal (April 10, 2006); Kaushik Kapisthalam – India’s Nuclear Quest Down Under (Asia Times – April 20, 2006); UNI – IAEA chief in favour of Indo-US nuke deal (Hindustan Times – May 25, 2006)

Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin – The Mitrokhin Archives II (2005)

Esther Pan – The US-India Nuclear Deal (Council on Foreign Relations – Updated 24 February 2006); Power and Interest News Report - ''Intelligence Brief: U.S.-India Nuclear Deal'' (7 March 2006); David Frum – Our Friends in New Delhi (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research – March 7, 2006); K Subrahmanyam - N-deal: Boon for India, US, world (Rediff.com March 9, 2006); Leonard Weiss – A high-stakes nuclear gamble (LA Times December 30, 2005); Rajan Menon - A nuclear deal, warts and all (LA Times March 7, 2006); Gary Thomas – India’s Nuclear Deal (Voice of America March 10, 2006); Xinhua - Strategic gains at heart of Bush South Asia trip (March 7, 2006); Seema Sridhar – Musharraf’s Visit to China: Strengthening Strategic Alliance (Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies – February 27, 2006); D.S. Rajan - China: Future directions of US relations with India and Pakistan (SAAG – February 28, 2006); Manjeet Singh Pardesi – Deducing India’s Grand Strategy of Regional Hegemony from Historical and Conceptual Perspectives (Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies – April 2005) pg. 31; Alex Perry – Why Bush is Courting India? (Time – March 27, 2006); Tayyab Siddiqui – The Emerging Profile of India (Dawn Editorial – April 1, 2006); Rukmini Gupta – China and Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Deal: Another Perspective (IPCS March 31, 2006); Talat Masood – Implications of N-Deal with India (Dawn April 4, 2006); David Culp and Aaron Scherb - Loose Nukes for India (TomPaine.com – April 5, 2006); IANS – Tit for tat: A Pakistan-China nuclear deal? (DNA World – April 10, 2006); Brig Gen Jahangir Kabir ndc, psc (Retd) - The Indo-US strategic alliance (The Daily Star – April 14, 2006); Barrister Harun ur Rashid - India's military acquisition and militarisation of the Indian Ocean ((The Daily Star – April 14, 2006); Chietigj Bajpaee – India held back by wall of instability (Asia Times – June 1, 2006); D.S. Rajan – China’s military modernization – Shift in India’s perceptions SAAG – June 1, 2006); Michael A Levi & Charles D. Ferguson – US–India Nuclear Cooperation (Council on Foreign Relations – June 16, 2006); Stephen Blank – SCO: Cracks behind the façade (ISN – June 22, 2006)

Praful Bidwai – A Global Bully as a Friend (Rediff.com – March 6, 2006); Ram Puniyani – US, India Alliance and Global Scenario (Countercurrents.org – April 1, 2006); US State Department – State's Boucher Hails Transformed U.S.-India Relations (April 7, 2006)

See Parts 1 and 2A and 2B of this article

Dr. Michael A. Weinstein - ''Washington's 2006 National Security Strategy Confirms a Policy Void'' (PINR – 22 March 2006); India Express - India invited to be a part of the United States Strategic Command (India Defence – March 28, 2006); AFP – India is a ‘singularly important’ foreign priority (March 22, 2006); BBC – India defends submarine purchase (21 March 2006); Najmuddin A. Shaikh - New turn in US-India ties (Dawn, 22 March 2006); Tayyab Siddiqui – The Emerging Profile of India (Dawn Editorial – April 1, 2006);

Harsh V. Pant - India-Israel Partnership: Convergence and Constraints (Middle East Review of International Affairs - Vol. 8, No. 4, Article 6 - December 2004); P.R. Kumaraswamy – Strategic Partnership between Israel and India (MERIA – Vol. 2 , No. 2 – May 1998); Efraim Inbar – The Indian Israeli entente (Orbis – Vol. 48, Issue 1, Winter 2004); Cucciniello & Mitra – India and Israel Move Closer Together (South Asia Monitor – Number 63, October 1, 2003); Mike Marqusee – India, Israel and the US (Znet - June 18, 2006)

I had predicted this alliance of interests between the US-India-Israel several years ago in my article, America’s Janus-Faced Strategy: An Opinion (December 25, 2001); Mike Marqusee – India, Israel and the US (Znet - June 18, 2006)

MV Kamath – What on earth is wrong with Muslims? (News Today – March 20, 2006); MV Kamath – Whither Indian Muslims? (News Today – April 3, 2006); Azim Khan – Gujarat: Four Years After the Genocide (Countercurrents.org – 25 February 2006); J.S. Bandukwala – Gujarat after four years (The Milli Gazette Online – 4 March 2006); Hari Kumar – In India, remains of a massacre revive tensions (New York Times – March 21, 2006); B. Raman – Al Qaeda, The IIF & Indian Muslims (SAAG – March 20, 2006); Amnesty International – India (Country Report 2004); David Mier-Levi - Why Bangladesh Matters (FrontPage Magazine – April 25,2006); Ajmer Singh – Gujarat emerging as a polarized state: Report (NDTV – June 4, 2006); Prof. Ram Puniyani – India UPA government after Gujarat carnage ( Holiday- June 9, 2006);

Reuters – Citing Safety Issue, Russia Offers India Uranium for Fuel (New York Times – March 15, 2006); Deepak Mahaaan – Russia Offers Nuclear Supplies to India (CNSNews.com – March 17, 2006); The Tribune (Chandigarh, India) - US has reservations on Russian fuel for India (March 17, 2006); Sudhakar – India rejects US objection to Russian fuel supply for Tarapur plant (newKerala.com – 15 March 2006)

US Lawmaker says - India's training of Iranian military could dampen nuclear deal (AFP Report – March 31, 2006); Few takers on Capitol Hill for India-US civil nuclear deal (DNA World – April 3, 2006); Seema Mustafa - Nuke deal in trouble, legislators in US may delay vote (The Asian Age – April 3, 2006); CNN – Rice downplays India’s Iran links (April 6, 2006); specific details of the agreement may also become a bone of contention: Anwar Iqbal – India must define minimum nuclear deterrence, insists US (Dawn – April 10, 2006); AFP - No compromise on weapons program in nuclear deal with Washington: India (April 10, 2006); Nasim Zehra – Indo-US deal not without amendments (The News International – April 10, 2006); Vijay Sakhuja - Iran Stirs India-US Waters (April 10, 2006); Reuters – Russia ignores US delivers nuclear fuel to India (April 25, 2006); Daily Star correspondent – India to join US-backed gas pipeline project (The Daily Star – May 20, 2006); S. Nihal Singh – Great chess games: Iran moves against West (New Age – May 20, 2006); Paul Richter – Bush’s India Plans at Risk (LA Times – June 2, 2006); Reuters – US lawmaker warns India over Iran nuclear stance (New Age – June 23, 2006)

AFP – Cheney warns Congress against delaying Indian nuclear deal (New Age – June 24, 2006)

Michael A Levi & Charles D. Ferguson pg. 3

Carol Giacomo – U.S., India try to rescue nuclear deal (Reuters – May 17, 2006); Khalid Hasan – US-India deal languishing on the hill (Daily Times – June 10, 2006)

Praful Bidwai – A Global Bully as a Friend (Rediff.com – March 6, 2006); Randeep Ramesh – Spinning a web for India (The Guardian – March 3, 2006); Amit Baruah – Unequal Partners? (The Hindu – March 2, 2006); Jai Singh – American and India: Friends … Sort of (March 1, 2006); Tayyab Siddiqui – The Emerging Profile of India (Dawn Editorial – April 1, 2006); Brahma Chelleney – Help from Elsewhere (Hindustan Times – April 14, 2006); Animesh Roul – Indo-US nuke deal in trouble in Congress (International Relations and Security Network (ISN) – April 21, 2006); Brahma Chellaney – India has sold its nuclear soul to the US (Rediff – April 27, 2006); Ikram Sehgal - Reverse Swing (Probe Magazine – Volume 4 Issue 43 April 21-27, 2006)

Daily Times – US to apply for SAARC observer status (April 02, 2006); It is unlikely that many within South Asia will gladly accept such a framework and may look for alternative security guarantees (The Pakistani Newspaper – Pakistan gets China’s support securing SCO’s membership: Mushahid (April 2, 2006)); It appears that the EC is also expressing an interest in attaining observer status at SAARC meetings (Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha – EC seeks SAARC observer status (New Age – April 4, 2006); Abdul Quader Chowdhury – Mutual cooperation can be beneficial (Holiday – June 9, 2006); Paul Richter – Bush’s India Plans at Risk (LA Times – June 2, 2006)

Michael A Levi & Charles D. Ferguson pg. 17; IANS – ‘US grooms India to annoy China, Pak (June 10, 2006); Barrister Harun ur Rashid – Future of Congress and BJP in Indian politics (Holiday – June 16, 2006); AFP – Cheney warns Congress against delaying Indian nuclear deal (New Age – June 24, 2006)

See George Perkovich - The U.S.-India Deal: Can An Asian Nuclear Build Up Be Avoided? (Carnegie Endowment – May 9, 2006); Manjeet Singh Pardesi – Deducing India’s Grand Strategy of Regional Hegemony from Historical and Conceptual Perspectives (Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies – April 2005) pg. 5

Stephen Blank – SCO: Cracks behind the façade (ISN – June 22, 2006); B. Raman – Shanghai Summit: Indian Misgivings (SAAG – June 23, 2006); D.S. Rajan – China’s military modernization – Shift in India’s perceptions SAAG – June 1, 2006); P.R. Kumaraswamy – The Shanghai Summit without Manmohan Singh (Asian Tribune – June 15, 2006); C. Raja Mohan – India’s New Foreign Policy Strategy (Carnegie Endowment – May 26, 2006); Tanvir Ahmed Khan - India, Pakistan and the Shanghai spirit (Daily Times – June 23, 2006); Sudha Ramachandran – India gives Shanghai the cold shoulder (Asia Times – June 23, 2006); John Chan – Shanghai summit: China and Russia strengthen bloc to counter the US in Asia (WSWS – June 23, 2006); B. Raman – India & China – See no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil (SAAG – June 23, 2006)

See also Shahidul Islam’s article, ‘India’s ‘push-in’ constitutes unprovoked aggression’ in Holiday February 7, 2003 issue; also in the same issue see Nurul Kabir’s, ‘India pursuing agenda at human cost’. Brig Gen Shamsuddin Ahmed – Rise of Islamic militancy in Bangladesh (The Daily Star – June 11, 2006). If the push-in attempts taking place on the Bangladesh border with India were to have occurred in Europe the world would have described it as ethnic cleansing and the media networks would be falling over themselves to investigate what is going on and report on it. As of March 2006, not much has been said or is likely to be said in the international media about the push in attempts which have now substantially decreased but could again be used as a policy of pressure.

Independent Magazine – 17 January 2003; See also Barrister Harun-ur-Rashids article, ‘India’s conduct towards Bangladesh is short-sighted’ in Holiday February 7, 2003 issue; Pankaj Mishra – ‘The Other Face of Fanaticism’ in Holiday February 21, 2003 issue

Ahmed Rashid – US-Pakistani relations in downward spiral (Eurasia Insight – May 17, 2006)

See also Muhammad Zamir – De we have a security policy for Bangladesh? (The Daily Star – June 24, 2006)

[akzaman]

THE INDIA DOCTRINE

PART 1

THE EMERGENCE OF INDIA AND
THE POLICY OF REUNIFICATION


“Whoso writes the history of his own
time must expect to be attacked for
everything he has said, and for everything
he has not said; but those little draw backs
should not discourage a man who loves truth
and liberty, expects nothing, fears nothing, asks nothing,
and limits his ambition to the cultivation of letters”
(Voltaire)

Introduction

India has made no official statement to the effect that it would pursue a policy seeking reunification or what in some knowledgeable and specialist circles have called an ‘Akhand-Bharat’ or a United India based on the pre-1947 borders that had constituted the area under the jurisdiction of the British Raj. According to some experts the concept of an Akhand Bharat may extend even further to the territorial limits corresponding to ancient Buddhist and Hindu empires that are now only reminisced about in modern Indian literature and in some historical and religious texts. Such a controversial policy for the implementation of an Akhand Bharat would certainly not be so explicitly stated or formulated in the same manner as was suggested by this author (in his previous remarks on the subject and which had been published in several articles written during 2000-2001). An Akhand Bharat nevertheless remains the basis for an unofficial Indian government policy towards its neighbours and this has been the case since 1947.

For all practical purposes what is being offered now is near enough in content to the author’s original proposition that many readers had found so incredulous and unbelievable. What had appeared so astonishing at the time was the reaction to a single paragraph in an article of 2001 where the author claimed that there was a concerted and planned domination and encroachment by India on its neighbours. The constant skirmishing between the BSF and BDR and the continuous killing of Bangladeshi civilians along the border area between India and Bangladesh is only a single instance of this aggressive expansionist policy which has shown no sign of abating and is an example of India’s non-acceptance of the realities of a post-1947 South Asia. This attitude has been particularly pronounced in the unrest in Nepal, Sri Lanka and in the Balochistan province of Pakistan in the first half of 2006 and the signs of a similar policy of destabilization was being felt in Bangladesh in the run up to the 2007 General Elections.

Two Nation Theory

It is unfortunate that so many people are still ignorant of the fact that India has never accepted the concept of the Two-Nation theory which resulted in the break up of India into two separate parts in 1947. It is well known that they employ stooges and quislings in all the countries of the sub-continent promoting the view that the Two Nations theory based on religion was a mistake. This author would agree with that assessment but not in an attempt to distract from India’s own fissiparous and centrifugal forces or in a cheap attempt to break up Pakistan further but to promote a more realistic evaluation and appraisal of India’s conduct to its neighbours which depends largely on the ideological imperatives of an Akhand Bharat.

Two quite extraordinary books revealing the lack of commonality between the two parts of Pakistan and the inherent cultural anomalies within East Pakistan sheds light on why a Two Nation Theory could not be a solution to Jinnah’s fear of Hindu domination. The whole notion of Two Nations based on religion was far too simplistic to begin with:

“If there were two religious ‘nations’ in India, there were many more cultural and linguistic ‘nations’. Certainly what was true of the U.P. Muslims was not so of their co-religionists in eastern India, notwithstanding the fact that they professed the same faith. The dominant culture of the former was based on the Mughal heritage with Urdu as its nucleus, while the latter were integrated more with the local Bengali culture than with any heritage of Muslim rule in India. The former looked upon Kurta and paijama as the proper dress for a Muslim, the latter wore a modest lungi, if not a dhoti like their Hindu neighbors; one looked upon Urdu as the appropriate language of Muslims in India, the latter hardly knew any word of it.”

The events of 1971 had substantially resolved this dichotomy but there still remains good reasons for minorities and Moslems in both Pakistan and Bangladesh to be apprehensive about current trends in India as the Congress Government and the Indian intelligence service (RAW) have taken a more hostile approach towards these countries which has involved creating unrest in Balochistan and violence in the industrial sectors of Bangladesh prior to the 2007 elections. These incidents have been further incited by the constant goading of the BJP and RSS that have taken on distinctly communal overtones which had been the original justification for the Muslim League’s demand for partition in 1947:

“…the growth of extreme Hindu nationalism with symbols repugnant to Muslims caused great uneasiness in their minds. A familiar idiom of nationalist Hindu militancy was the anti-Muslim rhetoric, which traced historically the Hindus fall from grace to the tyranny of the ‘alien’ rule. Muslims were contemptuously referred to as yavanas, melechchas, katchakholas and the like in the nationalist literature and exclusive Hindu symbols introduced as sources of Indian nationalism.”

In the authors opinion, it should not have been a Two-Nation theory but a ‘Several Nation Theory’ that could have been implemented in the 1947 partition program had there been the necessary will and foresight. That this would have been the far better solution to the communal and cultural divisions within India was subsequently shown in the several wars fought with Pakistan, the rise of Hindu fanaticism, the civil war in the Seven Sisters and the Indian governments brazen and obtrusive policy of domination and interference in the entire South Asian region that has been the cause of untold misery for the areas inhabitants.

It is unfortunate that from this perspective Viceroy Louis Mountbatten became so enamored with a unified India (or was it with Nehru’s idea and concept of India that must have been retold to him in their many private conversations together) that he failed to appreciate the autonomous tendencies within India itself, particularly in Kashmir and the Northeast region. It is likely that Mountbatten was unduly influenced by Jawaharlal Nehru since there is evidence that he had seriously considered a ‘Three Nation Theory’ that was originally cited in Collins and Lapierre – Freedom at Midnight (1982) but later conveniently forgotten or deliberately ignored by historians of both Pakistan and India,

“If the implications in the plan that [Mountbatten] had sent to London were fully realized, the great Indian subcontinent would be divided into three independent nations, not two. Mountbatten had inserted in his plan a clause that would allow the sixty-five million Hindus and Moslems of Bengal to join into one viable country, with the great seaport of Calcutta as their capital.

A sudden inspiration struck Mountbatten. He would reassure himself privately, informally, with the Indian leader, whom to the distress of his staff, he had invited to vacation with him in Simla … To show the plan to Nehru without exposing it to Jinnah would be a complete breech of faith with the Moslem leader. If he discovered it, Mountbatten’s whole position would be destroyed.

That night, Mountbatten invited Nehru to his study for a glass of port. Casually, he passed the Congress leader a copy of the plan. Jawaharlal Nehru began to scrutinize the text designed to chart his country’s future. He was horrified by what he read. The vision of the India that emerged from the plan’s pages was a nightmare, an India divided, not into two parts but fragmented into a dozen pieces … The plan he believed, would exacerbate all India’s fissiparous tendencies of dialect, culture and race to the point at which the subcontinent would risk exploding into a mosaic of weak hostile states.”

The consequences of this original Mountbatten plan of May 1947 would have seen the creation of another independent nation state separate from the Pakistan and Indian entities which might have been called the United States of Bengal or even Bangladesh. It would certainly have been unacceptable to both Mohammed Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League who would then have had difficulty in justifying a unified Pakistan if the plan had actually been put forward. This was also a concern shared by Jawaharlal Nehru whose real fear was that if the idea had gained ground other regions of India would clamour for separation on ethnic or religious grounds without the option of reuniting them later on into an Akhand Bharat with a strong Indian centre. If the May 1947 plan had in fact come to fruition and if contrary to Nehru’s predictions there was no further fragmentation of India the post-1947 Congress government would probably have invaded the new Bengal state not allowing it to survive beyond its first few months. This would have brought the Muslims of ‘East Bengal’ into the Indian Union and to an even worse fate than befell them within a moth eaten Pakistan but without the possibility of independence.

A far better solution which oddly did not present itself to Mountbatten was to have formed a loose Confederation of Bengal States separate, distinct and independent from India (similar to what was envisaged in the 1905 division of Bengal) which would have been a viable entity since the Seven Sisters have no real affinity to India as recent autonomy demands have suggested. Nevertheless, many commentators in Bangladesh are now saying a similar thing concerning the unity of Bengal states but the difference is that according to their vision if put into effect, Bangladesh would merely become another province within the India Union with limited autonomy if any at all.

However, this is not the subject of this present section but the question of a unified Bengal or an Akhand Bangla will be taken up in Parts 3 and 5 of this essay. It is India’s territorial and hegemonic ambitions that will be the subject of this part which will be further developed in part 2 where India’s intentions behind the military assistance it provided to East Pakistan in 1971 will be viewed from an international perspective. The remainder of the essay (parts 3-5) will be concerned with specific instances of Indian interference in Bangladesh that will involve an extensive and detailed survey of our history from 1947 to the present.

Jawaharlal Nehru – India’s ideologue

As it is impossible to understand Hitler’s Germany without reading Mein Kampf, the same applies to India in reference to Jawaharlal Nehru’s compositions and publications. This is, however, not an attempt at a comparison between these two men and their policies or outlook which differs in many fundamental respects but merely the offering of an illustration for ease of understanding - although the past BJP government would suitably fit such a comparison with Nazi Germany. On the other hand, it would not be an exaggeration to compare the ideological assumptions and imperatives of the Congress government and the Bush administration as they now have many shared interests with the nuclear deal and both have an affinity with neo-conservatism, political elitism and imperial expansionism driven by economic necessity.

Returning now to the question of India’s Foreign Policy objectives and designs. These matters were in embryonic form in Jawaharlal Nehru’s, ‘The Discovery of India’ (First edition-1946) from which I now quote at length:

“If India is split up into two or more parts and can no longer function as a political and economic unit, her progress will be seriously affected. The much worse will be the inner psychological conflict between those who wish to reunite her and those who oppose this … Unity is always better than disunity, but an enforced unity is a sham and dangerous affair, full of explosive possibilities. Unity must be of the mind and heart, a sense of the belonging together and of facing together those who attack it. I am convinced that there is that basic unity in India, but it has been overlaid and hidden to some extent by other forces. These latter may be temporary and artificial and may pass off, but they count today and no man can ignore them…Yet the fact remains that considerable numbers of Moslems have become sentimentally attached to this idea of separation without giving thought to its consequences … I think this sentiment has been artificially created and has no roots in the Moslem mind … It may be that some division of India is enforced, with some tenuous bond joining the divided parts. Even if this happens, I am convinced that the basic feeling of unity and world developments will later bring the divided parts nearer to each other and result in a real unity. It is obvious that whatever may be the future of India, and even if there is a regular partition, the different parts will have to co-operate with each other and in a hundred different ways. Even independent nations have to co-operate with each other and must hang together or deteriorate, disintegrate and loose their freedom…

Thus we arrive at the inevitable and ineluctable conclusion that, whether Pakistan comes or not, a number of important and basic functions of the state must be exercised on all-India basis if India is to survive as a free state and progress. The alternative is stagnation, decay and disintegration, leading to a loss of political and economic freedom, both for India as a whole and its various separated parts. As has been said by an eminent authority: ‘The inexorable logic of the age presents the country with radically different alternatives: union plus independence or disunion plus dependence.’ … There is grave danger in a possibility of partition and division to begin with. For such an attempt might well scotch the very beginnings of freedom and the formation of a free national state … Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of any free state emerging from such a turmoil, and if something does emerge, it will be a pitiful caricature full of contradictions and insoluble problems.”

This is the program for an Akhand Bharat which has been the central foreign policy goal of all the Indian political administrations since 1947 and remains the primary theme in relations with its neighbours in South Asia. The primary drawback to the whole United India agenda as formulated by Jawaharlal Nehru is the fact that ‘a state called India never existed before August 15, 1947, when British colonial rule ended in the subcontinent’. This reality has, nevertheless, not prevented Indian policy makers since the time of partition to recreate the concept of an Akhand Bharat to fit their ‘Grand Strategy’ for the South Asian region which views the divisions of 1947 as an aberration in their mythologized view of the historical past.

Historical Intentions

India’s views on partition have not fundamentally diverged from the original standpoint and impression of a united India but may have become even more extreme in recent decades. Jawaharlal Nehru, was the Prime Minister of India from 1947-1964, having tremendous and pervasive influence and clout on subsequent generations of foreign policy makers in that country. This is an observation that is unlikely to be questioned or open to contradiction nor is it a particularly contentious observation in view of the continuation of his political dynasty through his daughter, grandson and great-grand-children who have all worked along the same lines within the Congress party.

These expressions of Prime Minister Nehru have also translated into action in attempts to enfeeble and demoralize its neighbors. Take for example, India’s and Pakistan’s agreement on the division of financial and material assets of the British Raj. Pakistan had already received 200 million rupees as advance and was to receive a further additional 550 million rupees as balance of her share. The Indians argued that the money would be used to purchase arms to kill Indian soldiers, so India refused to pay the sum until the Kashmir problem was resolved. Consequently, a cheque issued by the Pakistan Government to the British Overseas Airways Corporation bounced because of insufficient funds. This policy was sponsored by Sardar Patel and was endorsed by Jawaharlal Nehru and the whole cabinet although Mountbatten had gone to great lengths to finalize this comprehensive ‘package deal’. Mountbatten described India’s conduct as ‘unstatesmanlike’, ‘unwise’ and ‘dishonourable’. The money was finally released to Pakistan after intervention of Mahatma Gandhi when he threatened to fast until death if India did not take the honourable course.

India’s attitude to partition and Pakistan was highlighted by Pandit Nehru’s daughter Indira Gandhi at a public meeting on November 30, 1970 where she stated, “India has never reconciled with the existence of Pakistan. Indian leaders always believed that Pakistan should not have been created and that Pakistan nation has no right to exist.” This by implication would include Bangladesh though no one in this country would admit it in so many words. India’s role in the 1971 war was naturally, therefore, an extension of its own policy considerations and ideological compulsions based on the idea of an Akhand Bharat:

“India’s support for Bangladesh basically emanated from its negative approach towards Pakistan. For political, historical, and economic reasons, it was India’s natural desire to see that her rival power structure in the subcontinent is weakened. It was not so much love for democracy or sense of brotherhood for the people of Bangladesh that Indira Gandhi decided to support the Bengalis in their war to achieve independence. The then Government of India acted on its own calculations in order to achieve its own national and international objectives. Once India got involved she became greatly interested in seeing the struggle the Bengalis remain in its complete control. The Indian Government wanted to ensure that following the removal of the west Pakistani authority and effective government of its own liking was established in Bangladesh.”

The extent to which the Indian government was prepared to go to achieve this and the efforts it would employ will become apparent in Parts 3-5 of this essay that deals with the relevant period from a national perspective.
The Nehru Doctrine and India’s Forward Policy
The big brotherly attitude of India which the above narrative provides only a tiny glimpse in relation to the events in 1971 and which other nations in South Asia have also found overbearing and an irritant is a predictable culmination of the thinking of Pandit Nehru and India’s Forward Policy. An example of this Forward Policy, not surprisingly, is found in what has been called the Nehru Doctrine. Its focus has been directed at Nepal but has meaning and resonance for all of India’s neighbours. Pandit Nehru on 17th March, 1950 in Parliament expressed it thus, "apart from any kind of alliance the fact remains that we can’t tolerate any foreign invasion from any foreign country in any part of the Indian sub-continent. Any possible invasion of Nepal will inevitably involve the safety of India."

As was witnessed over the first several months of 2006 the political turmoil in both Nepal and Sri Lanka may indicate that India has given a very wide meaning and interpretation to the term invasion. It would seem that in an exaggerated sense of its own vulnerability India is prepared to actively intervene at the slightest intimation of foreign interest in a neighbouring country – in both the Nepal and Sri Lankan case the Chinese (and to a lesser extent the Americans) were making impressive and enormous strides in fostering relations with these countries which was in turn making the Indian government increasingly anxious about its now diminished military and strategic supremacy in South Asia in the face of a formidable and far more popular competitor(s) – this is strangely the consequences of what has been called the Gujral Doctrine but for most nations in the region it is merely an extension of the Nehru Doctrine - as was the case with the Indira Doctrine - framed in diplomatic niceties.

To provide a more specific and contextual setting to the Nehru Doctrine one may compare the situation in Nepal during early 2006 with a parallel scenario that occurred in Sikkim in 1973-75 and which is still probably the best exemplar of the Nehru Doctrine in practice. The political turmoil in Nepal bears a marked resemblance to the sequence of events in the Sikkim incident which saw the abolishment of the monarchy in that country through the indirect intervention of the Indian government. In the similar case of King Gayenendra of Nepal his defiant attitude to India and the dissolution of Parliament and proclamation of a State of Emergency twice, led to street protests in Katmandu and his eventual deposing from power.

This series of events in Nepal had been in large part due to the successful interjection of the Indian government that had maintained contacts with the pro-democratic forces as well as the Maoist insurgents and was therefore able to exert pressure for the Kings removal. India will now probably expect Nepali politics, ‘to function as that of a union territory in all but formal status’ thus severely curtailing the country’s sovereign rights and independent decision making processes. This had been the exact outcome in Sikkim but the trigger for India’s intercession there was a belief that the Chogyal (Dharma Raja or righteous king) was intending to set up an independent kingdom with a flag of its own and a separate national anthem which would have been in contravention of an understanding between the Indian government and a Sikkim delegation that agreed to designate the country a protectorate of India in March 1950 but which had no binding force and could be amended by either of the parties unilaterally.

The Indians claim to have had evidence that the CIA was encouraging the Chogyal to seek independence so they instructed their own external intelligence agency RAW to stir up trouble. It seems likely that RAW concocted a plot implicating the Chogyal in a conspiracy to assassinate top leaders and civil servants which galvanized the population against their ruler and brought public resentment out on to the streets. This became a perfect cover for the Indian army to intervene in April 1973 on the grounds that it was protecting the Chogyal. The army was really brought in to intimidate the Chogyal into submission which he promptly did by agreeing to popular government and a legislature to be elected every four years and on April 10th the Sikkim Assembly was able to say that, “the institution of Chogyal is hereby abolished and Sikkim shall henceforth be a constituent unit of India.” India’s justification was superficially based on the idea of democracy and human rights but its true motivations were derived from the precepts of the Nehru Doctrine and the Forward Policy which was brought into play by the perceived US interest in Sikkim,

“India could least afford an unstable Sikkim or allow interference of any foreign country in Sikkim affairs … It was also obvious that an unstable neighbour would become a grave threat to India’s national security … [So in] response to [the Sikkim Assembly] resolution, the Constitution (Thirty-Eighth Amendment] Act was passed by Parliament, making Sikkim the 22nd State of the Indain Union on April 26, 1975. RAW had helped in the bloodless transformation of a princely state into a democratic state of India. How far the Chogyal had personally masterminded the plot, to annihilate popular leaders and assume absolute power over Sikkim, remains a mystery.

Four years later, RAW was still moping up loose ends. There were still a few people who had to be paid off for services rendered. Payments had been delayed … Fresh authority for funds to be released had to be sanctioned. These never came through.”
One may also recall India’s strong opposition to any military pact between the United States and Bangladesh during the BJP administration as well as recent suspicions about Bangladesh’s growing relations with China. The doctrine may, therefore, be said to encompass the preventing of any alliances which could necessarily be construed as a threat to India’s supremacy in the region which it is prepared to defend jealously through the force of arms but more often by internal pressures such as sabotage and state sponsored terrorism. From these few examples given above it should be clear that the Nehru Doctrine flagrantly infringes upon the independent sovereign rights of nations and interferes in their internal decision making processes. If control is not de jure, it is certainly de facto but this has not prevented India from binding its neighbours to legal agreements and instruments that subvert the sovereignty of the weaker and smaller nations who are usually forced to acquiesce.

India will, therefore, continue to assign the right to interpret the word ‘invasions’ according to its own wisdom and thought processes regardless of international opinion which can be so easily manipulated through the press and media. As was observed by Secretary of State Kissinger, "I did not find in Indian history or in Indian conduct towards its own people or its neighbours a unique moral sensitivity." This judgment coming from a man who oversaw American policy during the Vietnam War and has been accused of a fair amount of moral insensitivity himself but this should not be taken as hypocrisy but the insight of a statesman whose views are not tainted by illusions and sentimentality and which offers the reader a clearer analysis on Indian ambitions in the subcontinent.

Much closer to home, the Forward Policy and the Nehru Doctrine were at play during the Liberation War of 1971, as explained by Secretary of State Kissinger, "Despite Yahya’s proclamation of an amnesty India made the return of refugees to East Pakistan depend on a political settlement there. But India reserved the right to define what constituted an acceptable political settlement on the sovereign territory of its neighbour." There is no reason to assume that this policy has fundamentally changed over the last 35 years even with the absence of the Congress party from government which could have provided an opportunity for other parties to change the nation’s foreign policy direction but this rarely ever happened in practice.
It might be confidently stated that under all previous governments in India the attitude of the political and intelligence elite has been consistently the same and with only the methods changing according to circumstances and particular political inclinations. The political and religious forms that this may take in the future was demonstrated by the strongest proponents of the Akhand Bharat ideal (and may well have been applauded by Nehru had he been alive to see their fanatical zeal for his vision) in a commentary for the Hindu magazine in 2005 where it states,

“The RSS has never reconciled to Partition and has always been a proponent of the ideal of Akhand Bharat (unified India), which would also be a Hindu Rashtra (Hindu Nation). The only "common enemy" that the RSS has ever recognised is Pakistan and Islam. The rejection of Partition was clearly spelt out by the founding fathers of the RSS. In his ‘Bunch of Thoughts’, Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar says: "Our leaders who were a party to the creation of Pakistan may try to whitewash the tragedy by saying that it was a brotherly division of the country and so on. But the naked fact remains that an aggressive Muslim State has been carved out of our own motherland. From the day the so-called Pakistan came into being, we in the Sangh have been declaring that it is a clear case of continued Muslim aggression." Elsewhere in the book, Golwalkar calls Pakistan a "self-declared theocratic Islamic State".

The clearest statement against recognising Pakistan as a sovereign nation comes from a statement issued by the RSS in 1965, which states: "So long as Pakistan exists as at present, she will continue to be hostile and aggressive towards Bharat. Pakistan was born in hatred of Bharat. It was carved out artificially by disrupting the natural, national integrity of Bharat. The K.K.M (Kendriya Karyakari Mandal or central working committee) is, therefore, of the firm opinion that peace and normalcy are inconceivable without the establishment of Akhand Bharat."”

Some may argue that the RSS and Sangh Parivar were a mere aberration in Indian politics that did not substantially vitiate the secular ideals of the constitution. This is probably missing the point as the concept of Akhand Bharat has been a mainstay of Indian political culture since 1947 but has never been so explicitly stated in intellectual discourse inside India or elsewhere in South Asia. Instead the concept has been camouflaged by policy prescriptions such as the Forward Policy discussed in this section or under the guise of military tactics and operations such as occurred in Baraibari, Roumari upazila, Sylhet on April 18, 2001 which led to an uprising by ordinary villagers in Bangladesh against the intruders. Unfortunately the brave BDR personnel that lost their lives in this confrontation have never been properly honoured for their sacrifice.

Akhand Bharat and the Implications for Bangladesh
In light of the above discussion Bangladesh’s suspicion of India can appear only natural and healthy reflecting an instinctive will to survive. Historical evidence has shown that India did not have Bangladesh’s best interests in mind after 1971 and if given half the chance would probably have tried to strangle the new nation at birth. It was only for the international condemnation, criticism and the likelihood of sanctions being imposed that dissuaded India from taking such an overtly aggressive course. But as shall be seen in Parts 2 to 5 of this essay the policy of undermining Bangladesh has continued without respite since 1971. The vision of an Akhand Bharat has remained a significant component of India’s foreign policy objectives in the South Asia region and is reflected in its treatment of its near neighbours and Bangladesh has been particularly affected by this attitude.

The Bangladesh-India relationship from 1971 onwards can be most appropriately described as somewhat akin to absentee landlordism especially when the Awami League has taken occupation as the democratically elected tenants with extensive support and lobbying by New Delhi. Any of the other political parties coming to power in Bangladesh are considered mere squatters by India and are therefore in adverse possession of what our large neighbour views as their personal real estate. It is in this perspective of an improvised and imagined Akhand Bharat that we should interpret the comments, in an otherwise, fulsome description of Indo-Bangladesh relations provided by Indian External Affairs Secretary Rajiv Sikri,
“Bangladesh is the most important neighbour and regional partner for India. In fact, I would say Bangladesh is special and unique for India because the Indian state of West Bengal, Bangladesh and the northeastern region of India had historically constituted an integrated space.”

This is, of course, is a complete misrepresentation of the history and culture of the region which was originally expressed by Mahatma Gandhi who believed that the two Bengal’s possessed a common culture as embodied in the writings of Rabindranath Tagore and has its roots in the philosophy of the Upanishads which was also, according to him, common to the whole of India. This is again another subtle expression of the Akhand Bharat that propagates the myth of a homogeneous and culturally unified ‘Mother’ India. Although there may be many similarities between Bengali Hindus and Bengali Muslims in respect of ‘customs, habits, dress and food but as far as culture is concerned when the Muslims gave up idolatry and accepted Islam as a philosophy of life’ they disassociated themselves from all cultural aspects based on Hindu idol worship and the Upanishads.

Apart from these religious or cultural differences there are many other good academic and theoretical reasons why nations that share borders with India should be wary of its ideological intent especially when there have already been overt acts of encroachment as has happened in the Talpatty islands and most recently in the Bay of Bengal where India unilaterally included 19, 000 sq km of Bangladesh territory within its own bidding blocks for proposed international gas exploration. The purpose and motivation behind such activities has been explained by a German mercantilist writer, von Hornigk, who observed that, "Whether a nation be mighty today and rich or not depends not on the abundance or security of its power and riches, but principally on whether its neighbours have more or less of it."

This acquisitiveness when wedded to the concept of an Akhand Bharat necessarily entails a beggar thy neighbour attitude which India has striven to achieve throughout the 35 years of Bangladesh’s independence from Pakistan and which was viewed by New Delhi as simplifying the task of subverting the sovereignty of its new and callow neighbour in order to aggrandize itself at the latter’s expense. The consequence to Bangladesh of such economic imperialism and hegemonic designs can be found in the attempted destruction of the industrial and commercial infrastructure of the country and the damaging of trade relations with third countries that had started with the looting by Indian soldiers occupying Dhaka and other towns after the defeat of the Pakistan military forces in 1971.

This was also the actual motivation behind the appalling acts of carnage and waste witnessed in May 2006 when almost 300 garment factories and other unrelated industries came under attack from unidentified miscreants most likely in the payroll of India. An allegation predictably denied by some pro-Indian columnists writing in newspapers and magazines operating in Bangladesh who have consistently and loyally represented the interests and views of a foreign power that has since 1947 proven its inimical intentions towards the country. These incidents are the unfortunate consequences of the last Awami League government’s foreign policy objective of least resistance to India and the party’s attitude of servile obedience in its relations with New Delhi. This neatly complemented the domineering and exploitative tendencies of India’s political, intelligence and business elites and also allowed them the opportunity to infiltrate all sectors of Bangladesh society to carry out their nefarious activities even if their party of choice was defeated in national elections.

As a consequence it has become an unsatisfactory explanation to accord sole blame for this sorry state of affairs on the Indian government alone but to apportion some of the fault with the responsible and educated stratum of civil society for not being more judicious in their choice of leaders and also for their total lack of loyalty to the ideals of the liberation war. If the nation is incapable of competing because the conscious and educated segments of the citizenry prefer to be indolent, opportunistic or just simply too materialistic with hardly any feeling of patriotism then we can only expect that India will take advantage of this situation at its neighbours cost, as is the norm in international relations even amongst close and friendly States:

“... the power of a nation-state by no means consists only in its armed forces, but also in its economic and technological resources; in the dexterity, foresight and resolution with which its foreign policy is conducted; in the efficiency of its social and political organization. It consists most of all in the nation itself, the people; their skills, energy, ambition, discipline, initiative; their beliefs, myths and illusions. And it consists, further, in the way all these factors are related to one another. Moreover national power has to be considered not only in itself, in its absolute extent, but relative to the state's foreign or imperial obligations; it has to be considered relative to the power of other states."

What had not been evident when this essay was originally written as a short article for the internet in 2001 was that if Bangladesh even attempts at an independent foreign policy the Indian government would directly intervene military to bring the Bangladesh government into line. This explains the recent allegations of terrorist bases in Bangladesh which have been repeated in the international media but charges that still remain unproved and the ethnic cleansing taking place in West Bengal and bordering states against Muslims which is a possible ruse for military conflict if political circumstances in Bangladesh are not to India’s liking. Even with such hostile actions Bangladesh should resist such provocations and also persist in developing an independent thought process that can be utilized in the best interests of the nation.

END NOTES & REFERENCES

See Manjeet Singh Pardesi – Deducing India’s Grand Strategy of Regional Hegemony from Historical and Conceptual Perspectives (Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies – April 2005)

See Manjeet Singh Pardesi pg. 9

See Staff Correspondent – Murder of Bangladeshis by BSF goes on unabated: Odhikar (New Age – May 10, 2006); Asraful Huq – 387 Bangladeshis killed by BSF since 2000 (The Independent – June 1, 2006); UNB – BDR, BSF exchange heavy fire (The Independent – June 11, 2006); Amanur Aman – BSF kills 10 in ten days on southwestern border (The Daily Star – June 13, 2006); UNB- Gunfight with BDR in Satkhira: BSF among 3 Indian killed (The New Nation – June 13, 2006); UNB – 293 Bangladeshis killed by BSF since Oct 2001 (The Daily Star – June 15, 2006); Editorial – Unnecessary border tension (The New Nation – June 18, 2006); Star Report – Four Bangladeshis killed in BSF firing (The Daily Star – June 24, 2006); Staff Correspondent – BSF kills three Bangladeshis (New Age – June 24, 2006)

See Collins and Lapierre – Freedom at Midnight (1982); Arundhati Roy and Shoma Chaudhuri – ‘There is a Fury Building up Across India (The Hindu – April 29, 2006); Barrister Harun ur Rashid – Future of Congress and BJP in Indian politics (Holiday – June 16, 2006)

Rafiuddin Ahmed – “The Bengal Muslims 1871 – 1906 A Quest for Identity” (Second Edition 1988) Preface to the First Edition pg. x; see also Abdul Quader Chowdhury – Mutual cooperation can be beneficial (Holiday – May 26, 2006); Manjeet Singh Pardesi pg. 12

See RAW analysis in B. Raman – Chinese presence in Balochistan & northern areas (SAAG – May 24, 2006); see also Manjeet Singh Pardesi pg. 29

Rafiuddin Ahmed pg. 188; a must read is Muhammed Mohar Ali’s book, “History of the Muslims of Bengal (First Edition 1985); see also Rounaq Jahan – “Pakistan Failure in National Integration” (Second Impression 1977); Prof. K. Ali – “Bangladesh a New Nation”; Rick Fountain’s ‘Bangladesh War Secrets Revealed’ 1 January 2003)

Collins and Lapierre pp. 146-148

Khodeja Bejum – Historical illumination on attempts to create a United Bengal and Akhand Bharat (Dainik Ajkal Khobor – November 24, 2003): This is an excellent introduction into how India has made active attempts to reunite Bengal and thereby bring Bangladesh within the larger Indian union. It provides a detailed summation of most of the relevant events, documents and authorities that have engaged in this endeavor; Abu Al Sayeed – ShatCholisher Akhand Bangla Andalon: Purba Pakistan Theke Bangladesh (1999)

It is true that L.K. Advani had made it clear that the concept of ‘Akhand Bharat’ was no more justified he also added that in the changing situation between Pakistan and India there could be a possibility of India and Pakistan coming close enough to form a confederation. For this comment he was severely reprimanded by the Sangh Parivar and eventually had to resign his post as President of the BJP. It appears that with the retirement of Atal Bihari Vajpayee as leader of the BJP L.K. Advani has taken over that post and is now leader of the opposition. (Rediff.com – Concept of Akhand Bharat no more relevant: Advani (June 15, 2005); Ram Puniyani – Golwalker: Conceptualizing Hindutva fascism (Holiday – May 12, 2006)

Jawaharlal Nehru – The Discovery of India (Ninth Impression) pp. 526-536

Manjeet Singh Pardesi pg. 13

Collins and Lapierre - ‘Freedom at Midnight’ (1984 reprint); H.V. Hodson - ‘The Great Divide’ (First Published 1969); Stanley Wolpert – ‘Jinnah of Pakistan’ (Fourth Impression 1998); Prof. K. Ali – “Bangladesh a New Nation”; K.Z. Islam –‘Mountbatten’s India Bias’ – serialized in the weekly Holiday); see also Sadeq Khan – ‘Allusions and Realities’ – The weekly Holiday July 7, 2000)

‘India’s Nuclear Doctrine by Wing Comd. (Retd) Muhammed Irshid – defence journal - Oct 99; see also Henry Kissinger – ‘The White House Years’ (First Published 1979; Mohammed Tajammul Hussain – Bangladesh Victim of Black Propaganda Intrigue and Indian Hegemony (First Published May 1996); Rick Fountain’s ‘Bangladesh War Secrets Revealed’ 1 January 2003); Pallab Bhattacharya – ‘Indo-Bangladesh relations get a boost during Khaleda’s Delhi visit’ (The Daily Star – March 31, 2006)

Moudud Ahmed – “Bangladesh: Constitutional Quest for Autonomy” (Second Revised Edition 1991) pg. 251; Dr. Kalidas Baidya - Bangaleer Muktiyuddhe Antaraler Sheikh Mujib (2005); Ikram Sehgal - Reverse Swing (Probe Magazine – Volume 4 Issue 43 April 21-27, 2006)

Manjeet Singh Pardesi pg. 45

I.K. Gujral – Asian Security (South Asian Journal – August/September 2003); C Raja Mohan – Dangerous Neighbourhood (April 26, 2006); Satish Nambier – India’s Strategic Interest (South Asian Journal – January/March 2004); C Raja Mohan – Cooperative Security in South Asia (South Asian Journal – October/December 2004); Interim Report of the Jain Commission on the assassination of Shri Rajiv Gandhi (Vol. V-VIII – August 1997); I.P Khosla – Bangladesh-India Relations (South Asian Journal - January/March 2005); K.K. Katyal – India’s South Asian Neighbourhood – (South Asian Journal – August/September 2004); Sanjay Joshi – Colonial Notion of South Asia (South Asian Journal – August/September 2003); Manjeet Singh Pardesi – Deducing India’s Grand Strategy of Regional Hegemony from Historical and Conceptual Perspectives (Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies – April 2005); Dr. Geeta Madhavan – India’s Policies-Dithering Delhi (SAAG – April 28, 2006); B. Raman – Chinese presence in Balochistan & northern areas (SAAG – May 24, 2006); Bibhuti Bhusan Nandi – India’s insecurity I (The Statesman – May 20, 2006); Chietigj Bajpaee – India held back by wall of instability (Asia Times – June 1, 2006); Abdul Quader Chowdhury – Mutual cooperation can be beneficial part II (Holiday – June 2, 2006)

Kumaraswamy and Datta – India struggles to Negotiate a Settlement in Nepal (PINR – May 1, 2006); Prakash Nepali & Phanindra Subba – Civil Military Relations and the Maoist insurgency in Nepal (Small Wars and Insurgencies – Vol. 16. No. 1 March, 2005); Charles Haviland – Nepal the challenges ahead (BBC – June 16, 2006); Agencies – Maoists to join Nepal government (New Age – June 17, 2006); Reuters – Nepal rebel chief tells king to abdicate (New Age – June 17, 2006); Pratyush Chandra – Angels and demons in the people’s movement in Nepal (New Age – June 17, 2006); AFP – Nepal power-sharing deal with Maoists widely welcomed (New Age – June 18, 2006); Mahtab Haider – Nepal wakes up to a new dawn (New Age – June 19, 2006); Pratyush Chandra – The historic agreement in Nepal and the immediate challenge (Znet – June 19, 2006); Reuters – Peace deal set to dispel fears in rural Nepal (New Age – June 19, 2006); Rabindra Mishra – Prachanda-hero or villain? (BBC News – June 20, 2006); Dr. S. Chandrasekharan – Nepal: The Maoists have their way so far (SAAG – June 23, 2006); AFP – Nepal’s Maoist’s refuse to disarm (New Age – June 23, 2006); AFP – ‘India played key role in Nepal’ (New Age – June 24, 2006)

Dr. Thomas A. Marks – Nepal: Hope is not a method (NFB – May 17, 2006); Sam Urquhart – Meddling in Nepal (Guerilla News Network – April 26, 2006); IANS – India pledges ‘unstinted’ support to Nepalese people (Defence India - April 25, 2006); M.R. Josse – Nepal’s Strategic Balance (South Asian Journal – Jan/Mar 2004); Lt. General (Retd.); Tapan Kumar Bose - Nepal: Context of Maoist Insurgency (South Asian Journal – July/September 2004); Krishna V. Rajan – Nepal-India Relations (South Asian Journal – January/March 2005); Prakash Nepali & Phanindra Subba – Civil Military Relations and the Maoist insurgency in Nepal (Small Wars and Insurgencies – Vol. 16. No. 1 March, 2005); Sunanda K. Datta-Ray - Maoists up in arms : A danger for India in Nepal (International Herald Tribune – June 6, 2002); Shamsuddin Ahmed – With India and Maoists Nepal presents worrisome scenario (The New Nation Editorial – April 30, 2006); Kumaraswamy and Datta – India struggles to Negotiate a Settlement in Nepal (PINR – May 1, 2006); Krishna Singh Bam – Nepal: Ominous Activism Across the Southern Border (NFB - May 8, 2006); ISN Security Watch – Nepal lawmakers cut king’s powers (ISN- May 18, 2006); AFP – Nepal to remove king’s ‘democracy’ messages (New Age – May 23, 2006); Reuters – Nepal’s king to lose remaining legislative role (New Age – June 1, 2006); AFP – Maoists to go back to war if Nepal not made republic (The Daily Star – June 7, 2006); Reuters – Nepal king loses parliament roles (New Age – June 12, 2006); M.R. Josse – On Nepal: PM’s Bharat yatra: beneath and beyond the rhetoric (NFB – June 16, 2006); AFP – Gyanendra lies low as country mulls his future (New Age – June 24, 2006); AFP – ‘India played key role in Nepal’ (New Age – June 24, 2006)

Asoka Raina – Inside RAW the story of India’s Secret Service (1981) pg. 66

Asoka Raina pg 70; see also Gp. Capt. SM Hali - Raw at War – Genesis of Secret Agencies in Ancient India (Defence Journal – Feb/Mar 1999); Dr. Shireen M. Mazari - India’s unconventional war strategy (Defence Journal – January 1999); M.R. Josse – Nepal’s Strategic Balance (South Asian Journal – Jan/Mar 2004); Dr. Bikash Thapa – Raw’s machination in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal (NFB – August 15, 2005); Manjeet Singh Pardesi pp. 33-34; Praveen Swami – Covert contestation (Frontline – Sept 10-23 2005); Sara Shneiderman & Mark Turin – Ethno-politics in Darjeeling and Sikkim (Himal Magazine – March/April 2006); Brahma Chellaney - Dragon designs (Hindustan Times – June 22, 2006)

Asoka Raina pp. 68-74; see also Manjeet Singh Pardesi pp. 33-34

Henry Kissinger – ‘The White House Years pg. 879

Henry Kissinger – ‘The White House Years pg 858; see also Zillur R. Khan – Leadership Crisis in Bangladesh; Mohammed Tajammul Hussain – Bangladesh Victim of Black Propaganda Intrigue and Indian Hegemony; also see Sadeq Khan – ‘A Coded Message of expansion" in the weekly ‘Holiday’ July 14th 2000; Dr. Kalidas Baidya - Bangaleer Muktiyuddhe Antaraler Sheikh Mujib (2005); C. Raja Mohan – Dangerous Neighbourhood (The Indian Express – April 26, 2006)

An interesting exception to this was the period after the emergency in India and the coming to power of the Janata Party in March 22, 1977 when the external activities of RAW was reduced ironically due to the suspicion that it had some involvement in the internal affairs of the Indian state during the period of the emergency under Indira Gandhi. This period can only be described as a respite for India’s neighbours as the idea of Akhand Bharat was merely held in abeyance and Indian interference in these countries was minimized by its own internal dynamics rather than a change in policy.

JYOTIRMAYA SHARMA – Ideological Heresy? (The Hindu Magazine – June 19, 2005); Balaji Reddy – India a Hindu nation by 2020? BJP-Sena takes the first move (India Daily – October 13, 2004); (Subramanian Swamy – The Demographic Detonators (Organiser - Vol. LVII, No. 40, New Delhi, April 16, 2006); I.K. Shukla - Saffronazis stalking India: terrorism on the March (Holiday – April 7, 2006); Dr. Kalidas Baidya - Bangaleer Muktiyuddhe Antaraler Sheikh Mujib (2005); Krishnadev Calamur – Analysis: Was Advani Right? (UPI- June 09, 2005); J.S. Bandukwala – Indian Muslims: Past, Present and Future (Economic and Political Weekly – April 8, 2006); Ram Puniyani – Golwalker: Conceptualizing Hindutva fascism (Holiday – May 12, 2006); BBC – India protests over Pope comments (23 May 2006); Barrister Harun ur Rashid – Future of Congress and BJP in Indian politics (Holiday – June 16, 2006); Syed Shahabuddin – A framework of Muslim participation in Indian politics (Holiday – June 16, 2006)

Special correspondent – India, Bangladesh agree to restore status quo (The Hindu – April 20, 2001); Haroon Habib – A brush with Bangladesh (Frontline Magazine – Volume 18 – Issue 10 – May12-25, 2001); Abul Kalam Azad and Mahfuz Siddique – The brotherhood of Baraibari (April 28, 2005); C Raja Mohan – Cooperative Security in South Asia (South Asian Journal – October/December 2004)

Pallab Bhattacharya – ‘Indo-Bangladesh relations get a boost during Khaleda’s Delhi visit’ (The Daily Star – March 31, 2006)

S.A. Siddique – The Pattern of Secularism in India and Bangladesh pg. 1 & 16

Shariar Khan – India’s exploration bid ‘overlaps’ block 21 in Bay (The Daily Star – May 12, 2006); BDNews – India grabs Bangladeshi oil and gas blocks (The New Nation – May 12, 2006); Nazrul Islam – Maritime territory yet to be marked (New Age – May 15, 2006); CMDRE Khursheed Alam – The issue of South Talpatty (The Daily Star – May 12, 2006); Harun ur Rashid – Is India taking advantage? (The Daily Star – May 17, 2006); Dr. Aftab Alam Khan – Is oil and gas exploration in the Bay turning into a geopolitical issue (The Daily Star – May 26, 2006); M Shahidul Islam – Deterrence, negotiation and litigation have become essential (Holiday – June 2, 2006); Cdre Md. Kurshid Alam – Legal analysis on oil/gas exploration inside Bangladesh territorial waters (The Daily Star – June 10, 2006)
German mercantilist Von Hornigk – From Paul Kennedy – ‘The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (First Published 1988); see also Manjeet Singh Pardesi – Deducing India’s Grand Strategy of Regional Hegemony from Historical and Conceptual Perspectives (Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies – April 2005)
Moudud Ahmed – Era of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman pg 183; Lt. Gen. JFR Jacob – Surrender at Dhaka (UPL – 1997) pg. 150

Staff correspondent – Apparel leaders point finger at neighbouring country (New Age – May 23, 2006); Staff correspondent – BGMEA terms it plot of ‘neighbouring state’ to capture int’l market (The Daily Star – May 23, 2006); Shahidul Islam Chowdhury - Govt suspects role of local, foreign instigators (New Age - May 24, 2006); Editorial – Who are they? (The New Nation – May 24, 2006); Faisal Rahim – Foreign conspiracy to cripple country’s garment sector? (Holiday – May 26, 2006); Nurul Kabir – Garment industry on a dormant volcano of genuine labour grievances (New Age – May 27, 2006); ANM Nurul Haque – Vandalism in garments industry: Causes must be removed (The Daily Star – May 29, 2006); Nizam Ahmad – The plight of the RMG workers (The Daily Star – May 30, 2006); Mahtab Haider – Some men more equal than others (New Age – May 30, 2006); Dr. Zakir Husain – A small matter of compliance (New Age- May 31, 2006); Harun ur Rashid – Why did it occur and what needs to be done (The Daily Star – May 31, 2006); Shahedul Anam Khan - RMG sector under siege: The conspiracy theory (The Daily Star – June 1, 2006); Dr Michael A. Weinstein – Industrial riots reveal Bangladesh’s Crisis of Governance (PINR – June 1, 2006); Staff Business Report – Violence in garment units erodes country’s image (The Daily Star – June 2, 2006); Mustafa Zaman & Shamim Ahsan – From Grievance to Mayhem (Star Magazine – June 2, 2006); Rejaul Karim Byron – Economists trash conspiracy theory (The Daily Star – June 4, 2006); UNB – Envious quarter with nexus home, abroad out to destroy RMG (The Daily Star – June 5, 2006); Staff Correspondent – Foreign, local plot behind unrest: Hafiz (New Age – June 5, 2006)

C. Barnett – The Collapse of British Power (1972) cited in Paul Kennedy – ‘The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers’ (1988) pg 260 see also Manjeet Singh Pardesi – Deducing India’s Grand Strategy of Regional Hegemony from Historical and Conceptual Perspectives (Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies – April 2005); Abdul Quader Chowdhury – Mutual cooperation can be beneficial (Holiday – June 9, 2006)

[akzaman]

THE INDIA DOCTRINE

PART 2A

THE 1971 WAR OF LIBERATION AND AFTER

"The Athenians, it seems to me, may think a man to be clever without paying him much attention. So long as they do not think that he teaches his wisdom to others. But as soon as they think that he makes other people clever, they get angry whether it be from jealousy, … or from some other reason" (Socrates)

" … I shall prove that I am not a clever speaker in any way at all: unless, indeed, by a clever speaker they mean a man who speaks the truth" (Socrates)

Henry Kissinger and the Indian Dilemma
The only senior diplomat and analyst that played an important role in the 1971 War in terms of the geo-strategic implications of the conflict was the former US National Security Adviser and Secretary of State , Henry Kissinger who seems to have realized that India’s cooperation to the East Pakistanis was motivated purely by self-interest guided by the dream of claiming all the territory ruled by the former British colonial power. The creation of Bangladesh had brought with it untold difficulties for India as well as a long-term policy dilemma that was recognized by only a few perceptive individuals in Washington amongst whom the former Secretary of State was the most perceptive and in some of his pronouncements almost prophetic. Recently a Pakistani analyst has entered the debate with a sardonic appraisal of the present Indo-Bangladesh relations which is a reflection of the inherent contradictions of Indian policy during the 1971 war,

“Sovereign Bangladesh presently has seven well trained infantry divisions, two independent infantry brigades and an armour brigade. Given that nearly 90% of its borders are shared with India (only 10% or less with Burma), one may well ask, against whom do the Bangladeshis need this firepower? Whenever a Bangladeshi gun is fired in anger, the bullet will hit an Indian … We have now again come a full circle, the State of Bangladesh having many more problems with India than Pakistan ever did when Bangladesh was ‘East Pakistan’.”

The complications that an independent Bangladesh would create for India was a price that Indira Gandhi was prepared to pay for the disintegration of her country’s arch-rival Pakistan but being an astute politician as she was she managed to extract written assurances from the Awami League leadership residing in Kolkata on the deference that would be expected to be paid by a post-war Bangladesh government to the administration in New Delhi. It was only after she had this written document in her hands did she embark on the road to war in the apparent defence of the East Pakistanis. Bangladesh was only able to release itself from many of these obligations and commitments after the events of 15th August 1975 which took the country on a drastically different course than was originally envisaged by Indira Gandhi and which also brought the pre-war concerns identified by Henry Kissinger to the fore. To understand the breadth, scope and complexity of the issues involved it is necessary to quote from Kissinger at some length:

"The inevitable emergence of Bangladesh - which we postulated – presented India with fierce long-term problems. For Bangladesh was in effect East Bengal. Separated only by religion from India’s most fractious and most separatist state, West Bengal. They shared language, tradition, culture, and above all, a volatile national character. Whether, it turned nationalistic or radical, Bangladesh would overtime accentuate India’s centrifugal tendencies. It might be a precedent for the creation of other Moslem states, carved this time out of India. Once it was independent, its Moslem heritage might eventually lead to a rapprochement with Pakistan. All of this dictated to the unsentimental planners in New Delhi that its birth had to be accompanied by a dramatic demonstration of Indian predominance on the sub-continent … Mrs. Gandhi was going to war not because she was convinced of our failure but because she feared our success [in negotiations].

Ignoring the issues that had produced the crisis, she gave a little lecture on the history of Pakistan. She denied that she was opposed to its existence, but her analysis did little to sustain her disclaimer. Her father, she averred, had been blamed for accepting partition. And there was an element of truth, she said, in the often heard charge that India had been brought into being by leaders of an indigenous independence movement while Pakistan had been formed by British collaborators who, as soon as they became ‘independent’ proceeded to imprison the authentic fighters for independence. Pakistan was a jerry-built structure held together by its hatred for India, which was being stoked by each new generation of Pakistani leaders. Conditions in East Pakistan reflected tendencies applicable to all of Pakistan. Neither Baluchistan nor the Northwest Frontier properly belonged to Pakistan; they too wanted and deserved greater autonomy: they should never have been part of the original settlement.

This history lesson was hardly calculated to calm anxiety about Indian intentions. It was at best irrelevant to the issues and at worst a threat to cohesion of even West Pakistan. Mrs. Gandhi stressed the congenital defects of Pakistan so insistently that she implied that confining her demands to the secession of East Pakistan amounted to Indian restraint, the continued existence of West Pakistan reflected Indian forbearance…

…what had caused the war, in Nixon’s view and mine, went beyond the refugee problem; it was India’s determination to use the crisis to establish its preeminence on the subcontinent…

I remain convinced to this day that Mrs. Gandhi was not motivated primarily by conditions in East Pakistan; many solutions to its inevitable autonomy existed, several suggested by us…

We had no national interest to prevent self-determination for East Pakistan – indeed, we had put several schemes to bring it about – but we had a stake in the process by which it occurred. We wanted it to be achieved by evolution, not by a traumatic shock to a country in whose survival the United States, China, and the world community (as shown in repeated UN votes) did feel a stake, or by a plain violation of the rules by which the world must conduct itself if it is to survive. India struck in late November; by the timetable that we induced Yahya to accept, martial law would have ended and a civilian government would have taken power at the end of December. This would almost surely have led to the autonomy and independence of East Pakistan – probably without the excesses of brutality, including public bayoneting, in which the Indian – trained guerillas, the Mukti Bahini, engaged when they in turn terrorized Dacca."

This last point was also revisited by Ms. Sarmila Bose whose paper on the 1971 war was released in 2005 and is the subject of Part 2A of this paper.

State Department Report Focuses on 1971 India-Pakistan War
Also in 2005 State Department declassified a volume documenting the policy of the Nixon administration towards South Asia from 1969-72. The contents of the documents provide a clearer insight into the thinking of the Nixon administration during the 1971 crisis and how it was framed within the wider concerns of the Cold War. Behind the Nixon administrations support of Pakistan during the war was the anxiety in some circles that ‘peace and stability in South Asia could be maintained by aiding Pakistan against a stronger India that was receiving military aid from the Soviet Union.’ In addition to this was the role played by Pakistan in US rapprochement with China which eventually led to the communist split and rivalry between Khrushchev and Mao for control of international communist ideology and support.

If properly interpreted, India’s diplomatic maneuvers with the two superpowers and China was intended to make war more likely with Pakistan and was confirmed by the signing of the twenty-five year Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation which called on the signatories (India and the USSR) to refrain from giving assistance to any third country taking part in an armed conflict with the other, and committed each side to consult immediately with a view toward taking ‘appropriate effective measures’ in case either party was attacked or threatened with attack. In other words, the treaty removed one of the principal obstacles to a military conflict which according to Indian military planners had been the possible disapproval to a war by the Soviet Union and the likely consequence this would have on the US and Chinese positions if India attacked Pakistan. The only remaining barrier to India’s intervening in East Pakistan was the Awami League leadership who were required to sign a 7 point agreement that ensured to India the continued support of Bangladesh within New Delhi’s sphere of influence after the conflict was over.

Predictably the Indians have ignored this aspect of the drama and now generally concentrate on the human rights aspect of the war, especially in the East Pakistan campaign which again became an issue on the declassification of documents released by the State Department in 2002. This may have appeared beneficial to the East Pakistanis at the time but had pernicious implications after the war since it presented India with a monopoly on how the war should be viewed not only in India but also in Bangladesh and the rest of the world. This inevitably left no room for interpretation of the war from a Bangladeshi perspective and the only views permissible in Bangladesh are those that fit the Indian angle and standpoint on the conflict.
Insights into India’s Reunification Policy

This geopolitical analysis and the statement of facts in both the Kissinger book and State Department documents does not wholly square with the Indian interpretation as seen above in their concentration on the human rights aspect of the war in exclusion of all other issues. In fact, Kissinger seems to completely contradict Indian opinion on all the relevant points but appears more convincing and authentic than his opponents, at least in relation to the 1971 war. Present authorship in India has single mindedly attempted to demolish all the arguments and explanations made in Mr. Kissinger’s book but has thoroughly failed in this respect. A case in point is ‘Liberation and Beyond’ by J.N. Dixit, a career diplomat and prior to his expiry in 2005 the head of Indian intelligence.

Whereas Kissinger has attempted a global analysis of the 1971 conflict fitting it into a framework of international politics, Dixit has confined himself into dealing with it as if it were an episode solely happening in India’s backyard and therefore a local matter of no interest to the international community or of wider interests in the region. Even if sufficient credence is given to Kissinger’s alleged bias or partiality, it does not explain the gulf between the two books in their portrayal of events before and during the 1971 war. Apart from the fact that Mr. Dixit has extensively used quoted paragraphs from Mr. Kissinger’s book and completely taken those out of context by not detailing what preceded the quoted section nor what it was intended to explain is damaging of itself. At least Mr. Kissinger had enough sense to be denigrating of the Pakistani’s too, whereas Mr. Dixit clearly shows us his pro-India bias.

The major discrepancies between the two books reside in their interpretation and explanation of specific facts and circumstances that reflect the different preoccupations of the American administration and India government during the war. A pertinent example can be found in ‘Liberation and Beyond’ where the author unsuccessfully tries to defend what many in Bangladesh still consider a slight to their sovereignty and the sacrifices made by the freedom fighters during the liberation struggle. Though military operations had been conducted under a Joint Command Structure with General Osmani as the counterpart of General Jagjit Singh Aurora, General Osmani was not present at the surrender ceremony of Pakistani Forces in Dhaka. Dixit describes this as a ‘major political mistake’ and that the circumstances of General Osmani’s omission created ‘widespread suspicion’ amongst the Bangladeshis. He describes the Indian ‘formal excuse’ as leading to an ‘unfortunate aberration’ in the Bangladeshi belief that India wished to highlight its role in the war at the expense of Bangladesh, which India could have apparently avoided.

This section in Dixit’s book is representative of much of Indian writing on the war as it merely states the problem but provides no answer to the question posed. If it was in India’s power to ensure General Osmani’s attendance then why did they not do so? Why a long-winded and ultimately confusing explanation that leads the reader to conclude that there is more here than meets the eye. These prevarications and equivocations on the details of the 1971 war give the impression that India considers Bangladesh as a mere vassal state and that it was merely recovering a piece of its territory from the Pakistanis. Dixit says on several occasions that, "India would not liberate Pakistan-occupied Kashmir." This is an interesting choice of words and reveals a more honest and truthful expression of Indian attitudes to its Muslim neighbour that could also have implications for Bangladesh.

At the end of the chapter, the author provides a number of press releases emanating from the 1971 war that discloses atrocities committed by West Pakistan forces in East Pakistan. Ninety per cent of the newspaper cuttings are of Indian origin. This could mean that the propaganda effort on behalf of the Bangladeshi Government was carried out by India or that the author’s research was very limited or he wishes to emphasize the support that India provided to Bangladesh. I would assume that it would be in India’s interest to make Pakistan look exceedingly ugly regardless of what happened in the Eastern theatre of operations. I am not denying that the Pakistani military committed heinous acts of aggression and brutality upon the East Pakistanis but recent research also shows that the Mukti Bahini and Mujib Bahini’s were also susceptible to such acts of violence and cruelty.

The manner in which the author has constructed his chapters on the war puts India in good stead but there is a disturbing inconsistency in the chronology of events from that found in ‘The White House Years.’ I would tend to believe Mr. Kissinger’s account, as it is more logical in its lay out and description. In ‘Liberation and Beyond’ there is also a tendency to overplay the role of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in the military sequence of events. Bhutto only appeared when the Pakistan military debacle became evident and he exploited this to eventually oust Yahya. Bhutto was certainly responsible for the break up of Pakistan and much disliked amongst many of his own people but according to a number of books he was unawares of the military option that was being adopted by Yahya Khan. Kissinger virtually ignores Bhutto for most part and concentrates on the deeds of Yahya Khan.

There is one section of the book where Mr. Kissinger praises the brilliance and sophistication of Bhutto but this was balanced by an immoderate, vindictive and emotionally unstable side that was probably hidden from the then US National Security Adviser:

"Zulfi suspected and feared collusion between Yahya and Mujib, and between Yahya and the fundamentalist Islamic parties of the West … Zulfi felt neglected by Yahya, offended by that little general to whom he had extended much hospitality in Larkana and had been especially moderate, thanks to Peerzada’s adroit diplomacy, never attacking him as mercilessly as he had attacked Ayub Khan. Soon Yayha’s turn would come, however, for he had the temerity to speak of Mujib as "prime minister.”
The central themes and arguments which appear to contradict in totality the narratives of Henry Kissinger and Stanley Wolpert may be summarized from ‘Liberation and Beyond’ as follows: According to J.N. Dixit it was Pakistan that conspired to create a situation against East Pakistan so as to find an excuse to make an assault upon India and its national integrity. In other words, it was Pakistan that desired a break up of India. India did not want a neighbouring country to be fragmented and destroyed but due to the humanitarian concern for East Pakistan, it could not stand by under such naked aggression of the Pakistanis against the East Pakistan populace. India tried it’s utmost to seek a diplomatic and negotiated settlement to the dispute but due to Pakistani intransigence, this was not possible. The United States was uncooperative by not pressuring Pakistan to adopt a more conciliatory stance and continued to supply military hardware to Pakistan even after an arms embargo was proclaimed. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was considered an important factor in the dispute implying that Pakistan wished to carry out his dream of eliminating India. India did not want a reversal of partition nor a reunification of those parts but was deeply convinced that religion alone did not make a nation. A non-hostile Bangladesh would be far more preferable than a hostile East Pakistan and a positive response to the Bangladesh movement would reduce chances of other states in India seeking autonomy. That the might of the Pakistan army in East Pakistan was so strong that the liberation struggle would eventually peter out without active support from India.

There was much more I could have included in this summary but this will suffice to illustrate my point. The whole of the above paragraph is in complete conflict with Kissinger’s perspective on the historical and political implications of the 1971 war and also certain parts of Wolpert’s biography on Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. I would also add that much of it does not accord with common sense or reality but these are not the considerations of an Indian elite bent on overturning the 1947 arrangement that saw India’s partition and which substantially guides its foreign policy goals in South Asia.

The purpose of this exercise is to show how false history can be induced into our national psyche which has effectively been the case since Bangladesh’s independence from Pakistan. This is not to suggest that Mr. Kissinger’s account is not tainted with national loyalties or personal considerations of his own but until a history is written by us we will continue to be mystified about our recent past. My argument goes further and to be understood clearly requires a survey of more recent events in Bangladesh which will hopefully show that history written by Indians about 1971 and propagated in Bangladesh has an objective and purpose directly related to the scheme of an Akhand Bharat which the entire discussion above only provides an elliptical sense of a much larger whole.

Reminders of 1971 Polarities and Post 9/11 Realities
It has been my argument in this part and will also be the subject in other sections of this essay that since 1971 India has constantly pummeled us with propaganda so that we are constantly at our own necks and are rendered incapable of developing an independent national identity that may eventually influence us in directions undesirable to India. The most recent of these attempts to instill confusion has been the stories concerning the growth of indigenous Islamic terrorism in Bangladesh aided in part by ISI agents roaming around Bangladesh creating havoc with the assistance of Taliban and Al Qaeda terrorists.

This approach has conveniently melded the Indian perspective of 1971 (as discussed above) as a war against the realities of partition and the Two Nation theory that bestowed sovereign rights to Pakistan (and then Bangladesh after its independence) and the events in America on September 11, 2001. By creating fear within Bangladesh and outside, of the specter of Islamic terrorism within the country, it is hoped that the public may turn away from Islam and the actualities of 1947 and adopt the secular mantra propagated by the Awami League and its foreign backers to more easily accommodate Indian requirements in the region and also to undermine the nations armed forces to render Bangladesh a defenseless entity through a distorted view of recent historical events. That this is the real purpose and aspiration behind Awami League politics was readily admitted to by Sheikh Hasina in her April 3, 2006 interview with Time Magazine,

“How much of this conflict stems from unhealed wounds dating back to Bangladesh's war of independence, when the country was split between nationalists and pro-Pakistan Muslims?

Hasina: It goes back to 1971, or even 1947 [when the territory now known as Bangladesh became East Pakistan during India's bloody Partition]. It's an ideological split. We believe in secular politics. We're very liberal. We struggle for the common people. Their only aim is to make money, remain in power and exploit people, that's all. They never think about people. The question is: should this country be ruled by a military dictatorship, or by them, or by the people?”

It would be reasonable to inquire how much of Sheikh Hasina’s speeches and interviews are influenced by RAW money since we already know the Indian intelligence agency regularly allots large sums to the Awami League for electioneering purposes and with such largesse conditions for its utilization including following India’s ideological line is an obvious expectation. That the Sheikh Hasina interview does fall in line with the Indian objectives for Bangladesh was hinted to in official circles and quietly released to the Indian press again in April of 2006,

"The rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Bangladesh," close defence exchanges and nuclear and missile cooperation between China and Pakistan, and left-wing radicalism are major security concerns for India.

On Bangladesh, the annual report of the ministry of defence for 2005-06 states that "the rise of Islamic fundamentalism as well as the increasing incidents of terrorism and political violence, with their attendant repercussions on the security of India, are being monitored". India’s concerns have been articulated at the highest political level with Bangladesh and the latter’s stable, prosperous, democratic and secular polity is important for both countries, the report said.” This propaganda campaign has conclusively been shown to be a complete charade engineered by the Indian media and backed by India’s political and intellectual elite,

“Contrary to Indian claim and the orchestrated blames heaped on Bangladesh, a researcher of the United States Institute of Peace dismissed that Bangladesh citizens were in any way involved in international terrorism.Dr Christine Fair, a US professor, said she had been told by the Indians that Bangladeshi citizens were involved in terrorism she did not find enough evidence to support the hypothesis.‘The entire blame-game was built around the premise of one Bangladeshi among the Guantanamo detainees and the deduction was sought to be made that there were many other Bangladeshis actively engaged in the terrorist training activities in Afghanistan,’ said Fair when speaking at a seminar on ‘Demand and Supply Side of International Terrorism’ at the National Press Club.”

With the arrest of Sheikh Abdur Rahman and Bangla Bhai as well as the dismantling of the (Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh) JMB command structure more light will be shed over the coming years of the assistance provided to these groups by Indian intelligence especially in the form of arms and explosives much of which has been recovered and bear Indian ordinance markings. There had also been several previous arrests immediately after the Mymensingh theater bombings where low ranking army personnel were apprehended carrying detailed documents on military matters intended to be passed on to Indian intelligence across the border. Since the two leaders of the JMB have confessed to being involved in that attack surely a link can be established with the earlier arrests.

I am also dismissive of the information now being procured through interrogation of Sheikh Abdur Rahman and Bangla Bhai. I doubt the truth behind their activities will be available for at least a few years and I am sure that they have been instructed to initially provide misleading information to divert the investigators from their actual support base. Many of the pro-Indian newspapers are concentrating on the revelations from Sheikh Abdur Rahman’s interrogation that suits their assumptions and prejudices on the issue without being critical of the contents of the report and then completely ignoring those confessionary admissions that are highly contradictory to their established positions on Islamic terrorist networks operating in Bangladesh. It is, however, revealing that Sheikh Abdur Rahman has disclosed to his interrogators to having sympathies for Akhand Bharat and apparently little interest in the insurgents of Kashmir which would seem to indicate Indian loyalties rather than pan-Islamic ones.

END NOTE & REFERENCES
Henry Kissinger became Secretary of State in 1973

Henry Kissinger – ‘The White House Years’ (1979) pg. 845

Ikram Sehgal - Reverse Swing (Probe Magazine – Volume 4 Issue 43 April 21-27, 2006)

Henry Kissinger pp. 881-915; see also Zillur R. Khan – "Leadership Crisis in Bangladesh" (First Published 1984) and Rick Fountain’s ‘Bangladesh War Secrets Revealed’ (1 January 2003.); Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin – The Mitrokhin Archives II (2005)

State Department Report Focuses on 1971 India-Pakistan War – GlobalSecurity.org (28 June 2005); Nixon/Kissinger Saw India as "Soviet Stooge" in 1971 South Asia Crisis – The National Security Archive (June 29, 2005); India, Pakistan urged to release 1971 war records (Daily Times June 30, 2005) Henry Kissinger pp. 866-868

Dharam Shourie - 'US okayed Pakistani repression in Bangladesh in 1971' (Rediff.com December 19, 2002); Anjum Niaz – When America Looked the Other Way (ZNET January 03, 2003)

See also Anwar Iqbal - Sheikh Mujib wanted a confederation: US papers (Dawn July 7, 2005); F.S. Aijazuddin - Eavesdropping on history (Dawn July 22, 2005); Ikram Sehgal - Reverse Swing (Probe Magazine – Volume 4 Issue 43 April 21-27, 2006); Manjeet Singh Pardesi – Deducing India’s Grand Strategy of Regional Hegemony from Historical and Conceptual Perspectives (Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies – April 2005) pp. 26-27

Mohammed Zianal Abedin – No Room to Pay Homage to Aurora (News From Bangladesh – March 23, 2006); Tuhin Reza – General Aurora and the looting by Indian soldiers (NFB – May 23, 2005)
A perspective that has been discredited by Jung Chang and Jon Halliday in their book ‘Mao The Unknown Story.’; See also Imtiaz Ahmed – Back in ’71 US policy revisited (Himal Magazine – May/June 2006)

This issue is again touched upon by Lt. Gen. JFR Jacob in two short sentences, ‘Unfortunately, Col Osmani could not attend the ceremony. The helicopter sent for him was damaged en route by hostile fire and could not be made serviceable in time.” (Lt. Gen. JFR Jacob – Surrender at Dhaka (UPL – 1997) pg. 147)

See Part 5A and 5B of this essay.

See Part 3 and 4 of this essay

See also – Pakistan: Partitions and Military Succession
http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/pakistan/pak....htm#bangladesh

Stanley Wolpert – ‘Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan" (1993); see also Tuhin Reza -
Mujib, 7 March 71 Speech and Call for Independence (NFB – April 3, 2006).

J.N. Dixit – ‘Liberation and Beyond: Indo-Bangladesh Relations’ (First Published 1999) pp. 30-130

‘India is causing trouble’ by Philip Bowring – International Herald Tribune Wednesday, January 22, 2003); Praful Bidwai ‘Grave crisis in South Asian ties: Neighbours as enemies.’ The Daily Star: February 17, 2003; Sheela Bhatt - ISI now outsources terror to Bangladesh (Rediff.com March 21 2006); Pramod Kumar Singh - Bangla terror to top talks with Khaleda (India Monitor March 14 2006); Chris Blackburn - The Threat of Bangladesh (FrontPage Magazine March 13 2006); Wilson John - Contours of a new terror matrix (The Pioneer March 26, 2006); Varun Gandhi - Bangladesh: Another Afghanistan in the making ( Organiser - Vol. LVII, No. 39, New Delhi, April 09, 2006); David Mier-Levi - Why Bangladesh Matters (FrontPage Magazine – April 25,2006); Brig Gen Shamsuddin Ahmed – Rise of Islamic militancy in Bangladesh (The Daily Star – June 11, 2006)

Time Magazine - “Democracy Means Tolerance. We Don’t Have That” (April 3, 2006); See also Shahidul Islam – PM as Time’s cover girl (Holiday – 31 March, 2006); Sadeq Khan – Attitudinal change in India, but same mindset in RAW (Holiday – April 14, 2006)

Inqilaab Correspondent – RAW provides four and a half crore rupee to a defeated party (Dainik Inqilaab – April 30, 1992); Abu Rushd – Raw in Bangladesh (Chapter 8 - English Edition 2005)

Rakesh K. Singh – Terror in Bangla worries India (The Asian Age – April 1, 2006); Sadeq Khan – Attitudinal change in India, but same mindset in RAW (Holiday – April 14, 2006); Brig Gen Shamsuddin Ahmed – Rise of Islamic militancy in Bangladesh (The Daily Star – June 11, 2006)

Staff Correspondent – ‘No evidence on Bangladeshis’ involvement in terrorism’ (New Age – August 14, 2005); Mohammed Zainul Abedin – ‘Unholy designs to harm Bangladesh using Islamic militancy as pretext’ (Watchbd.com – March 14, 2005)

Staff Correspondent – Sheikh Rahman believes in Akhand Bharat (The Daily Naya Diganta – March 31, 2006 (Page 1))

See Editorial – Resurfacing of Islamist Jihadis: Alarm bell for security (Holiday – June 23, 2006)

This post has been edited by akzaman: Nov 23 2008, 12:24 AM

[akzaman]

THE INDIA DOCTRINE

PART 3

THE CIRCLE OF HISTORY

It is often said that history comes full circle and it would be true in the case of this essay which has tried to recount a certain part of our history that spans from 1947 to the present. But the narrative has primarily concerned itself with the events from the 1971 war that created an independent Bangladesh but has so far failed to take account of the events preceding this period when the Indian government and intelligence were most active in trying to create an Akhand Bharat on the subcontinent.

It has been my opinion from my first attempts at writing this essay in 2001 that the story would be incomplete if left within the confining time frame of 1971 and after. The purpose now would be to look at 1971 and before but from a specifically East Pakistani standpoint as we then were. I have covered elements of the post 1947 period as an introduction to the Akhand Bharat vision envisaged by Jawaharlal Nehru and taken account of the Two Nation Theory espoused by Mohammed Ali Jinnah. The latter became a practical reality while the former is still in its drawing board stage awaiting its imminent realization if circumstance and opportunity permit. Although the active measures taken by India and its propaganda network have been thoroughly covered during the post-1971 period what has been lacking in my thesis is a similar coverage of the pre-1971 era when it could be said that India came one step closer to achieving its dream for an Akhand Bharat.

It is not to be supposed that this is another attempt to undermine the efforts of our martyrs who fought for liberation and the author has no interest or attraction to see a reunited Pakistan. More accurately this is a study of contrasts and comparisons between the ideals that inspired many of our youth to give up their lives and the motivations that guided India and its troops which was altogether different and far reaching. I do not think it would be an exaggeration to suggest that India’s assistance in the creation of Bangladesh was only a step to its eventual destruction and the reformation of a United Bengal within the larger entity of an Akhand Bharat.

This part will deal with three books in particular and hopefully in later editions to expand with the inclusion of other documents and materials as they become available to the author. The three books under discussion are (1) Faiz Ahmed – Agartala Mamla: Sheikh Mujib O Banglar Bidroho (1997 edition); (2) Asoka Raina - Inside RAW the story of India’s Secret Service (1981) and (3) Major General S.S. Uban - Phantoms of Chittagong: The “Fifth Army” in Bangladesh (1985). All the books mentioned have become authorities in the areas they cover but have not been given wide prominence in Bangladesh due to their content and historical disclosures made within their pages. I hope that a reading of the text and analysis of perspectives will shed light on India’s role prior to the 1971 war and its objectives for a newly independent Bangladesh and how this all fits in with the grand design for an Akhand Bharat.

For any credence to be given to this theory a link has to be established between the principal agents behind the idea of an Akhand Bharat and Indian involvement with the principal leaders of the nascent autonomy movement in East Pakistan who probably had different notions from that willed by the Indian political elite. In other words, it is necessary to show that India’s purpose in undermining central authority in East Pakistan was to further their goal in dividing the two halves of Pakistan with eventual secession of one half and then to bring the newly independent nation under the control and influence of India to realize at least a partial Akhand Bharat until all regions of the pre-1947 partition arrangement comes within its dominion.

THE AGARTALA CONSPIRACY CASE
The first intimation of any link between the Nehru administration (or the Indira Gandhi government from 1966) and leaders of the Awami League of Bangladesh begins with the 1968 sedition case of the State vs. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and others (popularly known as the Agartala Shorojontro Mamla or the Agartala conspiracy case). The allegations brought by the Ayub Khan government against Sheikh Mujibur Rahman appears to be that he had conspired with P.N. Ojha, the First Secretary to the Indian High Commission, to seek secession from Pakistan with supplies of weapons from India via the district of Agartala in Tripura state. The formal charge in part reads that the accused perons had conspired ‘to deprive Pakistan of a part of its territories, mainly the province of East Pakistan, by an armed revolt with weapons, ammunition and funds provided by India and to establish therein an independent government recognised by India.’ It has also been subsequently claimed that Mujib’s wife had been used as a courier in communications between the Indian diplomat and Mujib.

This particular point has generally been ignored by supporters of Sheikh Mujib (as no formal charges were laid against Mujib’s wife presumably due to the negative impact that this would have on East Pakistani opinion) who have also dismissed the charges against him as trumped up. Indian commentators have pointed out that although Sheikh Mujib did cross into India in 1965 New Delhi was never party to his leaving Pakistan and on their discovery of his presence in India he was requested to return. According to legal and political analysts the case was brought in order to tarnish Sheikh Mujib’s reputation in East Pakistan and arouse public wrath against him for his alleged collusion with Indian agents. This attempt at discrediting Sheikh Mujib abysmally failed and led to wider protest movements in East Pakistan organised by Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhasani through his Gono Obhyutthan, the All Parties Student Resistance Council and the Central Students Action Committee. Passions were further enflamed after Sheikh Mujib’s statement to the tribunal where he denied the allegations and then went on to deliver a poltical speech against the central authorities.

The West Pakistanis were sure that a conspiracy emanating from Agartala and involving senior Awami Leaguers had existed but its decision to prosecute and score politicial points against India was in part clouded by their unjustified over reaction to the six point formula put forward by Sheikh Mujib which merely sought to address the disparities between West Pakistan and East Pakistan caused by the economic exploitation of the latter by the former and the negligence and indifference of the central government towards the defence of East Pakistan. The six point formula had put forward the following demands:

(1) The character of the government shall be federal and parliamentary and on the basis of universal adult franchise. (2)The federal government shall be responsible only for the defense and foreign affairs (3) There shall be two separate currencies mutually of freely convertible in each wing for each region, or in the alternative a single currency, subject to the establishment of a federal reserve system in which there will be regional Federal Reserve banks, which shall devise measures to prevent the transfer of resources and flight of capital from one region to another. (4) Fiscal policy shall be the responsibility of the federating units. (5)Constitutional provisions shall be made to enable separate accounts to be maintained of the foreign exchange earnings of each of the federating units, under the control of the respective governments of the federating units. (6)The governments of the federating units shall be empowered to maintain militia or paramilitary force having Naval Headquarter in East Pakistan in order to contribute effectively towards national security.

For the central authorities in West Pakistan this was considered the first step towards a call to secessionism. Whether there were any substantive grounds for such a belief will only become clearer as more information and documentation becomes available. However, what was known to the Pakistan government about a parallel conspiracy would have put the central authorities on alert but probably did not amount to sufficient or adequate evidence to implicate Sheikh Mujibur Rahman himself. It did, nevertheless, demonstrate the extensiveness of the Indian network operating in East Pakistan and the various channels that were potentially open to the senior leaders of the Awami League who could now easily gain access to the Indian government and intelligence agencies through their operatives in Dhaka.

According to Masudul Haq in his book Bangladesher Shadinhata Juddeh RAW Abong CIA (Bangladesh Independence War: RAW and CIA) the Pakistan Director of Intelligence Bureau (DIB) knew by 1962 that at a house (probably Sunny Villa) located in Kolkata, Bhabhanipur area, an operational headquarter of the Indian Central Intelligence Agency had set up an association called the Shadin Bangla Biplobi Parishad (Independent Bengal Revolutionary Council) whose purpose was to secede the eastern part of Pakistan in order to create a new country. The DIB also knew that Chittaranjan Sutar and Kalidas Baidya, who were both Pakistani citizens, had a connection with this secret organization. The Shadin Bangla Biplobi Parishad (SBBP) in 1964 infiltrated the student community through the leadership of Shirajul Alam Khan (Chattra League General Secretary) along with Abdur Razzak (Chattra League Assistant General Secretary) and Kazi Aref who were to become the central cell of the student chapter of the organization. Abdur Razzak was to maintain links with Sheikh Mujib and the Awami League on behalf of the SBBP.

It was only after the publication of the 6 point demand that the SBBP were able to focus their operations on the real objective of secession which was probably the trigger that set alarm bells ringing in West Pakistan. The SBBP wanted to use Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s populist image to further their own goals but it was realized that he would not approve of such an overt alignment so the three student leaders of the SBBP carried on their work in secrecy and no one came to know of the council’s existence or its program to dismember Pakistan. It is, however, apparent that by 1971 there was a real fear in the West (US and Britain) not just of secessionism but that India would eventually try to take Pakistani territory by force and also seek the break-up of West Pakistan in the case of armed conflict. This would certainly have been the final culmination of many years of planning and conspiring but was in the end probably prevented by U.S. intervention through the activation of its Seventh Fleet during the 1971 war and the widespread fear within India that a major escalation involving the Americans may also bring in the Chinese and Russian military forces. This would have doubtless overturned any short term gains that may have been achieved by the Indian military through a conflict limited by the objectives of expediting the secession of East Pakistan and the weakening of the West Pakistan armed forces in direct combat. The purpose was, therefore, not the total disintegration of the Pakistan army which would have required a prolonged war involving the participation of global players who had a whole set of different and conflicting agendas and policy imperatives that were likely detrimental to India’s vision of an Akhand Bharat.

This plan for secessionism developed by the SBBP would gain credibility if there had indeed been a conspiracy in 1968 or earlier between India and the senior Awami League leadership in East Pakistan that was centered on Agartala and could be connected to Sheikh Mujib as well. One is, therefore, instantly alerted to the confusion amongst commentators on the Agartala Conspiracy Case as to whether they are defending Sheikh Mujib against a conspiracy that was alleged to have occurred in Agartala or in Dhaka or in both places at different times. The only documentary evidence that is strongly suggestive of a conspiracy involving Sheikh Mujib is the written statement made to Mr. Mafidul Haq in 1991 by the former Chief Minister of Tripura and published in Faiz Ahmed’s book in Bangla on the very last page. A rough and literal translation of the statement is as follows:

Sheikh Mujib’s relation with Agartala

Chief Minister of Tripura
In 1963 my brother Sri Omesh Lal Singh along with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and 10 others at Tripura, Palom District, through subdivision Khoai, Agartala, arrived at my Agartala Bungalow at 12.00 am. After the preliminary discussions Sheikh Sahib came to my sister Hemangini Devi’s residence one and half miles away from my bungalow where food and lodgings had been managed. Afterwards, according to Mujibur bhai’s previous proposal, I met with our Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and accompanying me was Sri Sri Raman, Chief Secretary. I left him (Sri Raman) in Foreign Secretary Sri Bhanderia’s room while I met with the Prime Minister. He [Nehru] did not accept that Mujibur Rahman should be left publicly in Tripura because after the conflict with China he did not want to take such a big risk. So after 15 days he [Sheikh Mujib] left Tripura. Sonamura, a subdivision of West Tripura, attached to Comilla. It was promised to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman that all forms of assistance would be provided to him.

Sri Shachindra Lal Singha Chief Minister Tripura
According to Mafidul Haq, the former Chief Minister when writing this statement was in weak health and suffered from poor eyesight which would explain the obvious mistakes in his memory and disjointed expression and train of thought. However, there is no question that Sri Shachindra Lal Singh was indeed the Chief Minister of Tripura from 1963-1971 and who passed away in the year 2000. The former Chief Minister’s recollection of this particular incident does not square with the official Indian position on the Agartala case nor with Sheikh Mujib’s defence team. What is astonishing about this affair is that no attempt has been made to rebut this statement and even if we were to discount it on grounds of plausibility or authenticity there should be some official record of disapproval and rejection but there is none. The implausibility lies not in the truth or otherwise of the above statement but in the fact that RAW’s involvement in the 1971 war was instantaneous and without any prior engagement with the top leadership of the Awami League. To have been effective at such a critical juncture there must have been some long standing relationship, understanding and cooperation between Indian authorities and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and other leaders of the independence movement at least by 1965 if not much earlier.

The emphasis on Sheikh Mujib as the chief protagonist in the Agartala conspiracy case has over shadowed the involvement of the other accused persons in the case and their clandestine dealings with the Indian High Commission in Dhaka. The principal accused that sought and obtained confidential contacts with P.N. Ojha, the First Secretary, include Lt. Col. Moazzam Hossain (accused No. 2) and Manik Chowdhury (accused No. 12) and from the allegations contained in the charge sheet they were merely following a course that had already been set by Sheikh Mujib in 1963 or 1965 in his trip to Agartala. It would have been fatal to the defence case if any link could have been established between Lt. Col. Moazzam Hossain and Sheikh Mujib as Moazzam was actively engaged in a revolutionary organization working for the independence of East Pakistan as early as 1967. If the trial had continued it is more than likely that evidence would have been produced showing India’s collusion with at least some of the accused but whether their objectives were confined to simply carving up Pakistan is debatable.

That India had other ulterior motives or agendas and viewed the creation of Bangladesh as only one step to their ultimate aim of establishing an Akhand Bharat may not have been in the contemplation of the leaders of the Awami League or the revolutionaries but we will probably never know their true intentions or the answers to the many questions that have been left unanswered by the fortuitous closing of the Agartala conspiracy case.

RAW AND THE MUKTI BAHINI
Much has already been written about RAW’s active role in assisting in the liberation war of 1971 but that it may have had an objective of its own and used the freedom fighters as mere agents in pursuit of this wider ambition is only now being researched and discussed. Unfortunately, no in-depth textual analysis is available from where we can draw conclusions about RAW’s intervention before and during the war and how they used this preexisting network to infiltrate (and where necessary plant) the political, military and intellectual classes into official power in Bangladesh and how this all fits into their wider plans for an Akhand Bharat.

It is my contention that India sought out political and student leaders in East Pakistan during the 1960’s to groom them for leadership once Pakistan had been successfully vivisected and the 1947 political geography rewritten in India’s preponderant favour. This section will attempt to show that RAW, soon after its establishment as India’s external intelligence agency in 1968, was involved in East Pakistan and actively participated in the war as advisers and coordinators to the guerilla forces. This cooperation merely reflected a continuing relationship between the Indian military and political authorities with Sheikh Mujib and other political figures of the Awami League and student fronts that probably predated the alleged contacts in Agartala in 1963 or 1965.

That my thesis has been confirmed in several respects in Asoka Raina’s book of 1981 has yet to filter into the Bangladesh mainstream media and the only omission from the book is a direct enunciation or elaboration of India’s broader goals in the subcontinent. It should be mentioned that Asoka Raina presents India’s assistance to East Pakistan as one of benevolence to a people long oppressed by an arrogant and distant ruler and that RAW and the Indian military were forced into play through humanitarian considerations caused by the neglect and repression of the central authority but he only hints at India’s own expansionist interests in this unfolding tragedy. To appreciate the significance and historical context of Raina’s account it is necessary to extensively quote and paraphrase from Chapter 6 of the book entitled, ‘Special Operations: Bangla Desh’:-

“The Bangla Desh Operation possibly began a year before the actual operation was underway. Even when the world did get a whiff of it in shape of the Mukti Bahani, many remained unaware of RAW’s involvement. By then Phase one of the operation was already completed. Phase two saw the Indian Armed Forces poised for the liberation of Bangla Desh. RAW, along with Mukti Bahani, when they developed into a formidable force, provided information to the Indian forces.

In order to present a clear synopsis of the events that finally brought RAW into the Bangladesh ops, one must review the intelligence activities that started soon after its formation in 1968. But by then Indian operatives had already been in contact with the “pro-Mujib” faction. A meeting convened in Agartala during 1962-63, between the IB foreign desk operatives and the Mujib faction.

The meeting in Agartala had indicated to “Colonel” Menon (which in fact was Sankaran Nair’s nom de guerre), the main liaison man between the Mujib faction and the Indian intelligence, that the ‘group’ was eager to escalate their movement. “Colonel Menon” had warned them that in his opinion it was far too early for them to take any positive action. The plans they had presented were half baked, and would not work. As Colonel Menon rightly put it … “they jumped the gun.” They raided the armoury of the East Bengal Rifles in Dacca but this initial movement failed. In fact, it was a total disaster, just as Colonel Menon had anticipated. A few months later, on January 6, 1968, the Pakistan government announced that 28 persons would be prosecuted for conspiring to bring about the secession of East Pakistan, with India’s help. Mujib was implicated twelve days later as an accused. This was known as the Agartala Conspiracy Case.”

This should have finally and definitively rested the case about a conspiracy back in 1981 when the book was originally published but for some reason this disclosure from an authentic and reliable Indian source has hardly ever been alluded to amongst Bangladeshi historians, journalists or political analysts or commentators. It would be useful to investigate the reasons behind this quite evident conspiracy of silence amongst those who would be expected to be most vocal about redressing the errors in our historical understanding of an important stage in our independence struggle and also in preventing Bangladesh’s incorporation into an Akhand Bharat that this might entail if our leaders were not sufficiently cautious.

The remaining pages of Chapter 6 are no less surprising in the unearthing of factual and historical truths that are still considered controversial subjects as the narrative takes us next to the advent of war in 1971 -

“RAW Steps up its Activities – Efforts were stepped up to help establish an underground network in East Pakistan. The year of “a hundred spies” had begun. RAW cells were set up all along the border … Colonel Menon’s … tours helped in the selection of local cell chiefs. Of the more prominent ones, led by Colonel M.A.G. Osmani were Major Khaled Musharraff, Major Saifullah and Abdul Kader Siddiqi, nicknamed “Tiger Siddiqi”, who later became the contact man between the Mukti Bahani and the RAW operatives.

Assessment of RAW – RAW agents were reported to have infiltrated almost every nook and corner of East Pakistan by that time [December 1970]. The number of double agents working for RAW … were in or near the helm of affairs. A senior Pakistani officer, who had stayed in Dacca till the emergence of Bangla Desh, provided invaluable information to the RAW operative, and was pulled out one day before Dacca fell.

[A] few hours before the crackdown, Mujib agreed to a few of the members leaving for India. They were Tajuddin Ahmed … along with a few others who were to travel overnight with the RAW operatives, to Mujib Nagar … and to establish the Bangla Desh government in exile. The others who accompanied Tajuddin were Nazrul Islam, Mushtaq Ahmed, Syleht Azad and four student leaders – Fazlul Haq Moni, Tufal Ahmed, Abdul Razakar and Shiraz-ul Alam Khan.

The events had drifted well into March and Tikka Khan struck with all his might on 25th March. April 12, 1971, saw the establishment of the Bangla Desh provincial government in Calcutta.

Mukti Bahani – RAW sanctuaries all along the Indo-East Pakistan border provided adequate cover and the vast border made it difficult for Pakistani security forces to ferret out the Mukti Fauj. The Mukti Fauj was known as the Mukti Bahani two months after its formation on the night of March 25, 1971 … the role of RAW in helping the Mukti Bahani to become an effective fighting force has yet to be written.”

This last sentence even after more than twenty years has still not been the subject of serious study and writers have tended to avoid this entire episode of the war. What this portion from the book illustrates is the close and personal relationship that prevailed from the early sixties right to the start of conflict between the Indian authorities, military and intelligence representatives in East Pakistan with Sheikh Mujib and the Awami League clan. That it continued after independence is tersely admitted to by Asoka Raina as RAW agents were said to have kept an eye on developments in the newly born country which the occupying Indian army were later very reluctant to leave.

FORMATION OF THE MUJIB BAHINI
It would be a grave omission to leave this section without mentioning the name of the chief architect and mastermind in this phase of RAW’s ‘blueprint’ for East Pakistan and whose later machinations in Bangladesh set the stage of increased bitterness and suspicion between the two nations when the country turned nationalist and constitutionally Islamic from 1975 onwards and less dependant on Indian tutelage and guidance - the more important factors in India’s calculations for an Akhand Bharat. His name was Rameshwar Nath Kao, the head of both RAW and the Directorate General of Security, and specially appointed for these posts by Indira Gandhi and who was in turn influenced by her father Jawaharlal Nehru who knew Kao personally. Presumably he was also considered the ideal person to implement the vision for an Akhand Bharat which may initially have brought him to the attention of the two Prime Ministers.

It was essentially through Kao that a special relationship developed between the Indian operatives in East Pakistan and the future leaders of Bangladesh who were diligently fostered for that purpose by RAW. Asoka Raina provides a useful overview of this relationship but it fails to convey the warmth and personal bonds that developed between the Awami League leadership and the Indian military and intelligence. That this almost familial association has often been represented in Indian intellectual circles as of a big brother towards a wayward and at times reckless sibling or a master to his loyal dog or slave is scrupulously avoided in Bangladesh but its repercussions are felt today in the troubled relations of the two countries.

Through the divisive policies advocated by Kao before and during the war suspicion and intrigue immediately dominated the post independence political landscape in Bangladesh. It was Kao that accorded special status to certain youth leaders of the Awami League who then formed themselves into the Mujib Bahini and were felt to be the only ones ‘who could deliver the goods’. The most prominent and favoured of these youth leaders were Sheikh Fazlul Haq Moni, Tufail Ahmed, Shirazul Alam Khan and Abdur Razzak. It was because of their stauncher loyalties and closeness to Sheikh Mujib that they preferred to be named Mujib Bahini rather then be associated with the Mukti Bahini who were said to include amongst their number many of their political enemies. The Mujib Bahini was trained and organized separately under the supervision of Major General S.S. Uban who later wrote a revealing book on his daring exploits with these specially selected ‘commandos’ in the 1971 war. It is due to this special treatment of Mujib loyalists by RAW that provided the grounds for distrust and misgivings soon after independence as they soon transformed themselves into the much reviled and detested Rakkhi Bahini.

Although Major General Uban no where mentions that he was working as a RAW operative and he misleadingly describes his superior, Mr. R.N. Kao, as a mere Secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat, we are now fully aware of their real designations within the Indian intelligence apparatus and their true motives in the war. The fact that, the decision to create the Mujib Bahini was made at the house of Chittarangan Sutar in the presence of Sheikh Fazlul Haq Moni, Tufail Ahmed, Shirazul Alam Khan and Abdur Razzak at the end of May 1971 with Major General Uban in attendance unmistakably imprints all those at the meeting as under RAW supervision and control which was later definitively confirmed by Dr. Kalidas Baidya and other experts on Indian intelligence. The key RAW figure at these meetings was undoubtedly Chittaranjan Sutar, who had been appointed Sheikh Mujib’s representative in India and had direct access to the Indian Prime Minister and other senior officials of the government. He was later assigned the important task of making Bangladesh a part of India of which the Mujib Bahini may come to have played a crucial role until events escalated out of their control in 1975.

It is, however, clear that during the 1971 war Kao had no intention of giving the Mujib Bahini a free hand in important policy decision making and sought to enflame jealousies and rivalries between different factions of the Awami League and with the other political parties so as to keep all the sides disunited and seeking Indian patronage and support. None of this is overtly mentioned within the pages of Major General Uban’s book but the implications and results of these policies are all there for the inquiring historian and general reader of political and historical events. It was also at this time that the political and military chain of command was severely disrupted as the Mujib Bahini did not accept the orders of Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed or come within the control structure headed by Colonel Osmany and General Aurora.

That Kao chose to juggle with the different political personalities and groups reflected Indian uncertainties over Sheikh Mujib’s whereabouts and whether he was alive or dead. On his release by Pakistan after the war the Indian government provided full support to him and his acolytes in the Awami League and accepted with alacrity his generous offer to have Major General Uban as his Personal Advisor. One can only speculate on how influential Major General Uban was in formulating the ideology of Mujibism that visualized democracy based on socialism and secularism that was foisted upon Bangladesh with the attendant atrocities committed under its name by what came to be known as BAKSAL (one party rule with Sheikh Mujib as President for life) and enforced by the Rakkhi Bahini both of which are glossed over in Uban’s account. His objective in writing the book can be surmised from the epilogue where he provides a hagiographic and almost surreal portrayal of Sheikh Mujib in order to promote the Indian ideals that distort the political, religious and geographical outcome of 1947.

Sheikh Mujib’s blind and sentimental attachment to India heavily tinged with his unlimited and at times irrational ambition led to the eventual and inevitable betrayal of Bangladesh as liberation only brought the dream of Akhand Bharat that much closer as the safeguards to Bangladesh’s independence were gradually removed until 1975 when they were again reemployed. This was not the ideal for which millions struggled, fought and sacrificed in 1971. A more independent and self-interested philosophy for Bangladesh could have saved the nation from the coming catastrophes wrought by Indian interference and domination in the internal affairs of the country.

APOLOGISTS FOR SHEIKH MUJIBUR RAHMAN
In an earlier part of this essay I dealt with several books that presented contradictory viewpoints on the 1971 war in this section I will try a similar approach on a single biography of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman by drawing in relevant points from the analysis and discussion given above. It is hoped that the reader will appreciate the manner and consistency in which India has managed to distort our history in order to fit their requirements for Bangladesh and how our local authors have enthusiastically propagated this slant and been willing parties to the deliberate falsification of historical record and national recollection.

It has in recent years become a fashion for authors to ingratiate themselves to populist sentiment and presumably Indian interests to author books that glamorize the life of Sheikh Mujib and portray him in mythical terms unsullied by conspiracy or personal ambition. One such example presents itself in the form of S.A. Karim’s, ‘Sheikh Mujib Triumph and Tragedy’ (2005) which attempts to cover the most significant events that contributed in forming the personality of the Sheikh and the ‘East Bengalis’ and the social, religious and political pressures that led to the independence of Bangladesh. For most writers this would be an endeavour of immense magnitude and for many beyond their limited capabilities. One is therefore left disappointed by the efforts of Mr. S.A. Karim who should have talent in abundance since he is a graduate of the Universities of Calcutta and Dhaka and the London School of Economics as well as being a member of the Foreign Service of Pakistan and Bangladesh since 1950.

It is only necessary to refer to one chapter of the book to demonstrate the fabrications adopted to save Sheikh Mujib from controversy and the resultant public obloquy and denigration that would have followed. In Chapter 34 on the Mukti Bahini the author makes the following astounding and thoroughly discreditable statement,

“One reason for the dilution of quality of the Mukti Bahini was the siphoning off of the more promising youth to form a parallel force: Mujib Bahini. This was a product of the underhand maneuvers of Sheikh Moni. Since his arrival in India Sheikh Moni had developed a good working relationship with RAW, the Indian intelligence service, through Chittaranjan Sutar. It was Moni who persuaded Kaw [Kao], the RAW chief, that it would be a good thing to have a separate force outside the control of the provisional government. Major General (Retd.) Uban of the Indian Army, who had overseen the formation of guerilla groups of Tibetan refugees, was put in charge of training the Mujib Bahini. Mujib Bahini did not play any active role in the liberation war. It was kept as a force-in-being for possible use after liberation.”

We know from Asoka Raina and Major General S.S. Uban that RAW was involved in organizing, training and equipping the Mukti Bahini and the Mujib Bahini. It is also untrue that the Mujib Bahini did not see action during the war as Uban details certain operations in which the Mujib Bahini took part in the Chittagong and Dhaka zones. The purpose of this falsehood would seem to be the exoneration of India and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman from the subsequent debacles and catastrophes that befell Bangladesh after independence and put the blame squarely on the shoulders of Sheikh Fazlul Huq Moni and his band of followers. Although the author names Uban directly he does not provide any reference to where he collected his information on the Mukti and Mujib Bahini and their connections with RAW which could only have come from Uban’s and Raina’s books. Such an omission is universally considered a lack of integrity and honesty amongst writers and intellectuals the world over especially by those engaged in serious scholarly study.

To draw too fine a distinction, as Mr. S.A. Karim does, between RAW’s nurturing of Sheikh Fazlul Haq Moni and their utilization of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman before and after the war leads one to logical and historical absurdities and is not consistent with the data now available. Prior to the 1971 war Moni supported Sheikh Mujib on the issue of the 6 point demand against those who favoured a one point demand for an independent socialist state. This fitted in with RAW’s program of creating a compliant bahini that would be used to eliminate communists, socialists and others of the leftist persuasion that were viewed as a threat to India. This was particularly so, in the case of the Mukti Bahini who were believed to have a large section of members sympathetic to the leftist cause and who may not tolerate Indian interference in a post-war government in Bangladesh. The purpose behind the creation of the Mujib Bahini was not to fight the Pakistan Army but to liquidate the perceived enemies of India such as the Mizos and the communists and socialists.

In reference to the latter two groups this policy of eradication was to be achieved through the secret assassination of known activists (many of the murders were subsequently blamed on the Razzakers or collaborators to the Pakistan Army who did commit acts of isolated atrocities but not on the scale that has been assumed). These operations began in August 1971 with the entry of the Mujib Bahini into the then East Pakistan theatre of war and their activities involved the betrayal of leftist sympathizers to the Pakistan Army such as Swapon Chowdhury who was the first to propose an independent socialist state for Bangladesh. On the instructions of RAW the Moni faction did not spare freedom fighters or even members of the Mujib Bahini who were felt to have leftist leanings.

After independence these operations against the communists, socialists and leftist thinkers became a matter of personal ambition and self-gratification for Moni who formed a private army called the Awami Jubo League to continue this process of selective killings which on occasion became very random and indiscriminate. These sentiments of distrust against the leftists were also shared by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman who it is claimed had proudly expressed the opinion that the leftists in East Pakistan would be soon eliminated. Sheikh Mujib later used the Rakkhi Bahini, of which Moni was one of the key figures, to exterminate all his opponents who tended to be on the left wing of the politics spectrum and who were also opposed to Indian domination. This was to be the lowest ebb of Sheikh Mujib’s rule and was partly brought about by the signing of the Twenty-Five Year Treaty 1972 with India which provided for the formation of a paramilitary group to take on the responsibilities of the army and which also shackled Bangladesh to the security and strategic arrangements imposed by New Delhi,

“When Mujib signed this treaty with India, Maulana Bhashani opposed and criticized Mujib for having traded ‘the political and economic sovereignty’ of Bangladesh to India. Sirajul Alam Khan, the guide of the Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal or JSD (Jalil-Rab), also expressed the same view and incited anti-Mujib anti-Indian agitation. And that influenced ordinary people significantly.”

It is clear that S.A. Karim has not made the necessary connections between Indian expansionist designs and the complementary gestures made by both Moni and Sheikh Mujib to facilitate their project in East Pakistan and later in Bangladesh. Ultimately Sheikh Mujib became distant and emotionally divorced from the people who made the greatest sacrifices for freedom during the liberation war. This was revealed by a close associate, Ruhul Quddus, who - as a former CSP, Agartala conspiracy case co-accused and drafter of the 6 point demand - was able to acquire first hand knowledge of the Sheikh’s personality. According to Quddus, Sheikh Mujib was reluctant to accept the contributions of others in the bringing of independence to Bangladesh. He could not believe that Bangladesh achieved independence in his absence and he never asked those who did the actual fighting about their experiences or suffering. In contrast, S.A. Karim presents Sheikh Mujib in this period, soon after his return from Pakistan (via London), as a man befuddled by long confinement and easily misled by Moni and to some extent the Indian government but generally ignores the deeper threads interwoven in this story and especially the dark side of Mujib’s personality which he glosses over with euphemisms.

Similar inconsistencies, contradictions and fallacies as narrated in Chapter 34, 39 and 40 of S.A. Karim’s book appear through out the volume but are most egregious in Chapter 35 on the ‘Impact on India’; Chapter 42 on ‘Domestic Affairs’ but is really a defence of the Rakkhi Bahini; Chapter 50 on ‘Mending Fences with India’ which merely absolves India of blame on border disputes, the enclaves issue and the Farraka Barrage; Chapter 54 on ‘Mujib’s Second Revolution’ that papers over the unconscionable assault on democracy through BAKSAL; Chapter 55 on ‘Siraj Sikder’ which unconvincingly searches for an excuse and an alibi to Sheikh Mujib’s involvement in the leftist leaders murder; and in Chapter 57 on ‘End of the Mujib Regime’ which details the plot behind the Sheikhs assassination on 15th August 1975 and ultimately blames Moni for everything that went wrong during the preceding 3 years. Moni has effectively been used as a device to cover up the misdeeds of RAW and the Indian government who are kept well away from the real drama and their voices are represented through the persona of Moni.

Basically the book tries to divert our attention away from the real issue of India’s schemes and stratagems that were employed in East Pakistan and Bangladesh for their more distant vision of an Akhand Bharat which seems to be the whole purpose of the introductory chapters of S.A. Karim’s book which reminisces over a United Bengal.


END NOTES & REFERENCES
Khodeja Bejum – Historical illumination on attempts to create a United Bengal and Akhand Bharat (Dainik Ajkal Khobor – November 24, 2003): This is an excellent introduction into how India has made active attempts to reunite Bengal and thereby bring Bangladesh within the larger Indian union. It provides a detailed summation of most of the relevant events, documents and authorities that have engaged in this endeavor.

See Rick Fountain – Bangladesh War Secrets Revealed (BBC News World Edition – January 1, 2003)
Kuldip Nayar - Facts, not fiction, about Pakistan's debacle in Bangladesh (Indian Express – January 24, 2001); Moudud Ahmed – Bangladesh: Constitutional Quest for Autonomy (1991)
Moudud Ahmed – Bangladesh: Constitutional Quest for Autonomy (1991) Ch. 6
Salman Akhter - 1971 (http://faculty.babson.edu/ahussain/Papers/popper.pdf)

Kuldip Nayar - Facts, not fiction, about Pakistan's debacle in Bangladesh (Indian Express – January 24, 2001)

Kuldip Nayar - Facts, not fiction, about Pakistan's debacle in Bangladesh (Indian Express – January 24, 2001); Moudud Ahmed – Bangladesh: Constitutional Quest for Autonomy (1991); Banglapedia – Agartala Conspiracy Case
(http://banglapedia.org/HT/A_0059.HTM)

This now appears deceitful and discomfiting in light of the new evidence of his rapport with India.

Banglapedia – Six-point Programme (http://banglapedia.org/HT/S_0426.HTM)

Moudud Ahmed Ch. 6; Syed Badrul Ahsan – 7 June 1966: Revisiting the Six Points (The Daily Star – June 7, 2006); M. Waheeduzaman Manik – The Significance of the Six-Point Movement and its Impact on Bangladesh’s Struggle for Freedom and Self-determination (NFB – June 8, 2006)

Masudul Haq - Bangladesher Shadinhata Juddeh RAW Abong CIA (Bangladesh Independence War: RAW and CIA) (1990) pg. 10-12

Masudul Haq pp. 31-32

Masudul Haq pg. 35

Masudul Haq pg. 44

Rick Fountain – Bangladesh War Secrets Revealed (BBC News World Edition – January 1, 2003); After 30 years and a new warming of relations between the United States and India there is less concern in America if Pakistan were to disintegrate and already eulogies are being written: Michael F. Scheuer - A Back of the Hand (The Washington Times – April 7, 2006)

Manjeet Singh Pardesi – Deducing India’s Grand Strategy of Regional Hegemony from Historical and Conceptual Perspectives (Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies – April 2005) pg. 29

Moudud Ahmed Ch. 6; Faiz Ahmed – Agartala Mamla: Sheikh Mujib O Banglar Bidroho (1997 edition)

Moudud Ahmed Ch. 6; This outfit has many similarities to the JMB of 35 years later.

Md. Zainul Abedin – RAW and Bangladesh (1995)

Praveen Swami – Covert Contestation (Frontline Magazine - Volume 22 - Issue 19, Sep 10 - 23, 2005); B. Raman - 'We should leave Pakistan to stew in her own juice (January 18, 2003); Dr. Shireen M. Mazari – India’s Unconventional War Strategy ( Defence Journal – Vol 3 No. 1 January 1999)

I have generally ignored Asoka Raina’s paragraph structure which I think is idiosyncratic and have freely adapted it for the ease of reading and comprehension.

Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin – The Mitrokhin Archives II (2005) – On page 347 the authors state, “By the late 1960s the Kremlin seems to have come to the conclusion that the separation of Pakistan’s western and eastern wings would be in Soviet, as well as Indian, interests. The KGB therefore set out to cultivate the leader of the autonomist Awami League, Sheik Mujibur Rahman (‘Mujib’). Though Mujib was unaware of the cultivation, the KGB claimed that it succeeded in persuading him that the United States had been responsible for his arrest in January 1968, when he had been charged with leading the so-called ‘Agartala conspiracy’, hatched during meetings with Indian officials at the border town of Agartala to bring about the secession of East Pakistan with Indian help. Through an intermediary, Mujib was told in September 1969 that the names of all the conspirators had been personally passed to Ayub by the US Ambassador. According to a KGB report, Mujib was completely taken in by the disinformation and concluded that there must have been a leak to the Americans from someone in his entourage.” (pg. 347)

Author’s emphasis. What is actually being implied by the term provincial unless he was confusing the word with provisional which I doubt? A Freudian slip perhaps?

… and when they did they left with much of our military equipment, tables and chairs right down to the water faucets and taps. ( see Mohammed Zainul Abedin – No room to pay homage to Aurora (NFB – March 27, 2006)

B. Raman – ‘We should leave Pakistan to stew in her own juice (rediff.com – January 18, 2003)

It should not be surprising that many of the intelligence heads appointed in India have shared similar opinions about the 1971 war and after and in this respect J.N. Dixit, the subject of Part 2A of this article, was the intelligence chief appointed by the Congress party that attained power in the 2004 national elections.

S.S. Uban – Phantoms of Chittagong: The “Fifth Army” in Bangladesh (1985)

Mahmud Hasan – Mujib Bahini Vs. Mukti Bahini (Holiday – November 11, 2004)

It is only in Chapter 16 of Uban’s book that a hint is made of Kao’s responsibility as external intelligence chief but this is so obscurely stated that a reader may actually miss its implications.

Masudul Haq pp. 68, 97, 176

In his book ‘Bangaleer Muktiyuddhe Antaraler Sheikh Mujib’ to be discussed in the next part

Sutar’s importance to Indian designs, of which the Mujib Bahini were to play an important part, were revealed in an interview of Humayan Rashed Chowdhury, a former diplomat to the UN and India and a former speaker of Parliament, where it had been disclosed to him that Chittaranjan Sutar had been instructed by Indira Gandhi on 28 December, 1971 to make Bangladesh a part of India (Masudul Haq pg. 162)

S.S. Uban was only one of many advisers that were sent to Dhaka on secession of hostilities. See Moudud Ahmed – Era of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (1983) and Lt. Gen. JFR Jacob – Surrender at Dhaka (UPL – 1997) pg. 149

See page 2 and Chapter 15 of the same book to get a clear appreciation of Uban’s views on the Two Nation Theory; See also Manjeet Singh Pardesi pg. 26-27

See part 2B

However, recent research does seem to indicate that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was not as gullible as the Indians had hoped or wished nor was he as ideologically committed as some of his supporters seem to think (see Tuhin Reza -
Mujib, 7 March 71 Speech and Call for Independence (NFB – April 3, 2006). This theory would suggest that at heart Sheikh Mujib was no more than an opportunist who craved power above all else and probably would have settled for a lot less than independence if a power sharing arrangement had been finalized with Yahya Khan. To elaborate on this theory it was due to the arrogance and a lack of perspicacity of the Pakistani central authorities Sheikh Mujib’s hand was forced and events moved beyond his control while he was incarcerated on the charges brought against him in the Agartala Conspiracy Case (and on an earlier charge based on the Six Point Demand). Once the students and Awami League leaders were psychologically geared towards independence it was too late for him to back out without losing face so he burned all his bridges and opted wholly for the Indian cause. The only problem with this thesis is that we would be expected to believe that for two decades Sheikh Mujib had been playing the Indians and Pakistanis against each other and simply miscalculated at the last moment! (See also Tuhin Reza – Father of the Nation Controversy: My Comments (NFB - May 25, 2006)

Masudul Haq pp. 50, 96, 124, 127, 203, 204; see also Manjeet Singh Pardesi pg. 121

G.W. Choudhury – The Last Days of United Pakistan pg. 119 cited in Masudul Haq pg. 65

Masudul Haq pp. 131, 155,

Abdul Quader Chowdhury – Mutual cooperation can be beneficial (part 1) (Holiday – May 26, 2006)

Masudul Haq pp. 136, 169-170

Abu Al Sayyid – Shatcholisher Akhand Bangla Andalon (1999); Dr. Kalidas Baidya - Bangaleer Muktiyuddhe Antaraler Sheikh Mujib (2005)

[akzaman]

THE INDIA DOCTRINE
PART 4

THE BETRAYAL OF BANGLADESH

Sheikh Mujibir Rahman was confident in the knowledge that India had practically installed him into power through almost two decades of nurturing and cooperation and then direct military intervention in 1971. India could therefore be said to have had a huge investment in his continued occupation of the post of Prime Minister and leader of Bangladesh. This hubris probably started him on his precipitous decline into megalomania, dictatorship and political intimidation. This phase in the country’s history has been thoroughly documented by numerous authors of varying quality, depth and bias but what has generally been omitted from these narratives, is the role played by India, in implanting the contradictory premises and ambitions of the different political characters and personalities within the polity of the new nation.

As we have already seen the creation of the Mujib Bahini was essentially a policy initiative of RAW. That other groups were also courted by Indian intelligence and military officials indicates that they were not prepared to put all their eggs in one basket but also primarily to ensure that the competing political factions sought out only Indian assistance in ‘impartially’ adjudicating their internal disputes. The main consequence of this approach was that a combination of these parties could never become a united entity that may one day turn against their supposed benefactors and adopt an independent line from New Delhi.

This is illustrated by the fact that India had no real affection or fondness for Sheikh Mujib who they saw merely as a pawn in their wider political chess game in creating an Akhand Bharat and is expressed in the crudest and coarsest terms by Dr. Kalidas Baidya in his book, ‘Bangaleer Muktiyuddhe Antaraler Sheikh Mujib’ published in 2005. It is likely that Sheikh Mujib and the Awami League were aware that they were only tolerated by India for the services that they could render to that country in exchange for the power that would be conferred upon them through Indian arms once Bangladesh achieved independence. It was also probably for this reason that Sheikh Mujib was resistant to declaring independence until the very last moment (Dr. Kalidas Baidya has argued that the Sheikh never actually declared independence) since he correctly realized that a bargain with the West Pakistanis would be better than a pact with the devil. However, once the decision was taken irrevocably out of his hands due to his voluntary confinement in Pakistan he opted completely for the Indian cause on his return to a now independent Bangladesh. Dr. Kalidas Baidya would probably discount Sheikh Mujib’s reliability after he took control of power but his subsequent decisions only increased India’s stranglehold on Bangladesh which was reversed only after his death by President Ziaur Rahman.

It is more than likely that Dr. Baidya is still aggrieved that Sheikh Mujib did not go even further in accommodating Indian interests but it ignores the ground realities in Bangladesh and the sentiments of the people who would not have tolerated further encroachment which may have encouraged a counter-revolution. One should also not make the mistake to think that Dr. Baidya is an impartial and objective observer with no axes to grind or political agendas to fulfill through the falsification and manipulation of facts and opinion. In this same respect, one will not find a consistent and ideologically committed Sheikh Mujib as he was never truly in control of events and was prepared to prevaricate and bargain when it suited him and his ego.

BANGLADESH OR EAST BENGAL
An extensive review of ‘Bangaleer Muktiyuddhe Antaraler Sheikh Mujib’ will help to provide insights that will clarify the ambiguities that may be in the readers mind between the independence struggle and India’s aim of an Akhand Bharat which was intended to be the logical consequence to an Indian liberated East Pakistan. It will also shed light on the subsequent calamitous decisions made by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman that were to substantially impair the nation’s sovereignty and posed a risk to its territorial integrity. Although the term Akhand Bharat does not appear in ‘Bangaleer Muktiyuddhe Antaraler Sheikh Mujib’ it is an unspoken aspiration hidden beneath another no less threatening agenda of an independent ‘East Bengal’ which if successful would lead inexorably to the ultimate prize for India - reunification.

It should be mentioned at the outset of this discussion on ‘Bangaleer Muktiyuddhe Antaraler Sheikh Mujib’ that Dr. Kalidas Baidya is the head of the Bangla Sena, an organization outlawed by Bangladesh and which operates from Kolkata. Official requests by the Bangladesh government have been made to the Indian government to halt the activities of this group but to no avail. This, of course enhances Dr. Kalidas Baidya credentials as a spokesman for Indian designs on Bangladesh and which is further reinforced in the introduction to the book written by Pabitra Kumar Ghosh, a journalist and advisor to the Dainik Bartaman, who assures us that Dr. Baidya had been working for East Pakistan’s freedom soon after Pakistan’s establishment in 1947. He was also a close associate of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and took on onerous responsibilities which allowed him to witness the changes in this historical period from the vantage point of an insider. He had become acquainted with Sheikh Mujib from the time of the 1952 Language Movement. The information provided in the book, according to Kumar Ghosh, can have only come from Dr. Baidya who has publicized matters that have never before been disclosed about these historical upheavals. In the final analysis, it is for the reader to determine how much of what has been written in the book is factual, truthful, authentic and reliable and which parts are influenced by the desire to confuse, deceive and manipulate opinion.

It is necessary to adopt a critical approach to the text as under the section titled ‘Writers Words’ the author makes his viewpoint clear and that the remainder of the book will be tainted with this outlook and perspective. According, to Dr. Baidya it was due to the [alleged] oppression of Hindu’s in Pakistan that animated him into seeking Pakistan’s break up. Once Pakistan had been shorn of its eastern half this separated segment would be enthused by Bengali nationalism that would bring an independent ‘East Bengal’ into existence. On this premise he devised a plan for ‘East Bengal’s’ actualization but to his great disappointment after Pakistan was divided by the 1971 war no ‘East Bengal’ appeared. This he blames on Sheikh Muibur Rahman who he claims promoted Islamic nationalism and this remains a sore point for him but the author fails to mention that his own conception of an ‘East Bengal’ would advance Hindu nationalism at the expense of the majority Muslims in Bangladesh.

In the first chapter of the book, ‘Our Work Begins in Dhaka’ we are told that the author, Chittaranjan Sutar and Nirod Majumder entered Dhaka at the end of 1951. As we already know from ‘Sheikh Mujib Triumph and Tragedy’ (2005) Chittaranjan Sutar was a RAW operative and so the author unwittingly discloses his own identity as a RAW agent. While Kalidas (Dr. Baidya) gets admitted as a student at Dhaka Medical College to engage with the student community the other two engage themselves in social welfare and start a public relations drive. We are informed that it was behind a curtain of secrecy that the three worked. It is in the chapter on ‘Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’ that the author expresses his animus towards Sheikh Mujib whose affiliation to H.S. Suhrawardy and his active participation in the infamous 1946 Kolkata riots indelibly marks him out as suspect and a communalist. It was, however, long before the 1964 Kolkata riots that Chittaranjan Sutar (Chittababu) and Kalidas gave Sheikh Mujib the assurance that all the Hindu’s of East Bengal would accept him as their leader and under him support the movement for self-rule of ‘East Bengal’. This crucial piece of information fits in very well with the narratives in Faiz Ahmed and Asoka Raina’s book providing a third link to a conspiracy involving Sheikh Mujib.

This connection is further strengthened in the following two chapters, ‘Understanding with Sheikh Mujib’ and ‘Six Point base for self-rule demand’ but receives its strongest endorsement in the chapter specifically on the ‘Agartala Conspiracy’. Both Sheikh Mujib and Chittababu were held as prisoners in Dhaka Central jail where Kalidas’ father-in-law was office head assistant to the Dhaka IG (Prisons) and who arranged meetings between the two. Whatever was discussed was passed on from Chittababu to Kalidas who was acting as his physician. If it was necessary for Sheikh Mujib to get out emergency information this would be informed to Kalidas who would then transmit it to the designated persons. In this way secret communications were distributed through Kalidas. This chapter not only provides a link between RAW and Sheikh Mujib but also its modus operandi during the period when the conspiracy was meant to have taken place (1963-1967) and also during the pendency of the trial when surveillance would have been at it’s highest.

It is in the chapter on the ‘Peoples Freedom Party’ that an Akhand Bharat is alluded to and for which a political party was formed in 1970 whose hidden agenda was an independent East Bengal. On the coming of Bangladesh and it’s renaming from East Pakistan, Kalidas absurdly states that his party took possession of West Bengal. It was at this time, that Kalidas discovered a lack of political consciousness of the Hindu’s. By naming itself Bangladesh it became the rightful owner of the Bangla language and therefore has an unrestrained and unhindered right over it, which was not protested by West Bengal or India. By not discerning this obvious danger, India through its recognition of Bangladesh has accepted a small part as if it considered it as the whole but a part can never be a whole but this was not in the comprehension or understanding of the Indian political leaders at that time, according to Kalidas.

In its convoluted way this chapter presents a political program that advocates the creation of an ‘East Bengal’ to be amalgamated or absorbed into an Akhand Bharat. It was for this reason that Kalidas and Chittababu’s primary objective was for Sheikh Mujib to issue a declaration for the independence of ‘East Bengal’. It was agreed that Chittababu would become Sheikh Mujib’s representative in Kolkata and would work secretly there for the establishment of an East Bengal. The manner in which this campaign was presented to the people had to be carefully orchestrated so that if Sheikh Mujib did betray them in end the movement could not be stopped and it would continue of its own momentum.

Suspicions were aroused when Sheikh Mujib voluntarily sought detention with the Pakistan Army after the start of the military crackdown when he could have easily escaped along with the other Awami League leaders to India. Kalidas raises the questions as to why Sheikh Mujib did not give a written declaration of independence to his party members who were allowed to flee across the border with RAW’s cooperation. It was due to this omission on Sheikh Mujib’s part that Major Ziaur Rahman had to declare independence in his stead - this issue still remains controversial and Kalidas is probably the first Indian to discuss this matter so openly. The reason for Sheikh Mujib’s behaviour could be that he wanted to negotiate further with the Pakistanis while in captivity but he would be at a serious disadvantage without access to the outside world. The more plausible answer which fits his character best was that he did not want to take the risks associated with war as he was on the verge of achieving personal victory. He did not want to make a final decision on independence until he was sure of the outcome and most importantly he was not confident enough to decide between an independent Bangladesh that may antagonize his Hindu/RAW supporters or an East Bengal that may turn the entire nation against him. The best policy for him was to remain silent until power was handed to him either through a Pakistan power sharing compromise or an Indian military victory bringing in an independent Bangladesh or an East Bengal which would be conveniently decided without him.

From this point onwards Kalidas follows a similar course to other writers that have covered this subject from a RAW/India standpoint. He identifies Shirazul Alam Khan, Abdur Razzak, Sheikh Moni and Tofail Ahmed as having the greatest contribution to Mujib’s rise. In Kolkata these four student leaders and Chittababu had regular meetings along with Abdur Rab Serniabat and then later Sheikh Kamal and Jamal. In the chapter, ‘Movement starts in Kolkata’ Kalidas digresses back to his favourite bugbear about the renaming of East Pakistan to Bangladesh but he adds an ominous twist to his argument. He states that the Hindu refugees now in India will create a homeland and reside there. Once Bangladesh becomes independent it will be necessary to raise the issue of a homeland but this will be publicized very cautiously and in extreme secrecy. According to Kalidas the Indian government gave its approval for this secret campaign for a Hindu homeland to commence.

This could only mean that Bangladesh would be carved up to furnish an enclave or an adjoining area to India so that Hindu’s could have their so-called homeland which would be based on an analogy with the state of Israel which is not acknowledged directly by Kalidas but this is evident in his pattern of thinking. In many ways there does exist a similarity of contention made by the Zionists for Palestinian land but in the case of a Hindu homeland India would not settle for less than the entire landmass of Bangladesh which would be the natural progression if only a small portion was to be made available due to the economic repercussions for the country. As an Akhand Bharat cannot be achieved directly it must be attained by a more circuitous route through demands for an East Bengal or a Hindu Homeland.

In the same way that Hitler used false accusations and charges against Poland, Czechoslovakia and Austria of oppressing their ethnic German population before invading those countries, Kalidas adopts the same methods as an excuse to interfere in East Pakistan/Bangladesh internal affairs. Staged acts of cruelty against Hindu’s were (and are being) used to promote the idea of a Hindu Homeland and to constitute a defense force for their protection. It was for this reason that secret training was to be administered to Hindu youth and to another elite force separate from the Mukti Bahini. This new bahini would be ‘non-communal’ in character and after independence would take on the main responsibilities normally carried out by an institutionalized army. The members of the bahini would also be involved in and control the executive running of state and would help diminish the power and strength of the ‘communalist’ Mukti Bahini. Chittababu proposed the name of Mujib Bahini that would be led by the student leaders listed above.

The student leaders, themselves believed, that if the Indian government gave permission for the activation of the Mujib Bahini and if they were able to work along the lines discussed above then the political and military power would automatically devolve into their hands. As a result, the new government could never be capable of asserting a different course from that desired by New Delhi. Chittababu and Kalidas were of the opinion that the two Bahini’s would continue to be plagued by ill feeling and jealousy which would be exacerbated with contradictions that would emerge later on with the Bangladesh government itself. If it was possible to set up a separate Hindu Bahini then this would act as a balance between the competing groups and ultimately would have the final say in the decision making process. The training for the Hindu Bahini would be completely secret and covert with only the Indian Prime Minister and the Army Chief knowing anything about it. Obviously, the Bangladesh government and its Army Chief could not be taken into confidence on this RAW initiative. The proposal for a Hindu Bahini was immediately accepted by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and training for the Mujib Bahini was started under the guidance of Major General S.S. Uban.

The most damning indictment against the Awami League leadership and the student leaders holed up in Kolkata comes at the end of the book in the chapter entitled, ‘Pakistan-India war preparations and war’. During the final phase of the conflict or at least very soon after the 1971 war (Kalidas does not specify a date) an agreement was signed between the Bangladesh government in exile by Acting President Syed Nazrul Islam (Sheikh Mujib had not been released by Pakistan by this time) and the Indian government which contained the following seven points:

1. Those who actively participated as Freedom Fighters and were recognized as such would according to ability, run the state administration of Bangladesh and the others would be removed from their employment and service.

2. The Indian and Bangladesh armies would be made into a joint or combined army whose head would be the Indian Army Chief. Only on his command could war be waged.

3. Bangladesh will not have its own military force.

4. Instead a paramilitary force would be established to take care of the internal law and order situation.

5. There will be an open market between the two countries but from time to time through mutual discussions the principles of trade would be settled.

6. The Indian Army will remain in Bangladesh for an indefinite period.

7. India and Bangladesh would have the same foreign policy based on discussions between the two countries.

After this agreement was signed Prime Minister Indira Gandhi took steps for war with Pakistan. On the 16th of December 1971 the Indian Army is said by Kalidas to have taken ‘possession’ of Bangladesh. In the surrender and sovereignty power document which was signed by General Niazi on behalf of the defeated Pakistan Army and handed over to General Aurora it was no where mentioned whether this document was then passed on to the Bangladesh government later on. Kalidas seems to be implying that with the possession of this document still in Indian hands ‘legal title’ to the sovereignty of Bangladesh remains with India. Kalidas adds that up to this time neither government, separately or jointly, has ever cancelled the 7 point agreement.

It may be useful to note that at the time of signing of the 7 point agreement there did not exist an internationally recognized Bangladesh government with its own territory, army or any of the other recognized symbols of statehood. There were no legitimate representation of the Bangladeshi people, as there was no Bangladesh state for them to be citizens of or represented by, at the signing of this document as the Mujibnagar government was based in Kolkata and was generally understood to be a transitional authority. Doubly detrimental to the agreements significance is that if all its provisions were scrupulously followed a Bangladesh state or government could not have come into existence to implement them since they would be perceived as mere puppets carrying out the dictates of the central authority in New Delhi which would negate the fundamental attributes of statehood. The lack of a date to the agreement is therefore a deliberate ploy by Kalidas to avoid these uncomfortable facts and a pretence to entrench in the Indian public’s mind the erroneous belief in the legal status and enforceability of the agreement which would by pen and paper have written in ‘East Bengal as another province of a still incomplete Akhand Bharat.

The supposed agreement (of which we have no proof) has no legal validity for the reasons just stipulated and is therefore not binding on the successor administration to the East Pakistan government. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was said to have denounced its provisions when he came to know of it from Tajuddin Ahmad, although, this may have been for public consumption because at least in one respect (point 4) he did see the agreement through to its tragic end when he gave tacit approval for the creation of the Rakkhi Bahini. As for the remainder of the agreement the provisions were given legal validity and effect by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman when he signed the 25 year Friendship Treaty with India. The Treaty came about as a result of growing international disquiet at the Indian army’s continued presence in Bangladesh and who appeared to be an occupying force rather a liberating one. Their extended stay was also breeding hostility amongst Bangladeshis because the Indian army was seen taking away, ‘the arms, ammunitions, equipments, machineries and even furniture and household goods in convoy of trucks across the border.’ For Sheikh Mujib the major cause of concern was that many countries were still withholding recognition because of the Indian army’s continuing presence in Bangladesh after the end of hostilities. For these reasons Sheikh Mujib was forced to submit to this Faustian bargain of which the relevant article are –

ARTICLE 4 - The High Contracting Parties shall maintain regular contacts with each other on major international problems affecting the interests of both States, through meetings and exchanges of views at all levels;

ARTICLE 5 - The High Contracting Parties shall continue to strengthen and widen their mutually advantageous and all-round cooperation in the economic, scientific and technical fields. The two countries shall develop mutual cooperation in the fields of trade, transport and communications between them on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual benefit and the most favoured nation principle.

ARTICLE 8 – In accordance with the ties of friendship existing between the two countries each of the High Contracting Parties solemnly declares that it shall not enter into or participate in any military alliance directed against the other party.

Each of the High Contracting Parties shall refrain from any aggression against the other Party and shall not allow the use of its territory for committing any act that may cause military damage to or constitute a threat to the security of the other High Contracting Party.

ARTICLE 9 – Each of the Contracting Parties shall refrain from giving any assistance to any third Party taking part in an armed conflict against the other party. In case either Party is attacked or threatened with attack, the High Contracting Parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to take appropriate effective measures to eliminate the threat and thus ensure the peace and security of their countries.

ARTICLE 10 – Each of the High Contracting Parties solemnly declares that it shall not undertake any commitment, secret or open, toward one or more states which may be incompatible with the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 11 – The present Treaty is signed for a term of twenty-five years and shall be subject to renewal by mutual agreement on the High Contracting Parties. The Treaty shall come into force with immediate effect from the date of its signature.


In a prearranged agreement between the two governments the Indian Army was withdrawn on March 12, 1972 and in return, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi paid a short visit to Bangladesh and signed a Joint Declaration along with the Friendship Treaty on March 19, 1972. As can be seen, the 7 point demand was virtually incorporated in nearly all its respects into the four articles reproduced above except for point 6 which was amended to take into account the new international realities. But the adapted formulation in articles 8-10 has had an equally pernicious effect on the country’s sovereignty and national integrity because while Bangladesh was held strictly to the terms of the agreement India followed it more in its breach. India never intended that the Treaty would apply to it and so disregarded any pretense at a meticulous or faithful observance of its letter or spirit. India’s interpretation of the agreement has given the words friendship and amity a novel and different meaning to that found in any dictionary since its lack of sincerity is far removed from the real sentiments behind these words - as shall be seen in Part 5 of this essay – which has resulted in the gradual diminishing of Bangladesh prestige and respect on the world stage during the Treaty’s existence and validity which expired in 1997 and has not been renewed.

It may be useful to note in this regard that the terms of the Treaty were very similar to the version India signed with the USSR (The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation, 9 August 1971) but with an important difference contained in Article 11 of that agreement which stated the duration of the Treaty to be of twenty years which could be automatically extended for each successive period of five years unless either party declared a desire to terminate it by giving notice to the other party twelve months prior to the Treaty’s expiration. The Treaty would also be subject to ratification and come into force on the date of the exchange of Instruments of Ratification within one month of the signing of the Treaty. These provisions guaranteed the sovereign rights of both countries and respected each nation’s internal ratification procedures. Neither of these provisions was included in the Indo-Bangladesh Friendship Treaty which in effect empowered Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to unilaterally enter into an agreement that gave away the nations sovereign rights without the possibility of termination for a period of twenty five years.

In order to accommodate the Treaty into the constitutional framework of the country Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in another act of national infamy and disgrace amended Article 63 of the constitution in 1973 and this amendment is now the last remaining remnant of the invalid 7 point agreement and the defunct 25 year Friendship Treaty. The original Article 63 had read as follows –

(1) War shall not be declared and the Republic shall not participate in any war except with the assent of Parliament.

(2) In case of actual or imminent invasion of Bangladesh by land, sea or air, the President may take whatever steps he considers necessary for the protection and defence of Bangladesh, and Parliament if not sitting shall be summoned forthwith.

(3) Nothing in this Constitution shall invalidate any law enacted by Parliament which is expressed to be for the purpose of securing the public safety and preservation of the State in time of war, invasion or armed rebellion.

By the Constitution (Second Amendment) Act of 1973 clauses (2) and (3) were omitted while providing for preventive detention and conferring power on Parliament and the executive to deal with emergency situations. In other words, without Parliament’s assent it would be impossible for Bangladesh to wage war even a defensive one in the face of military attack by a foreign power. This would mean that if Indian troops were to enter Bangladesh in an act of hostile and aggressive intent the country would have to wait for Parliament to convene, debate the threat and then assent or reject the proposal for reprisals, retaliation or war. In the context of Bangladesh’s parliamentary politics this would take several weeks to accomplish and by which time the Indian officers would be sitting inside parliament ordering the terms for surrender. Prior to 15 August 1975 this type of walk-over victory would have been much easier for the Indian troops to have achieved as they already a well equipped and trained fifth column awaiting their instructions inside Bangladesh and who were named ominously the Rakkhi Bahini.

THE RAKKHI BAHINI AND THE DECLINE INTO DICTATORSHIP
As we have just seen in Part 3 and in the above discussion India had taken elaborate measures to prevent Bangladesh ever coming out of its grasp and this was assisted by a number of initiatives of Sheikh Mujib on assuming power in 1972. The most far reaching and pernicious was the formation of the Rakkhi Bahini under the pretext that the law and order situation was out of control due to the decimation of the police force and the inadequacy of the Bangladesh Rifles after the events of 1971. With the Mukti Bahini apparently running amok and the availability of arms left in the hands of thousands of people who fought in the war it was felt that something needed to be done.

The intervention of the Bangladesh army was ruled out on the lame excuse that it was still disorganized and that it would appear politically imprudent to seek its assistance in civilian matters. The Awami League also believed that the country would do better without an institutional Army which according to Moudud Ahmed suited the plan of the Indian authorities, “Now that Bangladesh had a friendly relationship with India it was not necessary for her to have a regimental army …. ’ It was said that India could be depended upon to stand by Bangladesh in case of external aggression. It was never made clear what would happen if India became the aggressor.

The Rakkhi Bahini soon out grew its law and order responsibilities and became a tool of political repression not merely to those opposed to Sheikh Mujib and the Awami League but also to the blatant Indian interference in Bangladesh. That the Rakkhi Bahini was essentially a RAW inspired phenomenon appears in the writings of the Pakistani defence specialist Ikram Sehgal who claims that the Indian intelligence agency had raised the parallel military organization to be a loyal force to the Awami League and India. The Rakkhi Bahini was headed by Brig. Nurruzaman who had, as Captain in the Pakistan Army, been tried for treason in the famous Agartala Conspiracy Case which would then connect him with the revolutionary organization that maintained contacts with the Indian High Commission in Dhaka already mentioned in Part 3.

This contention has only found limited support in Bangladesh but with our knowledge of RAW’’s role in supervising, training and organizing the membership of the exclusive and elite Mujib Bahini we can for a number of valid reasons come to a similar conclusion to that of Ikram Sehgal especially since Major General S.S. Uban also assisted with the training and equipping of the Rakkhi Bahini. We also know that amongst the Indian trainers of the Mujib Bahini there included a Major Malhotra who also went on to train the Rakkhi Bahini.

The admission (probably inadvertent) by an Indian analyst who has attempted to address the question of why the Rakkhi Bahini was regarded as an extension of India’s authority in Bangladesh (even before we were aware of the secretive organization called RAW), finds a clue in the fact that military equipment was supplied to this paramilitary force by India, as per the request of the Bangladesh government and that they also used an identical uniform to that worn by the Border Security Force - all allegations that were originally raised by Moudud Ahmed in his book, ‘Era of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’ (1983). The Indian writer no where makes a categorical denial of these factual assertions but instead feebly opines, “The service provided by the Indian bureaucrats, at the request of Bangladesh government, was considered as interference and the looting - the ‘spoils of war’ – is a much overstated incident”.

This partial acknowledgment and concession to the truth by an Indian author simply raises further doubts on the received wisdom from self-appointed experts on the actual genesis of the Rakkhi Bahini. These experts have uniformly viewed the formation of this group as an internal requirement of Sheikh Mujib without any outside input or contribution. The falsity of this claim is countered by the fact that soon after independence a contingent of Indian ‘advisers’ comprising civil servants and technical experts entered Dhaka to restart the civil administration and as we already know Major General S.S. Uban was appointed as Personal Advisor to Sheikh Mujib so that any request for arms for the Rakkhi Bahini would be in reality akin to any provincial government within the Union of India asking for a similar consignment of weapons from central authorities to quell public unrest or violence.

That after the fall of the Sheikh Mujib government the Rakkhi Bahini sought sanctuary in India to carry out terrorist raids into Bangladesh also further confirms our opinion of a RAW link with the setting up and organization of the paramilitary force. According to Moudud Ahmed the idea of introducing the Rakkhi Bahini into Bangladesh was originally conceived by the government in exile at Kolkata and the conceptual underpinning of the new force was politically motivated for the specific purpose of creating a counter-balance to the Army which would be in the interests of both Sheikh Mujib and the Indian government. This correlation of interests had horrendous effects on the discipline and morale of the Rakkhi Bahini once it became an operational force since its unstated and naturally undeclared function was to carry out extra-judicial killings of opposition groups that had sprung up against the Awami League. It was widely perceived that the party had increasingly displayed a subservient and slavish attitude to India and this was resented by Bangladeshis who must have felt betrayed by the broken promises of independence.

The legal framework for the Rakkhi Bahini was only promulgated with retrospective effect after training and recruitment were complete and actual operations had started. The language adopted in the Rakkhi Bahini Order provided little legal structure or restraints on the activities of the Rakkhi Bahini as there seemed to be no specific object or scheme contained within its provisions, which merely stated that, ‘it [the Rakkhi Bahini] would be employed for the purpose of assisting the civil authority in the maintenance of internal security when required and it would perform such function as the government would direct.’ With the minimal of legal constrictions the Rakkhi Bahini commenced on a rampage through out the length and breadth of the country that involved killing, looting and even raping. One author relates the example of a 17 year old boy who was found to have ‘disappeared’ after four days of torture and the Supreme Court when it finally intervened severely castigated the Rakkhi Bahini for operating outside the law. The court found that the Rakkhi Bahini had no code of conduct, no rules of procedure and no register of arrests and interrogation. Instead of reining in the outfit, Sheikh Mujib in his now characteristic manner stripped the court of its powers to intervene in such matters.

The Indian government was prepared to tolerate many of the excesses committed by Sheikh Mujib, the Awami League and the Rakkhi Bahini simply because everything was done with India’s connivance and it was crucial to its strategy that this man, this party and these thugs retained power in Bangladesh at whatever cost. These sentiments are reflected in the propaganda output of two authors who have worked for Indian intelligence during some period in their long and illustrious careers. In the case of J.N. Dixit his principal regret was that Sheikh Mujib did not heed the advice of the commander of the Rakkhi Bahini, Brig. Nurruzaman, to issue the paramilitary force with tanks and armoured personnel carriers. One can only imagine the efficiency and speed with which the Rakkhi Bahini could have accomplished their task of murder and loot with these military vehicles at their disposal. Mr. Dixit never alludes to the atrocities committed by the Rakkhi Bahini and the other writer under review Major General S.S Uban glorifies their patriotism, independence and fearless character which now seems particularly deceitful and duplicitous in light of what we now know about the Rakkhi Bahini and the help provided by him in training and equipping them for their ‘duties’ as law enforcers.

From the above discussion and analysis it would not be an exaggeration to suggest that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had been working hand in glove with the Indians to secure his position as unrivalled leader of the independence movement and then as Prime Minister of Bangladesh while at the same time protecting India’s interest in having a quiescent and submissive eastern neighbour. But once this realization dawned on the people of Bangladesh civil unrest and sporadic uprisings occurred throughout the country especially where the disastrous economic policies of the Awami League were hardest felt. To subdue this growing despondency and potentially revolutionary situation more extreme and draconian measures were introduced that complemented the barbarities committed by the Rakkhi Bahini.

In quick succession several new laws and constitutional amendments were passed of which the most controversial were the President Order 50, Constitution Second Amendment Act 1973, Printing Press and Publications (Declaration and Registration) Ordinance, Special Powers Act 1974, Proclamation of Emergency Order 1974 and the Newspaper (Annulment of Declaration) Ordinance. These all were intended to stamp out dissent with ruthless vigour but the most destructive of democratic principles was the Fourth Amendment to the constitution that brought in the BAKSAL governing system. The implications of the Fourth Amendment were explained by the leading authority on constitutional law Senior Advocate Mahmudul Islam,

“In January, 1975 the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1975 was passed transforming the Constitution beyond any resemblance with the original. Part VIA was incorporated prescribing that there would be only one political party in the State, thereby rendering a severe blow to the democratic set up of the Constitution. Art. 102(1) which conferred power on the High Court Division to enforce the fundamental rights was repealed. The parliamentary form of government was replaced by a form of government was replaced by a form of government which was an apology of a presidential form as the normal checks and balances of a presidential form of government were not incorporated. The President became the repository of the executive power of the Republic which he would exercise with the assistance of ministers selected by him. The President was empowered to appoint the Prime Minister and other ministers. The Judges of the Supreme Court were made removable by the President on the ground of misbehaviour or incapacity. The system introduced was a mishmash of parliamentary and presidential forms of government and the upshot was that the President emerged as the all-powerful authority in the Republic.”

It therefore came as no surprise to Bangladeshis that in the early hours of 15th August 1975 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his entire family (excepting two daughters then in Europe) were killed along with Sheikh Fazlul Huq Moni, Abdur Rab Serniabat and some of their family members.


END NOTES & REFERENCES

Mahmud Hasan – Mujib Bahini Vs. Mukti Bahini (Holiday – November 11, 2004)

In the text where I have included brackets with a comment enclosed it is to signify my own opinion and not that of Dr. Baidya.

See Part 3; Abu Rushd- Raw in Bangladesh (2005) also has the same information. It is likely that Mr. S.A. Karim copied from this book but did not provide a reference to the original text which would constitute plagiarism.

This issue was again referred to in a later chapter ‘Movement Starts in Kolkata’ and in ‘Movement Starts in Kolkata’

S.A. Karim in his book phrases it slightly differently, ‘Sheikh Mujib Triumph and Tragedy’ (2005), “He [Chittaranjan Sutar] was a Hindu Awami Leaguer from Barisal who had been asked by Mujib in the late 1960’s to settle in Kolkata in maintain contact with the Indian authorities in case any help was needed from them.”

Major General S.S. Uban - Phantoms of Chittagong: The “Fifth Army” in Bangladesh (1985); Tuhin Reza – Father of the Nation Controversy: My Comments (NFB - May 25, 2006)

It has been said that he could be two faced and in a RAW assessment he was not trusted by the US, USSR or even India who only allowed to remain in power because there was not alternative then available. (Masudul Haq - Bangladesher Shadinhata Juddeh RAW Abong CIA (Bangladesh Independence War: RAW and CIA) (1990) pp. 138, 142)

Tuhin Reza - Mujib, 7 March 71 Speech and Call for Independence (NFB – April 3, 2006)

William L. Shirer – The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (1960)

Mahmud Hasan – Mujib Bahini Vs. Mukti Bahini (Holiday – November 11, 2004)

Muhammed Zainal Abedin asserts Mahmud Hasan – Mujib Bahini Vs. Mukti Bahini (Holiday – November 11, 2004)

In the text where I have included brackets with a comment enclosed it is to signify my own opinion and not that of Dr. Baidya.

See Part 3; Abu Rushd- Raw in Bangladesh (2005) also has the same information. It is likely that Mr. S.A. Karim copied from this book but did not provide a reference to the original text which would constitute plagiarism.

This issue was again referred to in a later chapter ‘Movement Starts in Kolkata’ and in ‘Movement Starts in Kolkata’

S.A. Karim in his book phrases it slightly differently, ‘Sheikh Mujib Triumph and Tragedy’ (2005), “He [Chittaranjan Sutar] was a Hindu Awami Leaguer from Barisal who had been asked by Mujib in the late 1960’s to settle in Kolkata in maintain contact with the Indian authorities the date October 1971 in his book ‘The Chittagong Hill Tracts: A Victim of Indian interference’ (2003) on page 117 but it is not clear where he got this information. He does make reference to an interview of Mr. Humayun Rashid Chowdhury (Masudul Hoque – RAW and CIA in the Liberation War of Bangladesh (1991)) but he does not specify whether he got the date from this source or somewhere else.

Masudul Haq pp. 92-93

It would still lack its Western portion constituting today’s Pakistan.

Masudul Haq pg. 140

Moudud Ahmed – Era of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman pg 183; Lt. Gen. JFR Jacob – Surrender at Dhaka (UPL – 1997) pg. 150

Moudud Ahmed pg. 185; Masudul Haq pg. 165; Lt. Gen. JFR Jacob pg. 150-151

Moudud Ahmed pg. 186; see also Abdul Quader Chowdhury – Mutual cooperation can be beneficial (Holiday – May 26, 2006)

Mahmudul Islam – Constitutional Law of Bangladesh (Second Edition – 2002)

Moudud Ahmed – Era of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (1983)

Ikram Sehgal – India and State Terrorism (Globe – August 1999)

CAF Dowlah - Crossfire extravaganza: Mindless playing with fire? (New Age – January 31, 2005)

Major General S.S. Uban - Phantoms of Chittagong: The “Fifth Army” in Bangladesh (1985); Dr. Kalidas Baidya - ‘Bangaleer Muktiyuddhe Antaraler Sheikh Mujib’ (2005)

Masudul Haq pg. 99

Smruti S Pattanaik – Internal Political Dynamics and Bangladesh’s Foreign Policy Towards India (Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis – Strategic Analysis Vol. 29, No. 3, Jul-Sep 2005)

Moudud Ahmed pg. 2

Smruti S Pattanaik – Internal Political Dynamics and Bangladesh’s Foreign Policy Towards India (Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis – Strategic Analysis Vol. 29, No. 3, Jul-Sep 2005)

A.K. Faezul Huq – When ‘crossfire’ crosses limits (The Independent – October 23, 2004); CAF Dowlah - Crossfire extravaganza: Mindless playing with fire? (New Age – January 31, 2005); Enayetullah Khan – The Limits of Power (November 11, 2004); Pratirodh Durbar', Abdul Awal Thakur, Itihash Parishad, Dhaka,1993 (Pages:102,186,203-4, 258-9); 'Bideshi Sangbadikder Dristitey Sheikh Mujiber Bangladesh', Hasnat Karim, Society for National Studies, Dhaka,1979 (Pages:63, 70-8, 83-6); 'Ja Dekhechi Ja Bujhechi Ja Korechi, Lt Col Shariful Haq Dalim, Nabajagaron Prakashani, Dhaka,2001 (Pages:371-400)

Moudud Ahmed – Era of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (1983)

Anthony Mascarenhas – Bangladesh – A Legacy of Blood (1986); Moudud Ahmed – Era of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (1983) – the Rakkhi Bahini was subsequently given indemnity by conferring retrospective legality on some of their actions.

J.N. Dixit – ‘Liberation and Beyond: Indo-Bangladesh Relations’ (First Published 1999)

Major General S.S. Uban - Phantoms of Chittagong: The “Fifth Army” in Bangladesh (1985)

Mahmudul Islam – Constitutional Law of Bangladesh (Second Edition – 2002)

[akzaman]

THE INDIA DOCTRINE

PART 5A

THE AFTERMATH

The death of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was felt more acutely in India than it was in Bangladesh where there was quite rejoicing at the fall of the tyrant, the disbanding of the Rakkhi Bahini and the repeal of his hated and maligned laws and constitutional amendments. India’s quest for its idealized Akhand Bharat also suffered a near fatal setback on the morning of 15th August 1975 but this did not deter them from pursuing their objectives with added zeal now that Bangladesh was finding its own voice distinct from that of India. Many in Bangladesh would lose their lives for this audacity but the nation was on an irreversible course that could only be disrupted through sabotage, terrorism and propaganda but the indomitable courage and determination of the people would not compromise on their new found freedom.

India’s plans in dissecting Pakistan and then undermining the sovereignty of Bangladesh would in their view hopefully lead to a reunification of the subcontinent was distressingly expressed by one of India’s most distinguished and highly regarded defence historians and analysts Ravi Rikhye,

“My belief is that India should, at the earliest opportunity, in corporate Pakistan into the Republic, followed by all the territories that composed the India before independence.

It is my contention that if India does not expand to fill its natural borders, then the centrifugal tendencies inherent in the situation get the upper hand and the country starts disintegrating inwards. The chaos engulfing us today is no accident: once India was partitioned, then the process of disintegration began and will continue till reversed.

The natural boundaries of India encompass the present-day states of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Our geo-strategical imperatives requires a subordinate Sri Lanka, Burma, Nepal and Bhutan, and a buffer Tibet and Afghanistan. It demands that the Indian Ocean be just that, an Indian ocean.

No matter what the cost, we must start the process of reintegration. The later we put it off, the more the eventual cost.
Because Pakistan is second only to India in terms of wealth and power, the reintegration process must start with that country. Once Pakistan returns to the fold, the combination of the two countries is such that the other states will return at a fraction of the cost and effort. Reintegration can be conducted either peacefully or by war.”

There was a third course of action other than peaceful or aggressive reintegration which Ravi Rikhye failed to mention that would be to foment subversion within the country to be reintegrated. This method would gradually wear away the control of government authority and paralyze the state machinery which would force the country to seek accommodation with India. This has been the preferred method in the case of Bangladesh, Nepal, Afghanistan, Maldives and Bhutan where Indian intelligence has infiltrated all sectors of government, political opposition, print and satellite media, cultural circles and the bureaucracy and state machinery. India is therefore freely able to conduct acts of propaganda, sabotage and terrorism without any risk to itself and also conveniently from within the territory of the target nation.

It is also interesting that Rikhye’s notion of Akhand Bharat includes so many countries that were independent of its suzerainty during the Britsh Raj or even that of the Mughal Empire when Hindu, Buddhist, Tamil or tribal kingdoms and principalities were out of its reach or were allowed to continue on terms. It is likely that Rikhye is harking back to a much earlier period in India’s ancient history that can only be sensibly referring to the rule of Ashoka the Great who was the third emperor of the Maurya Empire from approximately 273 BC – 232 BC. His empire encompassed much of present-day South Asia and was even further inclusive of territories and domains from Afghanistan to Bengal to Mysore. It was a Mauryan belief that expansion – an offensive action – was a defensive response and the empires survival depended on the exploitation and annexation of its neighbours and their divisions.

The period that constituted the Mauryan Empire also saw the emergence of a statecraft that was to influence Ashoka’s expansionism and was adopted wholesale by the Indian government and its military strategists, diplomats and intelligence agencies of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. It was through the writings of Kautilya (or Chanakya), the author of the Authashastra and the Chief Minister of Chandragupta (approx 321 B.C.E.), that the Mauryan rulers, ‘… sanctioned the use of covert actions, spies, assassinations, sowing discord among enemy leaders, spread of disinformation, making and breaking treaties as and when they suited national interests, in addition to a host of other ‘hyper-realist’ stratagems to subdue and subjugate the enemy. According to him, the enemy must be dominated/accommodated or defeated by clever stratagems. However, Kautilya was very aware that stratagems would work only when backed by credible military power.”

These methods worked profitably for Chandragupta and his successors including Ashoka and were subsequently used by the Indian intelligence agency RAW to great success in destabilizing neighbouring countries and disintegrating independent states through the practice of the Chanakyan principles of deceit and guile. It is, therefore, of some significance that on January 26, 1950 the Indian government also adopted the Sarnath Lion Capital and Chakra of Ashoka as its National Symbol and which appears on nearly all government seals and official documents as well as on its national flag. On how the Ashoka Empire can again be reunited is the subject of Rikhye’s piece and the matter of Bangladesh reappears often within his pages,

“In 1975, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman was assassinated. Though Mrs. Indira Gandhi first considered intervention and though the Army alerted three divisions, in the end the Government hesitated and the moment passed. The result: our chance to keep Bangladesh in our camp vanished. India would have been fully justified in intervening under the same doctrine that lets the Soviet Union intervene in Poland and Afghanistan and the Americans, intervene in Nicaragua and Grenada.”

It was not a moment of hesitation that restrained India from direct military intervention in Bangladesh but simply that Indira Gandhi had called a state of emergency on June 26, 1975 in relation to incidents that were taking place inside her country and the timing would have been extremely inopportune for such adventurism as proposed by Rikhye. After several months had gone by and the turmoil subsided in India the new government could then give its uninterrupted attention to an armed assault on Bangladesh but it would certainly have caused an international outcry and attracted widespread condemnation. There still remained the possibility of arming insurgent groups operating from India and striking into Bangladesh when it would be least expected and causing the most damage to property and life provoking rebellion or inciting revolution.

In an act of despicable treachery Tiger (Kader) Siddique was prepared to offer his services to India to wage a guerilla war or insurgency on Bangladesh. This perfidious proposal was made on the pretext that he [Kader Siddique] was determined to keep alive the memory of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and with that purpose in mind brought 2000 of his followers into India for sanctuary against alleged reprisals in Bangladesh and also to receive unofficial support and funds to regroup themselves for armed combat against the Bangladesh government. According to Asoka Raina the Indian government acceded to these demands but on the condition that it fight within the borders of Bangladesh and for the limited objective of reviving the aspirations of Mujib. If the authorities in Bangladesh were ever to discover the source of Kader Siddique’s support base the Indians would falsely accuse the Bangladesh government of harbouring Mizo rebels and allowing China to train them inside their territory. This can be reasonably implied from Asoka Raina’s phrasing of this imputation and one could also justifiably interpret Kader Siddique’s motivation as being entirely self-serving probably reflecting his ambition to become the heir to Sheikh Mujib’s political legacy since both of Mujib’s sons were killed on 15 August 1975.

It was fortunate that the Desai government in India did not look at all favourably on the activities of RAW and reduced its manpower and funding and even went so far as to hand over suspected terrorists wanted in Bangladesh. It was due to this internal conflict between the Indian government and its intelligence agency that Kader Siddique’s plans came to naught. It was, however, not long before a more propitious atmosphere returned in New Delhi and a more benevolent attitude to RAW’s foreign intrigues allowed it to stir up trouble in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

INSURGENCY IN THE CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS

After the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the disbanding of the Rakkhi Bahini the main theatre of operations for RAW was the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) where ample opportunity lay for it to engineer a secessionist plot that was intended to undermine the integrity and unity of the state leading to the scenario outlined above by Ravi Rikhye for an Akhand Bharat in South Asia. It will be shown in this section that the claims of the secessionists are entirely unjustifiable and that they are aided and abetted by RAW with the concealed motive not for independence but instead a covert amalgamation with India.

The conflict in the CHT is so densely overlaid with historical inaccuracies, deliberate distortions and emotive nonsense that a comprehensive survey of the subject becomes necessary to fully understand and appreciate the complex dynamics that are at play in this region of Bangladesh. The differing contentions that have become a feature of the CHT issue predates nearly all the historical materials that have been discussed in this essay and relate to matters that are beyond living memory but with some textual analysis and analytical research it is possible to tweeze out the false claims and demands made by the tribal peoples (especially the Chakmas), who are being sponsored and manipulated by RAW, to secede the CHT from Bangladesh by force of arms. The more justifiable stand has been taken by President Ziaur Rahman, H.M. Ershad and Prime Minister Khaleda Zia whose policies have been to maintain the territorial integrity of the nation and reject outright the attempts at secession by the tribal insurgents and terrorists.

Inhabitants of the CHT

The basis of this section will be a point-by-point refutation of a paper written by Eleanor Dictaan-Bang-oa (Dictaan) entitled, ‘In Search for Peace in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh’ published by the UNDP in 2004. As Dictaan correctly points out the area of the CHT is approximately 5, 093 square miles but according to some writers the size of the district had originally been 6, 796 square miles but was reduced twice in the last century in 1901 and again in 1947 by the British colonial authorities to its present approximation, and which now constitutes one-tenth of the total land mass of Bangladesh. It should be pointed out that these diminutions in CHT’s total geographical area have come at the cost to Bangladesh’s own natural and historical territorial boundaries as the CHT is an integral and inseparable part of the country and any reduction in its size is a corresponding reduction to that of Bangladesh and any further attempts at truncating the CHT would be an intolerable threat to the nations integrity which would justifiably lead to war for its defence.

From this partially accurate beginning Dictaan soon falls into a common error by accepting uncritically the notion that the CHT has been inhabited by several indigenous peoples ‘since time immemorial’ who are known to have been living there for centuries, with their own forms of governance and sociopolitical institutions - all these statements are highly dubious and not based on facts, historical record or recent anthropological research. The several indigenous peoples or tribes that Dictaan refers to are the Bawm, Chak, Chakma, Khumi, Khyang, Lushai, Marma, Mro (Mru), Pankhua, Tanchangya and the Tripura, none of whom can be remotely described as indigenous to the region of CHT and as Bushra Hasina Chowdhury points out, are of Sino-Tibetan descent, but then in the face of conclusive evidence to the contrary, absurdly describes them as the original inhabitants of this area.

Several Indian writers cited in Mohammed Zainul Abedin’s book, ‘The Chittagong Hill Tracts - A Victim of Indian Intervention’ (2003) and in ‘Human Rights Violation in CHT: Myth and Reality’ (2005) provide an unbiased and objective assessment of the origins of these tribal peoples. According to BG Verghese, “The tribes live in CHT are of Tibeto-Burman/Mon Khmer stock similar to that found in India’s North-east … The CHT tribes migrated into the area between the 16th and 19th century with Bengali settlements along the Chittagong coastal plain.” It is interesting to note that Bushra Hasina Chowdhury (Bushra) makes no mention of the BG Verghese book but provides an unsupported and unreferenced preposition indirectly challenging his findings. According to her, the early Bengali settlement in the CHT took place during the seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, and the first half of the twentieth centuries for various unspecified reasons - BG Verghese puts Bengali settlements at least a full century earlier implying that on arrival of the tribal peoples in the CHT region it had already been inhabited by the native Bengalis.

In reference to the more numerous Chakma migrants Biroj Mohon Dewan states categorically that, “It is crystal clear that the Chakmas are not the sons of the soil of CHT …The Chakma’s are not the original dwellers of this district (CHT) and they entered Bengal [in the] 14th century having the favour of the Sultan”, and the reason for their migration was that they were, “… [being] attacked by the Burmese imperial power the Chakmas became weak and achieved the approval and assistance of the Subadar of Bengal on humanitarian ground to be settled down for the first time on the bank of the river Toinchari to protect their mere existence.” Even though the Chakmas are stated to have entered the CHT in the 14th Century their numbers must have been so small that 700 years later the Chakma population would never have exceeded 280, 000 persons as attested to in the 1991 census which showed an even lower figure. It is also worth pointing out that the data provided by Biroj Mohon Dewan confirms that a Mughal administration was operating in the CHT in the 14th Century presumably assisted by Bengali bureaucrats and settlers.

Certain intellectuals identified by Zainul Abedin in ‘The Chittagong Hill Tracts - A Victim of Indian Intervention’ have tried to establish that a Chakma civilization, culture, literature and language that was distinct from that of the Bengalis existed but their efforts being spurious and contrived have been decisively dismissed by Biroj Mohon Dewan and Ashok Kumar Dewan and many other writers. Bushra Hasina Chowdhury, an active proponent of the Chakma demands for autonomy has also had to admit that, ‘The Chakmas speak a dialect close to "Chittagonian," a dialect that is spoken by the local people of Chittagong, which is a deviation of the Bangla language. They also have a script resembling Burmese, but they seldom use the script. Significantly, Bangla, the state language of Bangladesh, is the lingua franca for inter-tribal communication and is understood by most tribes.”

It is apparent from the above discussion that the tribals are not indigenous to the CHT and may appropriately be described as nomads, refugees and asylum seekers who have no distinguishable cultural characteristics (apart from certain ritual and culinary differences) that would separate them from the native Bengalis, which is an expected outcome from centuries of assimilation with the local people (i.e. the Bengalis).

Muslim Influence in the CHT Region

This of course, does not fit the interpretation presented by Dictaan and Bushra and many Bangladeshi writers, who have rather concentrated on the alleged oppression, perpetrated by Muslim leaders such as the Sultans under the Mughal Empire. They claim that the Sultans were fiercely resisted by the Chakma kings who adopted Muslim names to appease the rulers they were fighting , which seems a singular and peculiar way of expressing defiance and antagonism to the authorities one is aggressively subverting. However, Dictaan suggests unconvincingly, that the Mughal’s were never able to subdue the tribal inhabitants and failed to impose its authority in the CHT area. The only concession that the tribal leaders made to the Mughal emperors was an annual payment of cotton bales as a mark of suzerainty (Treaty of 1713) but Dictaan insists that the CHT remained outside their jurisdiction.

As we have already seen, this has been disproved by Biroj Mohon Dewan whose research has confirmed that a Mughal administration existed in the CHT in the 14th Century and also by Bushra Hasina Chowdhury who narrates the story of the Chakma chief Jalal Khan, who refused to pay tribute to the Mughal administrator in Chittagong,

“Consequently he was attacked by the Mogul dewan, or state minister, Kishan Chand, and fled to Arakan, where he died afterwards. By 1737, Chief Shermust Khan yielded to the Mogul authority. Under the influence of the Moguls a new administrative post designated as dewan was introduced in the Chakma tribal administration, and continued up to 1900.”

It was not uncommon for uprisings to occur under Mughal rule but the true test of allegiance and fealty is the inscription on the coins issued by Chakma Kings. Numismatic research has discovered coins that bear the names of the Sultan or Emperor and even the term ‘Allah-hu Rabbi’ were sometimes inscribed upon them as a show of subservience. Whether any of this could be described as oppression by the Mughal emperors is debatable since we would be implanting 20th century European ideas to an 18th century Muslim society that would not have understood these concepts. Intrinsically they behaved as they did, to maintain their empire and to keep order amongst their subjects - thoughts and considerations also playing upon the minds of Europe’s monarchs and their powerful advisers and ministers who oversaw the administration of the imperial possessions and colonies. It was also necessary for the European imperial administrators to ensure that their colonial trade was not disrupted by rebellious natives in far away lands who had originally been subjugated to their rule by force – a distinguishing feature of colonialism that is not comparable to Muslim rule in Bengal and the CHT where Islam gained ground through the teachings of holy men, Arab traders and merchants and not as commonly thought by the sword or the scimitar which came much later.

In the many papers, articles and books written on this subject there has been little or no in-depth study of the Islamic influence in the area which would incontrovertibly establish that the Muslims (whether Arab traders, Mughal Generals or Bengali settlers) were the first to inhabit and settle in the CHT region and that Bangladesh is the rightful heir to this history and tract of land that is so closely associated with it. It is necessary, therefore, to explore the literature on the issue of Muslim settlements in the CHT region and come to a conclusion on the strength of their numbers and control and authority of the rulers over this area. According to Dr. Muhammad Enamul Haq, the Arab Muslim settlers in the Chittagong region had gradually grown to be a compact and influential community at around 951-957 A.C.E. and ‘had in the course of time organized an independent principality of their own comprising the coastal belt of Chittagong and Noakhali districts, and that the ruler of this Muslim principality bore the title of Sultan.’ The title of Sultan most certainly does not refer to the Mughal emperors or any central authority based in Delhi but it can be inferred that an organized and cohesive community existed in the Chittagong long before the arrival of the Muslim armies. Mohammed Mohar Ali in his magnificent and authoritative book, ‘History of the Muslims of Bengal’ explains the importance of this initial Muslim settlement in Chittagong,

“It may be noted in this connection that the Muslims first established their political authority in the west and northwest Bengal in the opening years of the thirteenth century A.C… Yet, Arabian influences generally are very thin in this area, whereas these are the most pronounced and extensive in the districts of Chittagong and Noakhali, the very areas which were the last to come under the Muslims’ political domination. The only explanation of this peculiar development is that this locality had been exposed to Islamic Arab influences for a long time before its conquest by the Muslim generals coming from the side of northern India’

It was not until Muhammad Tughlaq succeeded to the Delhi throne (March 1325 A.C.E.) that the Muslim dominium under the political authority of the Sultanate was extended from Sunargaon to the east-south-east up to Chittagong. Under Sultan Fakhr al-Din, Muslim rule was consolidated over the entire eastern Bengal area up to Chittagong which was said to be well under his control and it was during this period that he proclaimed independence from the Delhi Sultanate and ruled Bengal till his death in 1349 when his son took over but who was then ousted by one Haji Ilyas who founded the Ilyas Shahi dynasty. We next hear of a Sultan Jalal al-Din who acceded to power in 1415 who was a Muslim convert and whose father was a influential and mighty Hindu King named Raja Ganesh. Sultan Jalal al-Din issued coins from Chittagong in 1420 which seems to point to a ‘dramatic reassertion of the sultanate’s authority through out the delta’ but this does not seem to have lasted very long and either the Arakanese or Tippera forces under the rule of the Tripura King Dhanya Manikya occupied the area of Chittagong, less than a century later, from around 1509-1516. It was not until 1516 that Crown Prince Nusrat Shah, or as a Persian history would have it, ‘King or prince of Bengal’, conquered the territory of Chittagong and made it a Dar-al-Islam.

It is at this point that the Mughals come into the picture with the entry of Zahir al-Din Muhammad Babur and his son Humayun but they did not interfere with the Bengal Sultanate under Nusrat Shah who remained on the throne till he was assassinated by Firuz Shah who was himself ousted from power by Mahmud Shah who reigned as the Sultan of Bengal from 1533-1538. It was on the death of Mahmud Shah that the Afghan leader Sher Khan took over power in 1538 and started what became known as the Afghan kingship that lasted till the death of the last king Daud Shah in 1576. Still Bengal did not come under the Mughal sway due to pockets of resistance from Afghan warlords and it was during this troublesome period that the Arakanese ruler Meng Khamaung extended his authority up to Chittagong where he built a fort and stationed a strong naval garrison.

The conquest of Chittagong was undertaken by Emperor Aurangzeb’s maternal uncle Shaista Khan and in a naval battle with the Arakanese fleet on January 26, 1666 defeated the enemy navy and effectively brought the whole of northern Chittagong under Mughal control. The suzerainty of the Mughals was extended through out the CHT region in the coming decades and the only threat to their authority came from the British, after King James II while renewing the charter of the East India Company, specifically empowered them to make war and peace and to enter into alliances with the Indian rulers. So from the period of Muhammad Tughlaq to the defeat of Siraj-ud-Daulah in 1757 the only forces that opposed Mughal rule were the Arakanese (allied with the Portuguese) and then later the British commercial interests but no where is it mentioned that tribes in the CHT ever stood against their rulers. In fact the only people that have been described as indigenous to the region share no physical or cultural similarities to the tribes mentioned by Dictaan above and as Richard Eaton’s description of their social practices suggest they either died out or converted to Islam,

“The Chittagong interior was at the time [1666] inhabited by indigenous peoples described as having dark skin and little or no beard. And their religion, wrote Abu’l-fazl, ‘is said to be different to that of the Hindus and Muhammedans. Sisters may marry their own twin brothers, and they refrain only from marriage between a son and his mother.’ The material culture of these people was based on jhum, or shifting cultivation.”

Dictaan claims that the tribes she describes in her paper are the Jumma People – a word derived from jhum – but this is clearly a mistake since they do not resemble in any conceivable way the indigenous inhabitants described in the quotation above. It is likely that the original inhabitants simply became extinct through their obnoxious social practices or converted to Islam because soon after the Muhgal conquest of 1666, ‘mosques and shrines began proliferating throughout the Chittagong hinterland’ which was the outcome of a grants system provided for an emerging religious gentry who built hundreds of mosques and shrines dedicated to Muslim holy men. They also converted forest lands into rice fields and the indigenous inhabitants became rice-cultivating peasants, ‘at once both the economic and the religious clients of a new gentry.’

This method of gradual conversion and the initial settlements of the Arab traders and merchants in Chittagong afford a reliable explanation to the results of the first official census of 1872 which showed Muslims totaling 70 percent and more in the Chittagong, Noakhali, Pabna and Rajshahi districts. This correspondents to 2, 323, 008 Muslim inhabitants in Chittagong alone (and of these 5, 025 claimed foreign ancestry) which easily out numbers all the tribal people’s identified by Dictaan several times over. It is my contention that these tribal peoples never amounted to a significant proportion of the population of the CHT at least until 1900 and the majority that now inhabits that region probably migrated there during the better part of the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries with only a tiny minority that can trace their roots to the fourteenth century when the Muslim Subadar permitted a few Chakmas to settle in the area on humanitarian grounds in their flight from the Burmese King.


END NOTES & REFERENCES

Zainul Abedin in his book ‘Raw and Bangladesh’ makes the following statement in Chapter 30, “A noted Indian parliamentarian Mr. Subramanium Swamy, provided important insight about RAW’s plan to assassinate Ziaur Rahman. He stated in an interview given to the weekly magazine ‘Sunday’, ‘RAW had plotted the assassination of President Ziaur Rahman with ‘approval from Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Mr. R.N. Kao, the RAW Chief and Shankaran Nair, a senior official of RAW had plotted to kill General Ziaur Rahman. The scheme was already at an advanced stage with Mrs. Gandhi’s approval. But the Congress government fell and Mr. Morarji Desai became Prime Minister. Mr. Desai was appalled to learn about assassination plan. He called halt to the murder plot. The RAW warned the Prime Minister that it was too late to back out now and that many RAW assets would be endangered if the plan was aborted at this stage. However, Desai remained adamant and finally RAW abandoned the assassination.’ Mr. Subramanium Swami commented, ‘Zia was assassinated after Indira Gandhi returned to power but India said that she was not involved.” See also Abu Rushd – RAW in Bangladesh (2005) Chapter 7 pp. 68-71

Ravi Rikhye – The War That Never Was (Chanakya Publications (1988));

A method that was expertly devised by the KGB as disclosed in ‘The Mitrokhin Archive’ by Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin (2000)

Ashoka (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ashoka); Vincent A. Smith – The Early History of India (1962) pp. 169-171

Manjeet Singh Pradesh – Deducing India’s Grand Strategy of Regional Hegemony from Historical and Conceptual Perspectives (Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies – April 2005) pg. 32

Manjeet Singh Pardesi pg 20; see also Majumder, Raychaudhuri & Datta - An Advanced History of India (Second Edition -1950); Vincent A. Smith – The Early History of India (Fourth Edition – 1964)

Gp Capt SM Hali – RAW at War – Genesis of Secret Agencies in Ancient India (Defence Journal – Feb/Mar 1999)

The reasons behind Indira Gandhi’s decision to call a State of Emergency which virtually paralyzed Indian decision making on Bangladesh after 15th August 1975 and prevented an immediate military response can be gleaned from ‘The Mitrokhin Archive II ‘ by Christopher Andrews and Vasili Mitrokhin.

Asoka Raina - Inside RAW the story of India’s Secret Service (1981); see also Abdul Quader Chowdhury – Mutual cooperation can be beneficial (Holiday – May 26, 2006)

Dr. Kalidas Baidya - Bangaleer Muktiyuddhe Antaraler Sheikh Mujib (2005)

Asoka Raina - Inside RAW the story of India’s Secret Service (1981)

Who writes for Tebtebba (Indigenous Peoples International Centre for Policy Research and Education), Baguio City, Philippines

Dr. S. Kharat gives the figure of 5, 138 sq. miles in his research paper ‘From Internal Displacement to Refugees: The Trauma of Chakma’s in Bangladesh (2003); While reading through the paper I was amazed at the number of inaccuracies and imprecise data contained within its pages.

Mohammed Zainul Abedin – The Chittagong Hill Tracts A Victim of Indian Intervention (2003). Since the writer provides no reference it is not clear where he got these figures but one can assume they came from the British land records. Also see S. Mahmud Ali- The Fearful State: Power, People and Internal War in South Asia (1993) also cited in Abedin’s book.

In Part 1 of Bushra Hasina Chowdhury – Building Lasting Peace: Issues of the Implementation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (ACDIS Occasional Paper - 2002); This is a point that even Amnesty International has chosen to accept without any real investigation into the history of the region (Bangladesh – Human Rights in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (Amnesty International – February 2000) pg. 2); Dr. Nandita Chaudhuri - Ethnicity, Human Rights Violation and Colonial Legacies in Bangladesh: The Post-colonial Trajectory of the Jummaland Movement (2003) pg 3-4

BG Verghese – North East Resurgent Ethnicity, Insurgency, Governance, Development (1996); Quoted on pg. 53 of Zainul Abedin’s book The Chittagong Hill Tracts A Victim of Indian Intervention.; Dr. Nandita Chaudhuri - Ethnicity, Human Rights Violation and Colonial Legacies in Bangladesh: The Post-colonial Trajectory of the Jummaland Movement (2003) pg. 3-4

Part 1 of Building Lasting Peace: Issues of the Implementation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (see note 11)

Biroj Mohon Dewan – The Chronicle of the Chakma Nation (1969); Quoted on page 8-9 of ‘Human Rights Violation in CHT: Myth and Reality’ (2005) by Zainul Abedin.; Global IDP Project – Profile of Internal Displacement: Bangladesh (January 21, 2005) pg 20; Dr. Hasanuzzaman Chowdhury & Dr. Mohammed Abdur Rab – Parbata Chattagram Bhu-Ragniti O Biponno Sharbovhumoto (Chittagong Hill Tracts Geo-Politics and Endangered Sovereignty (1997)) pg 7-10

This is even after we take account of the 40 000 or so Chakmas that migrated to India during the 1960’s.

Ashok Kumar Dewan – An investigation into the history of the Chakma Nation (1991)

Part 1 of Building Lasting Peace: Issues of the Implementation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (see note 11); but see Dr. Nandita Chaudhuri - Ethnicity, Human Rights Violation and Colonial Legacies in Bangladesh: The Post-colonial Trajectory of the Jummaland Movement (2003) who completely ignores these findings.

Dr. Mizanur Rahman Shelly - The Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh: the Untold Story (Centre for Development Research - 1992)

Mohammed Zainul Abedin – The Chittagong Hill Tracts A Victim of Indian Intervention (2003) pg. 62; Richard M. Eaton – The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier 1204-1760 (OUP 1997) pp. 53, 54

Richard M. Eaton – The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier 1204-1760 (OUP 1997)

A.C.E. stands for ‘After the Common or Christian Era’ and B.C.E. refers to ‘Before the Common Era’ which has replaced AD and BC as acceptable historical terms for the periods they refer to.

Muhammad Mohar Ali – History of the Muslims of Bengal (1985) pp.37-38; Dr. Muhammad Enamul Haq – Purva Pakistane Islam (1948) pg 17

Mohar Ali pg. 40

Mohar Ali pg. 117

Mohar Ali pg. 122-123, 126

Eaton pg. 54

Mohar Ali pg. 201, Eaton pg. 237; Majumder, Raychaudhuri and Datta – An Advanced History of India (1961)

Mohar Ali pp. 217-231

Mohar Ali pp. 235-348

Mohar Ali pp. 433-442; Majumder, Raychaudhuri and Datta pg. 493

Mohar Ali pg. 507

Eaton pg. 236

Eaton pg. 239

Eaton pg. 119

Rafiuddin Ahmed – The Bengal Muslims 1871-1906 (OUP 1988) pg. 17

[akzaman]

THE INDIA DOCTRINE

PART 5B

Causes of the CHT Insurgency

With Shaista Khan’s victory over the Arakanese fleet in 1666 and his appointment as Viceroy of Bengal by the Mughal Emperor Aurengzeb, disagreements started almost immediately with the English traders represented by the East India Company and were aggravated further under diwan and naib-subahdar of Bengal Murshid Quli Khan who remained in this post from 1713-1727. This state of affairs continued until the defeat of Siraj-ud-Daulah in 1757 through a conspiracy involving the British and members of his own administration such as Mir Jafar, Amir Beg, Yar Latuf Khan, Khadim Husain Khan, Jagat Seth, Nanda Kumar, Mir Madan and Sri Babu as well as powerful Hindu interests represented by Govinda Ram Mitra, Manik Chand, Rai Durlabh Ram and Umichand.

As a consequence of this defeat the CHT region was ceded to the East India Company in 1760 by Qasim Ali Khan, the deputy governor, of Bengal and in 1860 it was annexed to the province of Bengal (Act No. XXII of 1860) in retaliation for raids on the British ‘carried out by the people living in Mizoram, farther to the east’ but reportedly not by the Chakma tribesmen or other inhabitants of the CHT. Dictaan, however, claims that in 1776, the CHT peoples waged a war of resistance against the British East India Company and that the CHT remained relatively autonomous from British control until 1860. This is the first time that the tribal peoples of the CHT makes a significant and noteworthy appearance in the historical records relating to the Mughal and British periods and is only referred to by Dictaan and Bashra without any further supporting evidence from where we could test its authenticity. According to Bashra, Chief Sherdaulat Khan (of the Chakma tribe) having stopped payment of taxes to the East India Company in 1777 brought instant retaliation from the company which resulted in intermittent wars between the two groups which lasted till 1785 when Jan Baksh Khan, the son of Sherdaulat, finally submitted to Warren Hastings.

Apart from the wide discrepancies between Dictaan and Bashra one may also question why this episode appears in no other reputable and authoritative publication. A far more plausible explanation about the unrest is that it was in fact the Mizos of present day Mizoram in India that posed the greatest threat to the British in the CHT during the late eighteenth century and not the Chakmas who seemed to have remained relatively docile after their initial confrontation in 1777. Modern writers have deliberately confused the two tribes to give some authenticity to their claims that there was continual resistance by the inhabitants of the CHT to foreign or external authority and control. As Dr. Nandita Chaudhuri has pointed out, it was to fend off Mizo attacks from the east that the British stationed troops on the eastern borders of the CHT. It may at the very least be stated that a minor incident involving the Chakmas was enlarged upon and exploited by the British as a pretext to occupy the CHT in gradual phases and to prevent further Muslim immigration and settlement in the area.

The myth of Chakma resistance was later propagated by the British authorities against the Muslim settlers and Jan Baksh Khan seems to have been used as a mere conduit or mouth piece for future policy initiatives, as he is said to have precipitated the crisis with the British due to his prohibition of the plains people (Bengali Muslims) from entering the CHT. This interdiction was subsequently incorporated into Regulation 1 of 1900 (popularly known as the 1900 Regulation or Manual) which gave the British the authority to impose restrictions on Bengali immigration and land ownership and later amendments clearly enunciated the intent behind these arbitrary powers,

“No person other than a Chakma, Mogh or a member of any hill tribe indigenous to [the] Chittagong Hill Tracts, the Lusai Hills, the Arakan Hill Tracts or the state of Tripura shall enter or reside within the Chittagong Hill Tracts unless he is in possession of a permit granted by the Deputy Commissioner at his discretion.”

Under Rule 51 of the Regulations the District Commissioner was also empowered to expel non-tribal people from the area and was enforced through the Chittagong Hill Tracts Frontier Police Regulation of 1881 which determined that the police force would be manned by the tribal peoples and likely led to intimidation and threats to the Muslim settlers who now found themselves disempowered and at the mercy of the hostile client tribes of the British.

The motive behind the introduction of these discriminatory provisions was to reverse the results of the 1872 census which showed an overwhelming number of Muslim’s in the CHT region who could have a posed a serious threat to British operations in the area and also in their use of the port facility especially in a time of crisis or rebellion as occurred in 1857. The 1900 Regulation also had the intentional effect of favouring certain tribes over others through the division of the CHT into three revenue circles, each headed by a Rajah. The three circles were known as the Chakma, the Mong and the Bohmang which was essentially given jurisdiction over the other ten tribes in the CHT. This privileged position was enhanced when the CHT was accorded special status as a ‘Totally Excluded Area’ as provided by the Government of India Act 1935, ‘which meant relative autonomy for the CHT under the jurisdiction of their traditional chieftains, with direct administration by the central government.’ Put together these changes were a classic example of the ‘indirect rule’ and ‘divide and conquer’ strategies of the British Raj, which in this particular case rendered the rightful owners and inhabitants of the CHT (the Muslims) mere second class ‘subjects’ in their own lands, while hypocritically claiming to ‘preserve minority tribal culture and heritage’.

The contradictions in this policy became more pronounced during the negotiations on the Partition of India in 1947 and the decision on whether to include Calcutta and Chittagong in East Pakistan which would have been the most appropriate course as both regions possessed a Muslim character, history and population. The burden of drawing the new boundaries in Bengal fell upon Sir Cyril Radcliffe, a strange choice considering that he knew nothing about India and had ‘never written about it or become involved in any of the complex legal problems. Indeed, [he] had never set foot on the subcontinent.’ He was, however, assisted by expert Boundary Commissions that were to demarcate boundaries on the ‘basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims, and in doing so to take into account also other factors’ that were never specified. Due to the deep divisions between the different members on the Partition Council a public statement was issued pledging its members to accept the awards of the Boundary Commissions whatever they might be and to enforce them impartially.

The unfairness in the demarcations made by the Boundary Commission especially in regard to Calcutta which was basically traded off for the CHT is a direct consequence of the 1900 Regulations and the promotion of certain newly discovered tribal groups against the much larger Muslim population that inhabited the Chittagong region. This was reflected in the stilted phrasing of certain basic questions that Sir Cyril considered to be important in making his awards in Bengal,

1. To which of the two States [Pakistan or India] was the City of Calcutta to be assigned, or was it possible to divide the City between them?

2. If Calcutta as a whole must be assigned to one State, what were the latter’s indispensable claims to territory such as adjacent river systems on which the life of the city and port depended?

3. Who was to have the Chittagong Hill Tracts, with their small Muslim minority but their intimate physical and economic association with East Bengal?

It was quite disingenuous to lump all the tribal groups into one block as it was only the Chakma tribe that sought autonomy and the Muslims only became a minority due to the 1900 Regulations that restricted their settlement in the CHT. If the actual demographic calculations were to be made the Muslim population and the ten tribes other than the Chakmas would have constituted an absolute majority but the questions were framed in such a way to as to leave open the door for a deal on Calcutta (which also had a large Muslim population) that was to be given to India, however, unjust this would be to East Pakistan. Even with such a favorable outcome for India their contingent never accepted these boundaries and there reaction to the CHT/Calcutta formula devised by Sir Cyril is significant in that it was sign of what was to come in the following decades.

In a letter sent by Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel (a Congress leader) to Mountbatten about a deputation of the Chittagong Hill tribes (probably only the Chakmas since none of the other tribes cooperated with India after 1947) who had expressed to him their ‘grave’ fear that their area was to be included in Pakistan made the following remarks related in H.V Hodson’s, ‘The Great Divide’,

“‘I have told them,’ wrote Sardar Patel, ‘that the proposition was so monstrous that if it should happen they would be justified in resisting to the utmost of their power and count on our maximum support in such resistance.’ The Chittagong Hill Tracts were in fact awarded to Pakistan. No reason was given by Sir Cyril Radcliffe, but according to the Governor of Bengal, in advice to the Viceroy, the whole economic life of the people of the Hill Tracts depended upon East Bengal.”

This may have been a belated attempt at redressing the wrongs committed by the British in the CHT against the Muslims since the passing of the 1900 Regulations or it could be simply trying to make the loss of Calcutta appear more palatable to the Bengali Muslims. Either way the Congress Party’s representations in favour of the Chakmas were a mere ruse to keep the province of Bengal united and under Hindu control and influence. It was with the backing of these communal interests that some Chakma groups in an act of pure opportunism raised the Indian flag on August 15, 1947 in the CHT. The pro-Indian Chakmas had even called for an armed struggle which was quickly abandoned as they soon accepted the inevitable when the Baluch regiment of the Pakistan army took control of the region. In the case of the Congress Party and the powerful Hindu interests in Calcutta the partition of Bengal was only grudgingly accepted with the hope of a retrieval of the lost portion at some point in the future. They continued to raise murmurs against what they considered an unfair distribution in favour of the Muslims who they had thus far become accustomed to discriminate against educationally, economically and politically and which was aptly demonstrated in their condescending attitude to a proposal by the British authorities for a university in Dhaka since the, ‘Muslims of Eastern Bengal were in large majority cultivators and they would benefit in no way by the foundation of a university’.

The Congress Party had already expressed many of these same anxieties and sentiments in their opposition to the proposed administrative division of Bengal in 1905 by the British Viceroy Lord Curzon. The original proposal of 1902 put forward by Andrew Frazer, later lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, had been to enlarge the province of Assam with the addition of the eastern districts of Bengal (to be separated from the administrative structure of West Bengal, Bihar and Orissa) that was reportedly favoured by local opinion in Chittagong but was vociferously opposed by the Congress Party and West Bengal’s powerful Hindu business and political elites. David Gilmore in his biography on Lord Curzon notes that, ‘While no one in the area wanted to belong to Assam, the Muslim inhabitants, who formed seventy per cent of the population, would be happy with a new province based at Dacca to which Assam could be united.’ This amended proposal was anathema to the Hindus in West Bengal whose protestations formed the basis for their subsequent petitions to the British in 1947 during the consultations on the findings of the Boundary Commission reports and the heated negotiations within the Partition Council.

This obdurate stand on a United Bengal (i.e. an Akhand Bangla) that animated Hindu opinion in 1905 had clouded the views of many in India and West Bengal and was to sour relations with its Muslim neighbour for many decades to come. These same political, social and religious circles now desired to see the entire region reunified along the pre-1947 partition boundaries of an Akhand Bharat. This is abundantly clear from the writings of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar and Dr. Kalidas Baidya who later contested East Pakistan’s right to the CHT and objected to the ‘infiltration’ of Muslims into the region during the era of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The award of Chittagong to East Pakistan has, therefore, remained a particularly sore point and the depth of feeling as illustrated in the context of 1905, is articulated in a book by Abu Al-Sayeed entitled, ‘Shat Cholisher Akhand Bangla Andalon: Purbo Pakistan theke Bangladesh’ (47 United Bengal Movement: East Pakistan to Bangladesh). Sayeed argues that after the division of Bengal in 1905 when Dhaka became the capital of East Bengal, Kolkata had been grievously insulted and the greatest harm was inflicted upon the Kolkata seaport. It was feared that Kolkata’s importance would be reduced by a vibrant and successful Chittagong port and there would be economic repercussions for all of West Bengal’s Hindu society especially the business and merchant classes.

It was, therefore, with some relief in the Bengali Hindu community that the partition of Bengal was revoked by George V at the Delhi Durbar in 1911. However, after the partition of 1947 India’s Bengali Hindus again reverted back to the 1905 position and sought the recovery of the CHT and the Chittagong Port facility through the use of secessionist movements or by negotiation and inducements as was offered in one case by former Indian Prime Minister I.K. Gujral, at a seminar in Dhaka, organized by the Centre for Policy Dialogue in 1998. He had proposed the floatation of a sub-regional economic zone comprising the CHT and Chittagong with Tripura and Mizoram states of India that would have resulted in the virtual annexation of the CHT and the Chittagong port from the rest of Bangladesh and embroiled the country in the disputes surrounding the insurgency afflicted regions of the Indian North-East.

With such communal and ethnic divisions prevailing in India the situation of the CHT since 1947 may be viewed quite favorably when compared to the condition of the once independent states of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Meghalaya, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Tripura which were annexed by the British and ceded to India after 1947. They were never before dependent on New Delhi and were free from its suzerainty since time immemorial and they have a distinct culture and history separate from the Indian peoples. Tripura, Meghalaya and Manipur only became a state of India in 1972, Nagaland in 1963, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh achieved this status in 1987 and in all of these cases there is an insurgency brewing with regular outbreaks of violence and unrest. The CHT as we have seen is in direct contrast, an integral, dependant and an inseparable part of the Bangladesh main land for the best part of 800 years when the first Muslim settlers arrived on Chittagong’s shores and Bengali settlements started in the region during the rule of the Bengal Sultanate and the recent insurgency by the Chakmas is merely a consequence of India’s interference to redress the dispensation of 1947.

The CHT from 1947-1971 – The Pakistan Period

During the Pakistan period the special status and immigration restrictions imposed by the 1900 Regulations were repealed and in 1964 its designation as a ‘Totally Excluded Area’ was constitutionally abolished reestablishing Muslim authority over the CHT region. It was due to this legal, political and constitutional change in the CHT’s status that a sudden reversal of the discriminatory effects of the 1900 Regulations was witnessed with the CHT’s lowland population increasing by about five times from 26, 000 to 119, 000 between 1951 and 1961. If the natural rate of population growth and demographic progression was allowed to continue unimpeded from 1900 then one can only imagine the improvements that would have come from large scale habitation and land use in the intervening fifty years but instead the area was allowed to remain stagnant, uncompetitive and monopolized by British commercial and trade interests.

In an effort to modernize and develop the CHT region the Pakistan government approved the Kaptai Hydro-Electric Project (1959-63) funded by the United States Agency for International Development. Other important investments were made in the area through the setting up of the Karnaphuli Paper Mills which utilized the dense forests in the CHT hinterland where different varieties of timber were introduced and there was already an abundance of teak and bamboo to facilitate the production of paper pulp. However, in the construction of the Kaptai Hydro-Electric Project (hereafter referred to as Kaptai Dam) it is estimated that 54,000 acres or 40% of the total cultivable land was inundated and that almost 100, 000 tribal peoples (mostly from amongst the Chakma tribe ) were rendered homeless. One may cogently argue that this is the inevitable and acceptable costs of progress for the greater good of the nation provided that all precautions and necessary measures have been taken for the rehabilitation and resettlement of those affected by the dramatic changes in their environment and adequate compensatory packages are made available to those affected.

Amongst the many writers, commentators and experts on the CHT issue there appears a sharp divergence of opinion as regards the compensation and rehabilitation measures undertaken by the Pakistan government, as the figures on the actual assistance package differs very widely but overall it does appear to have been grossly inadequate. This became a cause of continuing resentment amongst the Chakmas in particular, who were the worst affected by the project, but their protests seem to have been quire subdued and never turned violent or militant at least during the Pakistan period. This maybe explained by the fact that Raja Tridib Roy, ‘Chief as well as symbol of integrity and cohesion of the Chakma tribe, was pro-Pakistani in his political outlook. When Bangladesh came into being in 1971, he remained in and subsequently opted for Pakistan, leaving the Chakma tribe without a chief until 1978.’ This demonstrates that even within the Chakma tribe there were many who were naturally inclined to the Muslim rulers but the problem of the displaced peoples provided India with the opportunity to interfere in the CHT as they had always promised to do since the partition of 1947.

It is estimated that almost 40, 000 displaced peoples (predominantly Chakma) voluntarily migrated to India after the construction of the Kaptai Dam which had caused their displacement and for which insufficient funds and assistance had been provided by the government. But this was also a problem that all Bengali Muslims had to face in regard to the much needed input and investment in all sectors of the East Pakistani economy that was reportedly being diverted to West Pakistan to build their capital city. Many of these refugees went to the sparsely inhabited areas of Mizoram, Tripura, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh in India and in the last of these states their initial attempts at getting Indian citizenship failed. Only when reports surfaced that the government might be seeking to evict them that the Supreme Court of India ruled that the Chakma people living in Arunachal Pradesh were Indian citizens but the government allegedly continued with the evictions in violation of the court order. This is symptomatic of India’s treatment of all displaced peoples under its own river linking, irrigation and dam projects and the Sardar Sarovar reservoir instantly comes to mind, as well as the 3600 other dams that India has commissioned since Independence and which Arundhati Roy has roughly calculated to have displaced 33, 000, 000 - 50, 000, 000 people for which no provision or assistance was rarely or ever provided.

With this background it is obvious the manifold grievances, misunderstandings and outright hostility that India could exploit and manufacture for its own advantage in order to redress what it perceived as an unjust award of the CHT to East Pakistan in 1947 as well as entirely rewrite the Partition program to bring in an Akhand Bharat. A strong believer in this idea was Major General S.S. Uban, who we have already met in parts 3 and 4, and whose operations in the CHT during 1971 was to become the precursor to future militant insurgency movements in the area in the following three decades after Bangladesh independence.

In his book, ‘Phantoms of Chittagong’ he dedicates an entire chapter to the Mizo tribe that were the indigenous inhabitants of Mizoram. To include an entire chapter on a tribe that was irrelevant to the outcome of the 1971 war and the military operations undertaken in Chittagong, there is a certain incongruity in its inclusion in the book unless one looks back at the overall British policy on the CHT and its relation to the tribal groups in Mizoram, Tripura and Myanmar. As we have already seen the 1900 Regulations stated that no person other than a Chakma, Mogh or a member of any hill tribe indigenous to the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the Lusai Hills, the Arakan Hill Tracts or the state of Tripura could enter or reside within the Chittagong Hill Tracts unless he was in possession of a permit granted by the Deputy Commissioner at his discretion.

The Arakan Hill Tracts is located in present day Myanmar and the Lusai Hills now constitutes the separate state of Mizoram in India which seems to suggest that through the fiat of the 1900 Regulations the British were forging an alliance with the disparate tribal groups that inhabited this area and to create an autonomous zone encompassing all the geographically contiguous regions bordering and including the CHT. The British soon came to realize that the CHT could not be equated with Mizoram or Tripura since the latter regions had a long history of independence and self-government and whose inhabitants were predominantly tribal in character and outlook not tainted by exposure to foreign ways and thinking until the arrival of the Europeans in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the case of Tripura the tribal kings had ruled for hundreds of years without interruption and in Mizoram the Mizo tribe who had originally arrived from China at around the 5th Century A.C.E. still now accounts for almost two thirds of the entire population. Mizoram was appropriately designated a ‘Totally Excluded Area’ in 1935 alongside Assam which helped in enflaming their sentiments and passions for freedom and liberty inculcated by the British that led to demands for independence soon after their incorporation into India. The involvement of the British in sowing the seeds for future instability has drawn the ire of Major. General S.S Uban and the establishment that authorized him to eliminate the Mizo threat during the 1971 war,

“The British Government banned any kind of political organization in these sensitive border areas, but British missionaries were given full facilities to convert these simple tribes into Christians and spread Western education and culture into these areas as much as they could absorb.

Mr. Macdonald, the British Political Officer, played the notorious villain’s role and wrote pamphlet after pamphlet to educate people in what he called their self-determination. He used the Church leaders and Missionaries to warn Mizos about their cultural and religious exploitation by India and the impending danger of their complete Indianisation and losing the recently acquired Western tastes. He went to the extent of threatening Mizo Union leaders with dire consequences if they did not stop towing the line of the Indian National Congress, the majority freedom party of India. He told them, “You would be treated as traitors and the future generation would dig your very bones out of the graves and scatter them in muck.”

It is indicative that the British took a completely different line with the tribal people of the CHT and did not try to proselytize them into their way of thinking and rejected outright the idea of a confederation with India which had been put to the Congress Leadership by the Hillman Association that had been formed by some traditional Chieftains of the area in 1946. On the other hand, the situation of the Mizo tribes was substantively different in terms of both history and culture so that calls for liberty and freedom could not be simplistically attributed to the teachings of British missionaries and diplomats alone. On 22 October 1961, a political party was formed in Mizoram that named itself the Mizo National Front (MNF) led by its President Mr. Laldenga who had expressed the desire for an Independent Mizoram State and who is said to have authorized the creation of insurgent bands to violently realize this dream if necessary.

It was the duty of Major General Uban to infiltrate and then crush the Mizo tribe in his guerrilla operations in the CHT during the 1971 war and a useful pretext for these actions was to scapegoat the Pakistani and Chinese militaries and divert attention of his Special Frontier Force into attacking Mizo strongholds in the region where many had sought refuge. What Uban fails to have mentioned is that on the commencement of hostilities with the Pakistan Army it was well within their rights to assist freedom movements in Mizoram and cooperate with the Mizo tribal insurgency in combined operations against the Indian military. In most cases, however, it seems the Pakistanis and Mizos were acting defensively and it was the SSF that was the aggressing party as can be surmised from Uban’s retelling of his exploits in ‘Operation Eagle’.

Another aspect of Uban’s mission can be gleaned from chapter 9 of his book in which he provides detailed descriptions of the geography and topographical features of the CHT area that bear the hallmarks of a typical military surveying and reconnoiter of the region for possible future use. This information was probably of invaluable assistance in RAW’s coordinating the Chakma secessionist insurgents, the Shanti Bahini, from the 1970’s onwards. Uban tacitly indicates that this cooperation started during the 1971 war with the inducement that the SFF would be used to destroy the Kaptai Dam (a plan that was subsequently abandoned presumably on the premise that the Indians would need it when they were able to wrench away control of the CHT from Bangladesh) but their instructions were eventually confined to the more limited but no less important objective of securing the Chittagong Port facility.

It is Uban’s open admission of Mr. Rameshwar Nath Kao’s full support in all ‘legitimate action’ for the SFF that leads us inexorably to the RAW historian Asoka Raina who expressly admits to a link between the Indian intelligence agency and the Shanti Bahini,

“Towards the extreme end of Bangla Desh in the eastern borders, in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the Chakma guerillas operated, who like the Mukti Bahini, had closely assisted RAW operatives and the Indian Army during the liberation of Bangla Desh. The features of the Chakma tribesmen were no different from the Mizo rebels, who were also equipped with arms to be used for prolonging the insurgency in India’s North-East. The Chakmas offered to lose themselves in the Chittagong hill tracts and infiltrate among the Mizo rebels, and pass on information to the Indian government, in lieu of asylum to their families. This offer was accepted.”

This was the prelude to the sustaining and deepening ties between RAW and the Shanti Bahini that was renewed after the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1975. In a more contemporary setting the above discussion also helps explain India’s eagerness for transit rights that would dissect Bangladesh offering a direct route to the fractious North-East states and indirectly assist in the prolongation of the secessionist insurgency in the CHT which could be then more easily controlled and integrated to the wider scheme for an Akhand Bharat as we shall see in the next part.


END NOTES & REFERENCES

Muhammad Mohar Ali – History of the Muslims of Bengal (1985) Chapter 26; Robert Harvey – Clive: The Life and Death of a British Emperor (1998) Chapters 15 and 16

Dr. Nandita Chaudhuri - Ethnicity, Human Rights Violation and Colonial Legacies in Bangladesh: The Post-colonial Trajectory of the Jummaland Movement (2003) pg 13

In Part 2 of Bushra Hasina Chowdhury – Building Lasting Peace: Issues of the Implementation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (ACDIS Occasional Paper - 2002)

Nandita Chaudhuri pg. 13

Bushra Part 2

Quoted by S. Mahmud Ali - The Fearful State: Power, People and Internal War in South Asia (1993) pg. 175 and cited in Mohammed Zainul Abedin – The Chittagong Hill Tracts A Victim of Indian Intervention (2003) pg. 38

By 1951 the position had been completely reversed so that the tribal people constituted 91% of the population and the Bengali settlers only 9%. This was principally due to the 1900 Regulation so that in a matter of 50 years the Muslims were outnumbered by a ratio of 9 to 1 but the history of the area has never been fully researched by the western NGO and human rights bodies (Bangladesh – Human Rights in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (Amnesty International – February 2000) pg 2)

Eleanor Dictaan-Bang-oa - ‘In Search for Peace in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh’ published by the UNDP in 2004

Nandita Chaudhuri pg. 15

Bushra Part 2

Collins and Lapierre – Freedom at Midnight (1982) pg. 211

H.V. Hodson – The Great Divide (1969) pg. 346-347; see also Brig. Gen. Shahedul Anam Khan - Managing Our Borders (The Daily Star – May 11, 2006)

Hodson pg. 349

Hodson pg. 348

This is possible referring to the Hillman Association which was formed in 1946 which proposed a confederation under the Indian government with the CHT as a princely state cited by Dictaan) See Dr. Hasanuzzaman Chowdhury & Dr. Mohammed Abdur Rab – Parbata Chattagram Bhu-Ragniti O Biponno Sharbovhumoto (Chittagong Hill Tracts Geo-Politics and Endangered Sovereignty (1997)) pg 35

Nandita Chaudhuri pg. 17

Calcutta University Commission Report - http://banglapedia.net/HT/U_0030.HTM

David Gilmore – Curzon (Papermac- 1994) pg 272; see also Abdul Quader Chowdhury – Mutual cooperation can be beneficial (Holiday – May 26, 2006)

David Gilmore pg 272; Rafiuddin Ahmed – The Bengal Muslims 1871 – 1906 (1988 Edition) pp. 180-181

Abu Al-Sayeed - Shat Cholisher Akhand Bangla Andalon: Purbo Pakistan theke Bangladesh (1999) pg 12-13; Nandita Chaudhuri pp. 16-17

Mohammed Zainul Abedin – The Chittagong Hill Tracts pg. 112

See Chowdhury & Rab –pp 27-28, 38

See David Ludden – Where is Assam? (HIMAL South Asian magazine – November/December 2005); M.S. Prabhakara – In the name of changing names (Frontline – June 03-16, 2006)

See Dr. Bibhu Prasad Routray – Militancy in India’s Northeast (PINR- May 16, 2006); Zainul Abedin – Human Rights Violations in CHT pg 37; Bibhuti Bhusan Nandi – India’s insecurity II (The Statesman – May 30, 2006); Chietigj Bajpaee – India held back by wall of instability (Asia Times – June 1, 2006); Dr. Anand Kumar – Assam: Ex-Rebels Turn Kingmakers (SAAG – June 7, 2006); BBC News International – Assam rocked by deadly explosions (June 9, 2006); Prabin Kalita – Ulfa steps up attacks in Assam (The Times of India – June 12, 2006); Sushanta Talukdar – Militants blow up railway tracks in Assam (The Hindu – June 13, 2006); Wasbir Hussain – The ULFA Bombs its Way to Peace Talks (South Asia Intelligence Review – June 12, 2006); Nava Thakuria – Mayhem at Asom (New Age – June 15, 2006); Nava Thakuria – ULFA blames police to engineer it to derail peace talks (Holiday – June 16, 2006); AP – Indira Goswami terrorist liason? (Hindustan Times – June 16, 2006); Nava Thakuria – ULFA explodes confusions?( The New Nation – June 16, 2006); Tim Sullivan – Writer, militant give hope to India region (AP – June 17, 2006); SAAG – Assam: Peace Talks under the Shadow of Terror (June 21, 2006); Billy I Ahmed – North East India: A volatile tinderbox (The Daily Star – June 23, 2006)

Nandita Chaudhuri pp. 18-19; Life is not Ours: Land and Human Rights in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh: The report of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission (May 1991) p. 13. Cited in Mohammed Zainul Abedin – The Chittagong Hill Tracts A Victim of Indian Intervention (2003) pg. 43; R. Ramasubramanian – Elusive Peace in the Chittagong Hill Tracts: A Backgrounder (SAAG – September 15, 2005)

Golam Rasul – State Policies and Land Use in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh (International Institute for Environment and Development – 2005) pg 7

Dr. S. Kharat pg. 5; There was also the Karnaphuli Rayon Mill under the Karnaphuli Multipurpose Project.

Ganesh Thapa – Rural Poverty Reduction Strategy for South Asia (April 2004)

Syed Anwar Husain – War and Peace in the Chittagong Hill Tracts: Retrospect and Prospect (1999). Cited in Dictaan - In Search for Peace; Global IDP Project – Profile of Internal Displacement: Bangladesh (January 21, 2005)

Life is not Ours pg. 13;

Dictaan has claimed that the people displaced by the Kaptai Hydro-Electric Project received little or no compensation while Muhammad Zainul Abedin provides specific set of figures as to the assistance made available by the Pakistan government which amounted to the expenditure of Rs. 5 Crores on the rehabilitation of 550 families on 11, 000 acres of land, another 6293 families were provided with fishing instruments and a further Rs. 11 lakhs were spent to complete the Valley Irrigation Project. (Mohammed Zainul Abedin – The Chittagong Hill Tracts A Victim of Indian Intervention (2003) pg. 43); Golam Rasul – State Policies and Land Use in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh (International Institute for Environment and Development – 2005); Bangladesh – Human Rights in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (Amnesty International – February 2000) pg. 4; Dr. S. Kharat - ‘From Internal Displacement to Refugees: The Trauma of Chakma’s in Bangladesh (2003); Global IDP Project – Profile of Internal Displacement: Bangladesh (January 21, 2005); Nandita Chaudhuri pg. 18

Dr. S. Kharat pp. 6-7; see also Mohammed Zainul Abedin – The Chittagong Hill Tracts A Victim of Indian Intervention (2003) pg. 44

Interim report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the elimination of all forms of intolerance and of discrimination based on religion or belief - Addendum 2: Situation in Bangladesh (9 August 2000) pg. 17; Global IDP Project – Profile of Internal Displacement: Bangladesh (January 21, 2005)

Bangladesh – Human Rights in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (Amnesty International – February 2000) pg. 11

SAHRDC - The Stateless Hajongs and Chakmas of the Indian State of Arunachal Pradesh, (1997) cited in Unnikrishnan and Martin – Refugees in India (www.indiadisasters.org)

Arundhati Roy – The Algebra of Infinite Justice (2002) chapter 2

Wikipedia reference for Mizoram and Tripura at -
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mizoram and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tripura)

Major General S.S. Uban – Phantoms of Chittagong: The ‘Fifth Army’ of Bangladesh (1985) pp. 62-63; See also Prof. Ram Puniyani – Why do people opt to change religion? (Holiday – June 23, 2006)

But who later betrayed his people and cause when he sold out to the Indians through secret negotiations with RAW (Asoka Raina – Inside RAW the story of India’s Secret Service (1981)

Uban pg. 64

Uban pp. 64-66

Uban Chapters 8-14

Uban pg. 68

The head of both RAW and the Directorate General of Security.

Asoka Raina pg. 87

See Mokbul Islam – Dhaka-Yangon-Kunming Friendship Highway (New Age – May 19, 2006)

[akzaman]

THE INDIA DOCTRINE

PART 5C

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the CHT

On the independence of Bangladesh on December 16, 1971 and the installation of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as Prime Minister the new nation was instilled with the combined ideals of nationalism, socialism, democracy, and secularism and a national character that emphasized the ‘exclusive primacy of Bengali culture, heritage, language, and the sacrifices made by the Bengalis in the liberation struggle’ being the emotive sentiments expressed by the PM during the debate on the draft constitution. Apart from raising certain ambiguities in our relations with the majority culture and population of West Bengal additional vagueness was introduced in the original constitutional provisions of Article 3 which declared the state language to be Bengali and the related Article 6 that made the citizens of Bangladesh to be henceforth known confusingly as Bengalis.

This all demonstrated a lack of understanding in the leadership of Bangladesh between the concepts of culture, language, history and ethnicity with that of citizenship and the rights that such legal status accords to the holders of that entitlement and privilege whether by birth or naturalization. As a result or at least as an excuse, Manabendra Narayan Larma, the Chakma leader and a member of the East Pakistan Provincial Assembly in 1970 and a prominent figure in the politics of the CHT , ‘refused to endorse the constitution, since it did not recognize the existence of other national communities or sub-national identities.’ During the constitution making process and in the very early years of nation building, a delegation led by the Mong King Mongfru Shine, which also included M.N. Larma amongst the delegates, met with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1972 and submitted a four-point manifesto that could be interpreted as the beginnings of their secessionist designs:

(1) Autonomy for the Chittagong Hill tracts, including its own legislature; (2) retention of Regulation 1900 in the Constitution of Bangladesh; (3) continuation of the tribal chiefs’ offices ; and (4) a constitutional provision restricting the amendment of Regulation 1900 and imposition of a ban on the influx of the non-tribal people into CHT.

Sheikh Mujib rejected the document in a furious rage and urged the indigenous peoples to embrace Bengali nationalism and assimilate into the majority culture. With the benefit of hindsight and our knowledge of the ensuing secessionist insurgency this was probably the worst approach to take with the Chakma leaders and an alternative appeal based on citizenship obligations and duties could have been offered to the delegates citing the Bangladesh Citizenship (Temporary Provisions) Order, 1972 and the Citizenship Act 1951 which was just then being amended by Sheikh Mujib’s legal experts.

Sheikh Mujib should have pointed out the rights and duties associated with citizenship and explained to the delegates the meaning of the legal expression ‘permanent resident’ which could be altered by simply leaving the country with the intention of never returning and adopting a new domicile of choice as the Chakmas had originally done when they settled in the CHT in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries and again when 40, 000 of their tribe left permanently for India after the building of the Kaptai Dam. It is glaringly obvious that 1, 2 and 4 of the delegations demands were inherently contradictory to the territorial integrity of Bangladesh and therefore contrary to the acquiring of citizenship in the new nation which they were entirely free to vacate as they had no other rights that could be enforced - since they were clearly not indigenous to the CHT region. It may be redundant to mention that the 1972 Constitution made no provision for special status for the CHT and the demands that could have been accepted (see note 5 below) were ultimately rejected due to the inclusion of the demands on autonomy and retention of the 1900 Regulation which were the principal reasons for the manifestos submission.

As a consequence or in anticipation of this failed meeting with Sheikh Mujib the Rangamati Communist Party was secretly formed by M.N. Larma on May 16, 1972. The Chittagong Hill Tracts People's Solidarity Association (PCJSS - The Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti) was also launched as a mass contact organization for this party in the same year, although, it appears to have been formed some months earlier to the Rangamati Communist Party. The main purpose of the PCJSS was to campaign for the autonomy of the CHT and was based on the Panchayat system , with members supposedly elected by the village members but was in reality a dictatorial and highly selective body consisting of Chakma tribesmen who were the predominant force in its make up and operations. The Shanti Bahini was the next to be unleashed on the CHT region forming the armed wing of the PCJSS and the group most responsible for human rights abuses in the area. Their introduction on the scene in January 7, 1973 was separated by less than 8 months from the floating of the PCJSS which shows a well prepared plan and program of action.

The two constitutional principles that held together the nation and defeated the arguments for autonomy or secessionism were virtually obliterated by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in another of his ill conceived and servile decisions that gave an added incentive to the PCJSS and the Shanti Bahini to engage in a low intensity war with the Bangladesh government in the CHT. The provision for a unitary state in Article 1 and the territorial integrity of Bangladesh contained in Article 2 were both gravely undermined when Bangladesh entered into the Land Boundary Agreement signed by Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in May of 1974. Article 1.14 of the agreement stated,

“India will retain the southern half of South Berubari Union No. 12 and the adjacent enclaves, measuring an area of 2.64 square miles approximately, and in exchange Bangladesh will retain the Dahagram and Angorpota enclaves. India will lease in perpetuity to Bangladesh an area of 178 metres x 85 metres near 'Tin Bigha' to connect Dahagram with Panbari Mouza (P.S. Patgram) of Bangladesh.”

In compliance with the agreement Bangladesh ceded Berubari and even passed the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1974 to achieve this but India has not reciprocated by leasing the Tin Bigha corridor to allow access to Dahagram and Angorpota which was agreed through an Exchange of Letters on October 7, 1982 between the Foreign Minister of India Narasimha Rao and Mr. A. R. Shams-ud-Doha, the then Foreign Minister of Bangladesh. Both the Calcutta High Court and the Supreme Court of India ruled that the lease of the Tin Bigha was completely lawful but the Indian government still procrastinates after more than 32 years of the signing of the 1974 agreement. This surely can be described as another example of the ubiquitous Akhand Bharat phenomenon in Indian statecraft and politics which is also singularly a vision shared by some of the Chakma insurgents and any cessation of land can only provide encouragement to such groups especially when so carelessly given away.

It was only with the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman that dealings with India rigidified and the government’s attitude to the PCJSS and the Shanti Bahini became far less tolerant or lenient. The general publics outlook was also increasingly guided by the nations self interest and in maintaining its territorial integrity and any type of encroachment in any vicinity of Bangladesh was fiercely repelled with the help of the army or BDR even when the country’s political will became fearfully hesitant or was entirely absent as happened during the last Awami League government led by Sheikh Hasina (e.g. incursion into Baraibari, Roumari upazila, Sylhet on April 18, 2001) which contributed to her parties landslide defeat in the 2001 elections.

The Situation from 1975-1981
After the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman direct military intervention by India had been considered but was eventually dismissed as being prohibitively risky with the political turmoil created by the State of Emergency (called by Indira Gandhi on June 26, 1975) the situation could have taken a more serious turn bringing international condemnation and censure if the Indian government had taken armed recourse in response to the events inside Bangladesh. Alternative modes of interference were, therefore, adopted and RAW was instructed to actively seek out, communicate and engage with the Shanti Bahini developing upon a prior relationship with the Chakmas during the 1971 war.

RAW began training the members of the Shanti Bahini to carry out subversive activities to destabilize the CHT region and their collaborative network was further reinforced with the setting up of terrorist camps on Indian territory in direct violation of the terms of the 25 year India-Bangladesh Friendship Treaty,

“. In 1975, the RAW was instructed to assist the Chakma rebels with arms, supplies, bases and training. Training was conducted in the border camps in Tripura but specialized training was imparted at Chakrata near Dehra Doon. Shantu Larma's Shanti Bahini members were flown to Chakrata and then sent back to Tripura to infiltrate into Chittagong Hill Tracts. A RAW office and its operatives at Agartala monitored the progress of the trainees. In 1976, the Shanti Bahini launched its first attack on the Bangladesh force. A new insurgency had been born and India's secret war in the hills of Bangladesh had begun.”

This low intensity war started taking a serious toll in human lives and property from 1977 onwards when the Shanti Bahini initiated attacks on the Bangladesh military and paramilitary personnel and their bases in the CHT, as well as against non-tribal settlers, ‘resulting in hundreds of deaths and the abduction of foreign nationals for ransom money.’ These incidents of kidnapping and extortion convinced multinational companies like Shell to withdraw their investments in the area and abandon their oil exploration projects to the detriment of the entire Bangladesh economy which could have benefited hugely from any hydrocarbon deposits found in the region.

On assuming power in 1975, President Ziaur Rahman took several decisive and proactive steps to rein in the insurgency and rectify the imbalance created by the 1900 Regulations in the demographic make up of the CHT area that was originally embarked on by the Pakistan authorities and by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman but both in a limited and negative fashion simply continuing the policy of unrestrained movement into the region as prescribed by Article 36 of the Constitution that guarantees to every citizen the right to move freely throughout Bangladesh and to reside and settle in any place therein.

Taken alongside Article 42 that accords to every citizen the right to acquire, hold, transfer or otherwise dispose of property the only bar to entry into the CHT would be the personal considerations of safety and socioeconomic advancement. Sheikh Mujib did not inspire much confidence in his abilities to secure a safe environment for new settlers and his sycophantic administration was lacking in inspiration and also in new policy measures and the guidance provided by the necessary bold initiatives of a great leader. All these defects are reflected in the small number of internal migrants (from other parts of Bangladesh) to the CHT, at around a mere 50, 000 individuals (which is likely to be an exaggerated figure) from 16 December 1971 to 15 August 1975.

Even this small number was considered a serious threat by Dr. Kalidas Baidya who blames the Sheikh Mujibur Rahman administration for ‘artificially’ increasing the Muslim population in the CHT and antagonizing the Chakmas who took up arms in response to these intrusions. According to Kalidas the Muslims were infiltrated into the CHT to try to transform the region from a Dar-al-Harb to a Dar-al-Islam which would probably be the biggest obstacle to his program of an Akhand Bharat and RAW’s attempts at secession of the CHT. He has, however, failed to mention that Crown Prince Nusrat Shah had already proclaimed the CHT area a land of Islam as long ago as 1516 A.C.E. This could not, therefore, be the real cause of Chakma resentment on which the premises for conflict has been based but on an altogether different supposition related to a determination made by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman early in his career as Prime Minister.

If, therefore, the true cause of the Chakmas frustration that had been implanted by Sheikh Mujib could be removed then the will to fight might be sufficiently pacified to allow for compromise and discussion and secure the entry for Bengali migrants into the CHT region. President Ziaur Rahman by Proclamation Order 1 of 1977 wisely amended Article 6 of the constitution which now prescribed that all citizens of Bangladesh would henceforth be known as Bangladeshis denoting an inclusive and non-discriminatory entitlement and equal representation for all ethnic, cultural and religious groups within the states jurisdiction. This, however, did not mollify the Chakma rebels who now wanted unreasonably to impose the provisions of the 1900 Regulation on the CHT by coercing the government to stop settlements by Bengalis from the plain lands. President Ziaur Rahman ignoring these unjustifiable demands took active measures to encourage settlers to move into the area and with the assistance of USAID, the Government of Sweden, the World Health Organization and UNICEF he was able to provide the migrants with ‘transportation, money, a six month food supply, and 2.5 to 5 acres of land for each family’.

This consequently became a contentious and politicized issue with RAW sponsoring several highly prejudicial conference reports and book publications disclosing inflated and inconsistent figures for the numbers of Bengali settlers moving into the region that ranged from 441, 000 Muslim individuals during the period of 16 December 1971 to 24 March 1982 onwards or 400, 000 Bengalis up to 1985 and in another estimate the same number in the short space of 1979-1984 and regardless of which approximation is adopted the government managed only to bring the number of Bengalis residing in the CHT to 473, 301 as recorded in the 1991 census report.

That the RAW sponsored figures and the corresponding aggregates are fabricated and can be proven to be logically irrational is patently evident if one considers that during 1951-1961 the lowland population of the CHT increased from 29, 000-119,000 so if a similar number entered the area from 1961-1971 the Bengali settlers would exceed 200,000 which only allows for a further 200,000 settling in the period between 1971-1991 . The manipulation of these statistics was intended to legitimize Chakma violence by artificially inventing new causes for unrest that was meant to conjure up comparisons with the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip but which has no basis in the factual situation on the ground nor in the historical backdrop to the CHT region which had been under Muslim control for the better part of 800 years.

President Ziaur Rahman continued to promote immigration into the CHT from other parts of Bangladesh by creating opportunities for social and economic advancement in the area by setting up the Chittagong Hill Tracts Board and an Export Processing Zone. A Multisectoral Development Program was also undertaken with a view to create the ‘necessary conditions for the longer-term socioeconomic development of the region’ but it was mainly due to the intransigence of the PCJSS and the Shanti Bahini under the guidance and supervision of RAW that prevented a more sustained economic take off in the area.

With the 1977 ambush of an army convoy by the Shanti Bahini the CHT region was brought under the GOC of the Twenty-Fourth Division of the Bangladesh Army and counter-insurgency operations were started which involved in some cases the relocation of a few tribal peoples to cluster villages aiming at the isolation of the militant Shanti Bahini cadres and also the creation of the Village Defence Police to allow the Bengali settlers to resist their attacks. Due to the upsurge in violence instigated by the Shanti Bahini in 1977 several thousand Chakma tribe’s people left for the Indian state of Tripura. It actually became incumbent upon them to go there if they could not live peaceably as citizens of Bangladesh or suffered a conflict of loyalties in that regard - in the end they clearly preferred being stateless refugees living in squalor and deprivation in India.

Midway into his presidency Ziaur Rahman had appointed Rajmata (the mother of the Chakma King) Benita Roy as his advisor, later to be replaced by A.S. Prue Choudhury to reassure the Chakma tribe of his good will and sincerity towards them and his commitment to resolving the issues plaguing the region but ‘the political move did not produce the intended results, as both advisors belonged to the royal family and the insurgents did not have much confidence in their efficacy. In a further attempt at consensus building the President set up a Tribal Convention on 2 July 1977 to mediate between the government and the PCJSS but was also subsequently rejected by them as internal dissension within that organization escalated as many Chakmas must have felt that doing RAW’s bidding was no longer in their interests. With the assassination of President Ziaur Rahman in 1981 - who was rumoured to have been killed in a conspiracy organized by RAW - negotiations with the PCJSS were temporarily stalled.

Negotiations with the PCJSS & The Final Betrayal
Opportunities for negotiations again opened up after Lt. General H.M. Ershad seized control of the Government in a coup on 24 March 1982 ousting an ineffectual Justice Abdus Sattar and appointing himself President. Internal infighting between the PCJSS and the members of their militant wing resulted, ‘in the killing of all thirty members of the Shanti Bahini and injuring twenty-two others. Manabendra Narayan Larma, the leader of Shanti Bahini was also killed on 10 November 1983’. This civil war within the PCJSS split the organization into two factions, one led by the brother of the slain leader, Jyotindra Narayan Larma (widely known as Shantu Larma), and Priti Kumar Chakma. The Priti faction reached agreement with General Ershad in 1985 and 300 fighters of this breakaway group accepted a rehabilitation package offered by the government but which was rejected by the main body of the PCJSS now headed by Shantu Larma.

Ershad achieved this breakthrough by following the policies adopted by President Ziaur Rahman that included continuing the counter-insurgency operations, taking steps to develop socioeconomic structures and pursuing initiatives to ensure a comprehensive political settlement. Nevertheless, the situation in the CHT deteriorated in 1986 after the Shanti Bahini massacred 38 Bengalis and injured 24 in the northern villages of the CHT in Tainting, Tanakkopara, Sentilla and Assalong and in response, Bengali communities took swift and violent reprisal on the local tribal communities which led to an organized exodus of 50, 000 Chakmas to five refugee camps situated at Kathalchhari, Karbook, Pancharampara, Silachhari and Takumbari in the Indian state of Tripura.

Dialogue between the government and the PCJSS was revived under the auspices of the National Committee of the CHT and in the second of these dialogues held on 17-18 December, 1987, the Chakma delegation put forward a five-point demand that unequivocally set out a proposal for autonomy and if implemented even partially would have eventually led to secession. The five demands were subdivided into 47 sub-demands which called for devolved authority to the CHT under a Regional Council that would have limited executive powers and but the ability to approve its own annual budget independently from the central government in Dhaka.

The salient points of the demands as set out by Dictaan were: 1. Removal of non-indigenous peoples settled in the CHT after 1947; 2. Withdrawal of all Bangladeshi armed forces from the CHT including non-indigenous police force; 3. Retention of the CHT regulations of 1900 and a constitutional provision restricting its amendment; 4. Autonomy for the CHT with its own legislature and recognition of Jumma nation’s right to self-determination; and 5. Deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping force and implementation of these measures under the auspices of the UN. These demands were rejected by the government as being incompatible with the constitution and six further dialogues were held between the National Committee and the PCJSS but all culminated in failure.

With no further tangible progress in the talks the government unilaterally changed the administrative structure of the CHT and devolved certain powers to newly created region councils. The Bangladesh Parliament in 1989 enacted the Rangamati Hill Tracts Local Government Council Act of 1989, the Khagrachari Hill Tracts Local Government Council Act of 1989, the Bandarban Hill Tracts Local Government Council Act of 1989, and the Hill District (Repeal and Enforcement of Law and Special Provision) Act of 1989. The Special Affairs Ministry was constituted by the government in July 1990 to look after the affairs of the CHT. These Acts created three district councils in Rangamati, Khagrachari and Bandarban each composed of a two-thirds tribal majority with a tribal chairperson. This allowed for the smaller tribes to be involved in the political process which had been dominated by the Chakmas, the Marmas and the Tripuris. The Councils were given limited administrative and supervisory authority over a number of government departments including Fisheries, Agriculture, Small Cottage Industries, Public Health and Primary Education.

The PCJSS and the Shanti Bahini managed to find excuses to reject these changes principally at the instigation of RAW as it did not go far enough in meeting the Indian demands which would require a framework that could lead to final secession of the CHT region. This decision was unpopular amongst many Chakmas who were fighting a cause they no longer believed in and which was amply demonstrated when 2,294 insurgents and 30, 390 tribals returned from camps across the border. It was for this reason that the PCJSS boycotted the elections held in 1989 anticipating a protest vote from their own community against their destructive activities and inflexible negotiating positions.

Discussion were again dogged by mutual suspicions between the Khaleda Zia government and her Indian counterparts over the repatriation of Chakma tribal peoples staying in camps in Tripura, Mizoram and Arunchal Pradesh during the election campaign period of 1995-1996 when the opposition Awami League staged mass anti-government protests and called nationwide strikes which inflicted huge damage on the national economy. It was later discovered that RAW and been paying enormous sums to the leaders of the Awami League during this period and had been a reliable source of funds for journalists, cultural activists and politicians working against the interests of Bangladesh.

It was, therefore, no surprise that the Awami League won the elections in 1996 with the prodigious support of the Indian government and intelligence agencies and other front organizations. The Indian government could now extract a handsome return on its clandestine investments in Bangladesh and the form this took was revealed by Motiur Rahman Rentu in his book, ‘Amar Fashi Chai’. In the book, Rentu describes a visit to Bangladesh in late 1996 of the Chief Minister of West Bengal Jyoti Basu who in a personal meeting with Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina at Ganabhaban, advised her to sign a treaty with the tribal people of the CHT which would allow them to collect their own taxes and assess their own revenue and the government could do nothing in the region without their permission.

Jyoti Basu instructed her to name the accord a peace treaty and informed her that he had already assured the Indian Prime Minister, Home Minister, Defence Minister and the tribal leaders of the CHT that her government would implement this plan. She should publicize the agreement as bringing peace to the CHT region after many years of conflict and bloodshed and that she may even be awarded the Nobel Prize for this initiative. He also wanted her to accept transit facilities for India and also to hand over control of the Chittagong Port which along with the CHT Treaty had already been promised by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to the Indians during his premiership.

These concessions would have reversed the 1947 partition of ‘East Bengal’ and bring an Akhand Bharat several steps closer to realization but this does not seem to have been of much consequence to Sheikh Hasina who followed to the letter Basu’s instructions on forming a Committee on the Chittagong Hill Tracts (NCCHT) with Abul Hasnat Abdullah (son of Abdur Rab Serniabat) the Chief Whip, as its Chairman. After a number of meetings held in Dhaka between the NCCHT and the PCJSS a CHT Peace Accord was signed by Abul Hasnat Abdullah and Shantu Larma on 2nd December 1997 in the presence of the Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina but the accord did not, as its terms of reference cynically suggest, find a ‘permanent political solution within the framework of the state sovereignty of Bangladesh’.

The agreement could not technically be called a Treaty as the signatories were not two different countries but the Bangladesh Government and a small section of its own citizenry. It is for this reason that the accord is inherently defective because as long as the Indian government is not bound by the terms of a treaty and its obligations supervised by an independent body there will remain the threat from insurgents based in India attacking Bangladesh on the orders of RAW. It was for this exact reason that Article 8 and 9 was included in the 25 year Friendship Treaty but this has not restrained the Indian government from training, organizing and equipping insurgent outfits operating from its territory as a hostile gesture to Bangladesh. With the devolution of power to unaccountable and unrepresentative bodies and with officials answerable to only themselves this accord if fully implemented would have given India a prime opportunity for interference in the CHT but on a grander scale and helpfully financed by the Bangladesh taxpayers and businesses. For these reasons the most objectionable provisions of the 1997 Peace Accord include the following which have been taken from Part 4 of Bushra’s article –


General
1. Both sides, considering the CHT as a “Tribal Populated Region,” recognized the necessity of protecting the character of the region while making provisions for its overall development.

Hill District Local Government Council/Hill District Councils

Both sides agreed to change, amend, add, and repeal the Hill District Local Government Council Acts of 1989, and the various sections described in the accord, such as:

2. The name of the Hill District Local Government Council shall be amended and this council shall be renamed as the Hill District Council.

3. “Non-tribal permanent resident” shall mean a person who is not a tribal and who has lands of lawful entitlement in the hill districts, and who generally lives in the hill district at a specific address.

4. (d) The following sub-section shall be added to section 4:

“Whether a person is a non-tribal or not and, if so, which community he is a member of, shall be determined, subject to his producing a certificate from the concerned Mouza Headman/Union Council Chairman/ Municipality Chairman, by the Circle Chief concerned; without a certificate in this connection being received from the Circle Chief, no person shall be eligible as a non-tribal to be a candidate for the post of a non-tribal member.”

24. (a) Sub-section 1 of section 62 shall be amended as follows:

“Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, sub-inspectors and all members of ranks subordinate thereto of the hill district police shall be appointed by the council as per regulations and prescribed procedure, and the council shall be competent to transfer them and take punitive action against them in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the regulations, provided that the tribal of the district shall have preference in case of the said appointment.”

26. Section 64 shall be amended and enacted as follows:

“(a) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no land and premises, including the leasable Khas lands, within the territorial limits of the Hill Districts shall be transferable by Ijara (leasing), settlement, purchase, or sale except with the prior permission of the council, provided that this provision shall not be applicable in respect to the area of Reserved Forest, Kaptai Hydroelectric Project, Betbunia Satellite Station, state-owned industries and factories, and the lands recorded in the name of the government.”

“(b) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no land, hill forest under the control and within the jurisdiction of the council shall be acquired or transferred by the government without consultation with, or the consent of, the council.”
27. Section 65 shall be amended and formulated as follows:

“Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the responsibility of collecting the Land Development Tax of the district shall rest in the hands of the council and the collected tax of the district shall be deposited in the fund of the council.”

Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council
1. Subject to the amendment and addition of the various sections in the Parbattya Zilla Sthanio Sarkar Parishad Ayin, 1989 (Hill District Local Government Council Act XIX, XX, and XXI of 1989) for the purpose of making the Hill District Council more powerful and effective, a Regional Council will be formed comprising the local government councils of three Hill Districts.

9. (a) The council shall coordinate all of the development activities carried out by the three Hill District Councils, and shall also superintend and harmonize all affairs of, and affairs assigned to, the three Hill District Councils. In the event of lack of harmony or any inconsistency being found in the discharge of responsibilities given to the three Hill District Councils, the decision of the Regional Council shall be final.

© The council shall coordinate and supervise the three Hill Districts in matters of general administration, law and order, and development.

10. The Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board shall discharge the assigned duties under the general and overall supervision of the council. The government shall give preference to the eligible tribal candidates in appointing the chairman of the Development Board.

Rehabilitation, General Amnesty, and Other Matters
In order to restore normalcy in the Chittagong Hill Tracts region and, to that end, with respect to the works and matters of rehabilitation, general amnesty, and allied issues, both parties have arrived at the following consensus and agreed to undertake programs as follows:

4. A Land Commission shall be constituted under the leadership of a retired justice for settlement of disputes regarding lands and premises. This commission shall, in addition to early disposal of land disputes of the rehabilitated refugees, having full authority to annul the rights of ownership of those hills and lands which have been illegally settled and in respect of which have been illegally settled and in respect of which illegal dispossession has taken place. No appeal shall be maintainable against the judgment of this commission and the decision of this commission shall be deemed to be final. This provision shall be applicable in the case of fringe-lands.

8. Land allocation for rubber and other plantations: out of the lands allocated to non-tribal and non-local persons for rubber and other plantations, the lease (allocation) with respect to the lands of those who did not undertake any project during the last ten years or did not properly utilize the lands shall be cancelled.

17. (a) After the signing and execution of the agreement between the government and the Jana Samhiti Samiti, and immediately after the return of the members of the Jana Samhiti Samiti to normal life, all temporary camps of the army, the Ansars and the Village Defence Party (VDP), excepting the Border Security Force (BDR) and permanent army establishments (consisting of those three at the district headquarters and those at Alikadam, Ruma and Dighinala), shall be taken back in phases from the Chittagong Hill Tracts to permanent cantonments and a time limit shall be fixed for this purpose. In cases of the deterioration of law and order in the region, in times of normal calamities, and for similar other purposes, the armed forces may be deployed under the authority of the civil administration in adherence to law and rules as are applicable to all the other parts of the country. In this respect, the Regional Council may, in order to get the required or timely help, make requests to the appropriate authority.

(b) The abandoned lands of military and paramilitary forces and cantonments shall be transferred to their original owners or to the Hill District Council.

18. Permanent residents of the CHT, on a priority basis for the tribal, shall be appointed to all posts of officers and employees at all levels of government, semi-government, council offices, and autonomous bodies in the CHT. The government may assign a deputy for a term of a certain period, provided that qualified candidates among the permanent residents of the CHT are not available for a particular post.

Taken together these provisions if fully implemented would overturn 800 years of Muslim history in the region and leave Bangladesh virtually defenseless against a new insurgency in the CHT or a military incursion by Indian troops into the area. The accord also tries to re-impose the discriminatory and inequitable rules of the 1900 Regulations with many of the policy making and administrative bodies created under the agreement to be composed overwhelmingly with tribal people from amongst the Chakmas and Marmas and there is also a provision effectively reintroducing the iniquitous Chittagong Hill Tracts Frontier Police Regulations of 1881.

It is with some relief, therefore, that the 1900 Regulations have now come under challenge, after 150 years of it’s original enactment and almost a decade after the signing of the Peace Accords, in the High Court of Bangladesh through the petition of a private individual under the Writ Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court but which is now facing stiff opposition from certain vested quarters. There is, however, some suspicion that this challenge is a provocative act to highlight the claims of certain tribal groups before the 2007 elections to incite a new round of violence and unrest or it may just be an electioneering ploy by either of the main political parties. Nevertheless, neither of these explanations should undermine the innate justice in having the Regulations invalidated and nullified in toto as being contrary to the provisions of the constitution and against the rights of the people of Bangladesh. If the challenge is successful this would require several amendments to the accord which may also become subject to the requirements of the constitution and whole provisions of the agreement may have to be rewritten. Even if the case were to eventually collapse the door to further legal challenges has finally been opened and cannot now be shut.

India and the CHT Peace Accord
Since this essay is primarily concerned with the issue of Indian expansionism the criticisms leveled at the present BNP government for non-implementation of the accord and the matter of rehabilitation of tribals now residing in India becomes totally irrelevant in the face of threats to the nations integrity and sovereignty. As long as India maintains terrorist camps on its territory the question of removing Bangladesh military and paramilitary forces from the CHT does not arise and there cannot be any compromise on this issue. With the chance of fresh violence in the region possibly inspired by RAW, Article 17 (a) on removal of military forces from the area is a non-issue for Bangladesh and the accord itself stipulates no time limit on withdrawal. That the PCJSS has not given up its violent ways and is still merely a front for RAW operations was revealed in Dictaan’s paper which contains an interview with the Chairman of the Liaison Committee between the Bangladesh government and the PCJSS, Mr. Hangsadhwaj Chakma,

“If the government is not going to show sincerity on the peace agreement, then it is not giving the people any other choice but to launch another movement – whether armed or unarmed.”

It is the lack of sincerity on the part of some of the Chakma tribal leaders that is really in doubt with their consorting with a foreign intelligence agency and furthering the Indian agenda for an Akhand Bharat which is discernible from the rejection of the accord by the Pahari Gano Parishad (PGP or Hill Peoples Council), Pahari Chattra Parishad (PCP or Hill Students Council) and Hill Women Federation (HWF) who argue that it does not go far enough in meeting the aspirations of the tribal peoples for full autonomy (read independence). This repudiation of the accord has been backed up by insurgent groups such as the United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF) and the Jhum Liberation Army (JLA).

Moral support has been extended to these groups by some western human rights agencies who often receive distorted and prejudicial information from local non-governmental organizations that overplay the alleged human rights abuses of the Bangladesh army and the Bengali inhabitants in order to seek their removal from the CHT. Nearly all the human rights organizations support the accord but do not explain why if it is so essential to peace in the region the Indian government does not sign a similar agreement with the freedom fighters in Assam, Tripura, Mizoram and the other Seven Sister states. They do not even acknowledge that the legal framework applied to the CHT is no where near as oppressive as in the Seven Sisters where the Indian government has imposed draconian laws such as the Preventive Detention Act of 1950, Defense of Indian Rules 1962, Maintenance of Internal Security Act 1971, National Security Act 1980, Terrorists and Disruptive Activities Act 1985, Essential Services Maintenance Act 1980, Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act 1958 and Disturbed Areas Act (Assam) 1980.

The main perpetrator of human rights abuses in the CHT is not the Bangladesh Army who has an unblemished record in international peacekeeping operations but the insurgent groups such as the Shanti Bahini, UPDF and the JLA who have resorted to robbery, torture, extortion, kidnapping, murder, rape and arson amongst other less serious crimes. The purpose behind this propaganda campaign that emphasizes perceived human rights abuses of the Bangladesh Army but then tries to legitimize the conduct of the Shanti Bahini and other Chakma terrorist groups is to have the military forces removed from the CHT. This would render the area defenseless against Indian aggression which would be aided by certain tribes that have shown themselves to be more opportunistic than ideologically committed and probably do not appreciate the logic of an Akhand Bharat that will leave no one free from Indian hegemony and control.

COMMUNALIST SECESSIONIST CONSPIRACIES
In tandem with the secessionist conspiracies in the CHT the Indian intelligence agencies have engineered new communalist movements in Bangladesh based on the ideas of Dr. Kalidas Baidya discussed in Part 4 of this essay in relation to the creation of an East Bengal and the 1971 war. These groups also seem to derive inspiration from Hindu fanatical leaders like Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar, the father of the RSS, who had been the most active proponent of the Akhand Bharat ideal after Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. The principal objective of Kalidas has been to set up a Hindu Homeland by carving out a large portion of Bangladesh that would include the districts of greater Khulna, Jessore, Kushtia, Faridpur, Barisal and Patuakhali. Kalidas has sought the return of the Hindus that migrated to India during 1947 and in 1971 to a Hindu Homeland that is to be called Bangabhumi or ‘Swadin Bangabhumi’ as it was officially declared on 24 March, 1982.

The Bangabhumi Movement started its operations on August 15, 1977 under the name of ‘Nikhil Banga Nagarik Sangha (All Bengal Citizen’s Organization) with Dr. Kalidas Baidya as its General Secretary. Another of the key figures in this movement is Chittarangan Sutar who as a RAW operative maintained close links with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and had established himself in Bangladesh during the 1950’s. Like the PCJSS in the CHT the NBNS set up its own armed wing called the ‘Banga Sena’ with Dr. Kalidas Baidya as its commander. Over the years the Bangabhumi Movement has tried different methods of infiltration into Bangladesh under various guises with front organizations providing publicity and coordination which have included the Bangladesh Refugee Welfare Organization, the Mohajir Sangha and the Hindu-Buddha-Christian Oikya Parishad and there are numerous others that could have been mentioned but these have had less success in their nefarious activities. The ultimate aim of all these endeavors is the creation of an Akhand Bharat which was the candid and honest admission of Dr. Kalidas Baidya in an interview with the Dhaka Courier in May 1989 where he was asked by the interviewer, “Well, tell me, what may be the alternative to Bangabhumi movement?” Kalidas immediately replied, “[The] alternative is only one – Bangladesh may accept submission and become a part of India. The Bangabhumi movement may be stopped if it [Bangladesh] accept (sic) total submission.”

The latest manifestation of the Bangabhumi Movement has appeared in the form of the Human Rights Congress on Bangladeshi Minorities (HRCBM) that has highlighted fabricated cases of Hindu oppression in Bangladesh and gained international sympathy for their cause. The HRCBM and its subsidiary cyber group, the UnitedMinority, is an exclusively Hindu organization which intends to create communal violence in various parts of Bangladesh to force Hindus to relocate in border districts of the country and then force India to annex these districts into the larger Indian State (i.e. the program for an Akhand Bharat).

This outrageous plan for the balkanization of Bangladesh was disclosed by two patriotic Bangladeshis who joined HRCBM in a brilliant and quite uncommon example of intelligence work and investigative journalism and has been reported by Alochona eForce (an internet based group) in, ‘HRCBM – An Enemy of the State’. Their findings are based on emails exchanged between the leaders and supporters of HRCBM and so is a personalized record of the inner workings of the group and their motivations in Bangladesh. The author of this essay is familiar with one of the leading personalities behind HRCBM, Advocate Rabindra Ghosh, and can testify to the veracity of the report. In the preface to the report the tactics and strategies of the group are detailed which include –

- portraying Bangladesh internationally as a Talibanised country
- encouraging the boycott of Bangladesh made products
- expounding that Islam is the cause of evils
- seeking support from extremist Hindus worldwide
- damaging relations between Bangladesh and the UN and other countries
- inciting India to be actively hostile against Bangladesh
- creating social unrest within Bangladesh

Although the report nowhere mentions the vision of an Akhand Bharat there can no longer be any doubt that the guidelines above are intended to try to achieve this impossible Nehruvian goal. The conclusion to the report lays out the specific allegations against the HRCBM –

“HRCBM is an Enemy of Nation States
HRCBM has sought to exploit the post-election violence in Bangladesh by seeking an easily identifiable social grouping and acquiring the trappings of a cause that carries much currency in the post September 11 world.

The activities and motives of HRCBM as exposed in this report indicate irrefutably that it poses a serious threat to the security, sovereignty and long term socio -economic development of Bangladesh.

The HRCBM agenda is one of religious extremism disguised as human rights and secular principles and as such also constitutes a threat to the security, sovereignty and social stability of any nation state where there is a significant Hindu community.

HRCBM, its allies and collaborators, its sponsoring and supporting organizations (e.g. RSS, VHP) represent an axis of sedition against Bangladesh and Bangladeshis everywhere, irrespective of class, sex or religion.”

If the HRCBM organization had been able to continue its activities unimpeded a serious calamity would have certainly befallen Bangladesh. It was only through the bravery and foresight of two Bangladeshis that any untoward incidents did not occur as a consequence of HRCBM conspiracies. It is clear that many people still believe that it is worth defending Bangladesh against the machinations of the Indian government and its intelligence agencies which was at its most threatening during the period prior to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s death and then again during the insurgency in the CHT.

This essay is merely a reminder that the subversive plots against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bangladesh is ongoing and there will be no respite from this onslaught. Agents of India are located in every sector of our society that includes an array of personalities and characters involved in politics, the bureaucracy and administration, press and media, academia, cultural organizations, judiciary and the legal profession , Non-Governmental Organizations and human rights groups (such as the HRCBM but may also include less vocal entities posing as secularists or feminists) all of whom individually or in combination help to undermine the proper functioning of the state and which leads to dislocation and inefficiency in the administration of the country and demoralization amongst the people. The true motivating factor behind these extensive networks and collaborations is to assist in the realization of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru’s dream for a unified India or an Akhand Bharat.

END NOTES & REFERENCES

In Part 2 of Bushra Hasina Chowdhury – Building Lasting Peace: Issues of the Implementation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (ACDIS Occasional Paper - 2002)

Dr. S. Kharat - ‘From Internal Displacement to Refugees: The Trauma of Chakma’s in Bangladesh (2003) pg 7

Bushra Part 2

Chinmoy Mutchudee – Unrest in CHT and Relevant Matters (1992) cited in Mohammed Zainul Abedin – The Chittagong Hill Tracts A Victim of Indian Intervention (2003) pg. 79

Syed Aziz-Al Ahsan and Chakma Bhumitra - Problem of National Integration in Bangladesh: The Chittagong Hill Tracts, Asian Survey, (Berkeley), Vol. xxix, No. 10, October 1989, pp. 959-970. and cited in Dr. S. Kharat pg. 7; In addition to this it was also demanded that there should be payment of compensation to tribal families uprooted by the Kaptai Dam and the fixation of the water level of the dam at 90 feet (S.P. Talukdar - Chakmas : An Embattled Tribe (1994) cited in Dr. S. Kharat pg. 7)

Amena Mohsin – The Politics of Nationalism: The Case of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh (1997) cited by Eleanor Dictaan-Bang-oa - ‘In Search for Peace in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh’ published by the UNDP in 2004; Dr. Mizanur Rahman Shelly - The Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh: the Untold Story (Centre for Development Research - 1992); R. Ramasubramanian – Elusive Peace in the Chittagong Hill Tracts: A Backgrounder (SAAG – September 15, 2005)

Chinmoy pg 3 cited in Zainul Abedin – The Chittagong Hill Tracts pg. 81; Bushra claims that the PCJSS was formed in March 1972 (see Part 2 of Bushra) as does Amnesty International (Bangladesh – Human Rights in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (2000)) and Dr. S. Kharat pg. 7; Fahim Kawser – PCJSS’s past and present activities (New Nation – November 24, 2005)

Eleanor Dictaan-Bang-oa - ‘In Search for Peace in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh’ published by the UNDP in 2004

UNB- Questions in JS: Why Tin Bigha was not handed over in 30 yrs (The New Nation 0 November 30, 2004); BSS - India yet to hand over "Tin Bigha Corridor" to Bangladesh : National parliament informs (December 01, 2004)

Dr. Hasanuzzaman Chowdhury & Dr. Mohammed Abdur Rab – Parbata Chattagram Bhu-Ragniti O Biponno Sharbovhumoto (Chittagong Hill Tracts Geo-Politics and Endangered Sovereignty (1997)) pp 26 & 35

Chinmoy Mutchudee pg. 14 and Life is not Ours: Land and Human Rights in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh: The report of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission (May 1991) cited in Zainul Abedin – The Chittagong Hill Tracts pg. 83; Ashoke Biswas – RAW’s Role in Furthering India’s Foreign Policy (The New Nation – August 31, 1994) cited in Zainul Abedin – The Chittagong Hill Tracts pg. 98; See also Subir Bhaumik’s interview with Probe News Magazine (Vol.1 issue 4 – September 1-15, 2001); Chowdhury and Rab – pp 12, 38-49, 54-55

RAW's role in Furthering India's Foreign Policy, The New Nation, Dhaka, (31 August 1994); Motiur Rahman - Indo-Bangladesh Relation, (Daily Prothom Alo - 10 December 2002); Chowdhury and Rab pp 12, 38-49, 54-55

Binalaksmi Nepram - South Asia's Fractured Frontier, (Mittal Publishers - New Delhi, 2002) pp-153; See also Chowdhury and Rab pp 12, 38-49, 54-55

Amnesty International (2000) section 2 and pg. 24; Global IDP Project – Profile of Internal Displacement: Bangladesh (January 21, 2005) pg. 22; Dr. Nandita Chaudhuri - Ethnicity, Human Rights Violation and Colonial Legacies in Bangladesh: The Post-colonial Trajectory of the Jummaland Movement (2003) pg. 22

This policy appears also to have been guided by Indian political and business interests that have consistently created obstacles to the exploration for natural resources by other countries in the CHT in line with the Nehru Doctrine and Forward Policy discussed in part 1. To many Bangladeshis it smacks of gross insincerity and moral duplicity for the likes of Shantu Larma to complain about projects in other sectors of the economy on the grounds of environmental damage or the protection of indigenous rights of which he was least concerned as head of the Shanti Bahini. (A correspondent – Indigenous people rally against open pit mining plan (The Daily Star – May 1, 2006))

P.K. Debbarma, and George Sudhir Jacob – The Chakma Refugees in Tripura (1993) and cited in Dr. S. Kharat pg. 9.

Dr. Kalidas Baidya - ‘Bangaleer Muktiyuddhe Antaraler Sheikh Mujib’ (2005) pg. 189

Global IDP Project pg 24

Dr. S. Kharat pg. 9; But see Chowdhury and Rab Chapter 8

Global IDP Project pg 24; But see Chowdhury and Rab Chapter 8

Eleanor Dictaan-Bang-oa - ‘In Search for Peace in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh’ published by the UNDP in 2004; But see Chowdhury and Rab Chapter 8

If one also takes into account the births and deaths in this 20 year time frame

Bushra Part 3

Bushra Part 2

Eleanor Dictaan-Bang-oa - ‘In Search for Peace in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh’ published by the UNDP in 2004

Amnesty International pg. 5

Bushra Part 3

Bushra Part 3

Dr. S. Kharat pg. 10

Amnesty International pg. 5

Bushra Part 3

Far Eastern Economic Review (March 23, 1989) and cited in Zainul Abedin – The Chittagong Hill Tracts pg. 129

Debbarma and Jacob pg. 50 cited in Dr. S. Kharat pg. 10

As reproduced in Zainul Abedin – The Chittagong Hill Tracts pg. 162-168

C. Nicholas & R. Singh – ‘Indigenous People of Asia: Many People, One Struggle (1996) cited in Dictaan

Bushra Part 3

Bushra Part 3

Amnesty International pg. 5

Bushra Part 3

Inqilaab Correspondent – RAW provides four and a half crore rupee to a defeated party (Dainik Inqilaab – April 30, 1992); Abu Rushd – Raw in Bangladesh (Chapter 8 - English Edition 2005) pg 110-112; STAFF CORRESPONDENT - ‘Indian agencies offer money to write against Bangladesh’ (New Age – August 8, 2005); Salauddin Chowdhury – Bangladesh-India Relation: Truth must be told (The New Nation – 19 December, 1996)

Motiur Rahman Rentu - Amar Fashi Chai (1999) pp. 209-211 ; see also Chowdhury and Rab pp 18, 21-22

BDNews – CHT Manual Act challenged (The New Nation – June 9, 2006)

See Chowdhury and Rab Chapter 6; Staff Correspondent – EU for full implementation of CHT accord (New Age – June 13, 2006); Diplomatic Correspondent – EU concerned over slow implementation of CHT accord (The Daily Star - June 13, 2006); Staff Correspondent – AL hill district leaders want implementation of CHT peace accord (New Age – June 20, 2006)

Raja Devashish Roy – ‘Salient Features of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord of 1997’ in The Road to a lasting Peace (2000) pg 62; DS Correspondent – Implement peace accord, PCJSS demands (The Daily Star – May 17, 2006)

See Editorial – The Bangladesh Observer (September 9, 2003); See also Chowdhury and Rab pp 26, 35; R. Ramasubramanian – Elusive Peace in the Chittagong Hill Tracts: A Backgrounder (SAAG – September 15, 2005)

Abul Kalam Azad – Vested groups out to disrupt peace in CHT (New Age – April 23, 2006)

Mohammed Zainul Abedin – Human Rights Violations in CHT: Myth & Reality (2005); Staff Correspondent – Ethnic minorities for withdrawal of army from CHT (New Age – May 12, 2006); Staff Correspondent – Recover lands grabbed by Bengali settlers (The Daily Star – May 12, 2006); Ofiul Hasnat Ruhin – BNP MP accuses NGO’s in CHT of patronizing terrorists (New Age – May 29, 2006); R. Ramasubramanian – Elusive Peace in the Chittagong Hill Tracts: A Backgrounder (SAAG – September 15, 2005); Staff Correspondent – Rights activists demand action against culprits (The Daily Star – June 2, 2006)

See Sanjay Kumar – Overview: Problems and Solutions (Hindustan Times – October 17, 2005)

Zainul Abedin – Human Rights Violations in CHT pg 37; Dr. Bibhu Prasad Routray – Militancy in India’s Northeast (PINR- May 16, 2006)

Zainul Abedin – Human Rights Violations in CHT pg 53-64; See also Chowdhury and Rab Chapter 4; Abul Kalam Azad – Vested groups out to disrupt peace in CHT (New Age – April 23, 2006)

Abu Rushd – RAW in Bangladesh (2001) pg. 71

Zainul Abedin – RAW and Bangladesh (1995) Chapter 24

See Shamsuddin Ahmed - Are 500 Hindus leaving Bangladesh every day? (The New Nation – April 24, 2006)

Reproduced in Abu Rushd pg. 75 citing Sheikh Nurul Islam – Tathakathita Bangabhumi Andalon: Bartaman Tatparata O’Tar Nepthaya Kahini (Inside story of so-called Bangabhumi Movement (Daily Dinkal – December 4, 1993)

Indian Low Intensity War in Bangladesh – Case study of HRCBM (Bangladesh Research Forum)

The author of the report is Alochona e -Force. Alochona is a cyber forum where Bangladeshis meet and discuss issues of importance to Bangladesh. e -Force is a cyber task force that investigates issues of importance to the welfare of Bangladesh and Bangladeshis.

See BDNews – Lawyers boycott SC protesting injunction on ‘Dhaka siege’ (Bangladesh Observer – June 12, 2006); Staff Reporter – SCBA boycotts court protesting HC ban on ‘Dhaka siege’ (The Independent – June 12, 2006); Staff correspondent – SC halts as angry lawyers stage sit-in (The Daily Star – June 12, 2006); Sadeq Khan – Opposition gains no electoral capital (Holiday – June 16, 2006); Faisal Rahim – Judiciary under fresh attack (Holiday – June 16, 2006); Editorial – Honour of Judicary: How can lawyers disparage the sanctified institution? (Holiday – June 16, 2006)

[akzaman]

HIMALAYAN REVOLUTION- TESTING TIME FOR NEPAL

Brigadier General M. Sakhawat Hussain (retd)


I was in Katmandu, Nepal to attend Annual General Meeting (AGM) of South Asian Small Arms ( Anti-proliferation) Net – an organization, who are working to raise public awareness against the ill effect of the criminal use of small arms - both legal and illegal- by terrorists of all description. The organization is built to create a public pressure group to be brought on both manufacturer and user and on to the governments to ensure the accountability of both export and import to rein in the illegal proliferation in the society. Bangladesh has a chapter known as NSAF ( National Small Arms Forum) , an organization in its nascent stage – part of global movement against illegal trading of small arms and its effect on the society. It may be pointed out here that in a recent joint survey by Indian government and OXFAM it is estimated that out of known 74 million illegal small arms in the world about 40 million are within Sub-continent, particularly in India..

However, subject AGM was held on 22-23 May 06 which gave an opportunity to visit Katmandu at a time when one of the important SAARC member countries is passing through most crucial times of its history. Though my article would deal with the recent events of Nepal i.e. democratic movement - in which Maoist movement is considered as catalyst- yet I would like to talk a bit about the anti-proliferation organization as the article progresses.

The AGM also provided me a golden occasion of my second visit to Nepal, one of our important and closest neighbour, and opportunity to meet large section of Nepali civil society and had chance to meet couple of my old friends in the army, both serving as well retired from high posts. Nepal is not only our neighbour but could prove to be most important strategic partner. My opinion may prove to be understatement if one looks at the map of South Asia and the geographic location of both Bangladesh and Nepal vis-à-vis India and the other Asian giant China. It is worth noting that Tetulia to Katmandu Nepal’s capital- is 262 NM (nautical mile). There is a well laid out strategic road that links Nepal with Tibet (China) Katmandu to Kodari off Nepal. Kodari is at a distance of 542 NM from northern tip of Bangladesh. Bangladesh would have easier and shorter access into China should India provides a corridor through Jalpaiguri salient.

My visit to Nepal was in a critical time when king Ganenedra caved in with peoples’ upsurge opposing autocratic rule of the monarch. For 19 days otherwise serene Katmandu erupted with bullets, teargas canister and with death and destruction in favour of restoration of democracy and reinstallation of parliament that he dismissed in 2003. It was not first time that Katmandu witnessed political upheaval against the king in Nepal’s history yet monarchy survived with full authority making cosmic concession to the people as much as was needed to cool of the heat. So did co-exist kind of elected parliament - which could pass as part of royal reward to the agitating people - for last few decades but without power enact laws to challenge palace decree. But it was different ball game in April 2006 spring thanks to decade old armed upsurge by once remotely known CPN(M), commonly known as Maoists. Maoist and its supreme leader Mr. Puspa Kamal Dhal alias Parchanda to day rides the tide of popularity that had shaken the present SPA (Seven Party Alliance) government headed by aging and seriously sick leader Girija Parashad Koirala. SPA was formed and parliament was made sovereign by king’s decree on 24th April 2006 much to avoid physical removal of king as result of the street violence generated by ‘Ganoandolan’. It was primarily Maoist movement that prevailed upon the leaders now in power as Maoist guerrillas were holding and administering 80% of the territory of Nepal leaving the valley of Katmandu. Though 19 days virulent anti-monarch upsurge ended with 24th palace proclamation, seen as the victory of political parties but it is Maoist who feels vindicated as they were outlawed by Nepali government and is in the terrorist list of USA, yet the atmosphere of mistrust between two faction i.e. SPA and CPN(M) remains to be the most worrying factor for common Nepalis. Some of the CPN (M) top leaders are still in custody both in India and China as member of terrorist gang. That tag has already been removed in Nepal but yet to be removed from US list. Maoist still doubted by the Americans who had played significant part in bringing the settlement.

The Seven Party alliance, now given charge to prepare an election for establishing constituent assembly to draw a new democratic constitution and to form a national government to oversee the administration till ultimate elections held under the new constitution. But immediate essential reforms were forced by the people and largely by the Maoists to strip the king of his executive power including command of the army. King has been reduced to figurehead as per peoples demand –but not supported by the present constitution. Yet the Maoist were not satisfied and continued to pressure SPA government to bring about state structural change as soon as possible. SPA government capitulated fast under pressure. Ministry of defence has been now placed under the civil government, prim-minister holding the defence ministry, and decision to convert Nepal in to a secular state from ‘kingdom of Hindu State’ has already been approved on principal but lots of skepticism exists whether country with 80% Hindus would easily give up their distinct identity, especially the upper class Hindus. Nevertheless, King has been stripped of his title as the ‘Supreme Commander’ and Royal Nepali Army- which has been renamed as ‘Nepali Army’ – a major decision that made the king powerless. To-day king Ganendra holds no executive power.

There has been opposition and still growing against the decision for changing Nepal’s Hindu identity. Biswa Hindu Parishad, Nepal, in a very recent statement proclaimed that if there could be 56 Christian and 42 Islamic countries can exist in the world then why not one Hindu state? But Maoist has its own agenda. Since king Mahendra, once Nepal declared Hindu Kingdom, Nepali society echeloned as per the Hindu practice of cast system. It prevails. Entire Maoist movement has defied the social barrier and in last one decade CPN (M) succeeded in crushing that barrier to put together a force mainly consists of lower cast and Dalits.

Above discussed changes could be listed as major reform but not only limited to a few common changes that all party would accept. But CPN (M) would push through their major demands. However, much under pressure from Maoist, Nepal is witnessing rapid transformation from kingdom to republic. Yet Maoist are insisting to full fill the entire array of demands that they have been fighting for. Most important among all is the demand of declaring Nepal as republic before next elections are held i.e. abolishing the institution of monarchy and replaced by president who should also be the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Apparently Maoists, sensing the success of their decade long campaign, now is on the political offensive to increase their supremacy in future Nepal. Though three months ceasefire exists between the government forces and Maoist but report suggests that Maoists are gaining strength and recruiting new members in PLA (Peoples Liberation Army). Earlier SPA had entered into 12 point agreement with Maoist and according to the principal of 12 points accord important one pertained to freezing further recruitment of both sides fighting strength. This is also as per cease fire agreement. But apparently that is not holding, each one accusing other of the violation of the given understanding.

Meanwhile SPA government has suspended many government high officials who said to have been harsh in dealing with demonstrator that led to dozen dead. But that did not satisfy the Maoist. In their demand Maoist now insists on for the change in army structure, removal of top commanders including the Chief of Staff as per the recommendation of Raimajhi commission and appointment of new Chief –acceptable to them. The other major and most sensitive demand is the restructuring of the army to a greater extent PLA line absorbing PLA members. That would overnight change the cast system in the army. Presently 80% officers and NCO corps are from high cast Hindu-mostly Barahmin and Khaitra. PLA has drawn its members from backward cast with rural background. The idea has not gone well with Nepali army.

Though all these demands are known to have been in the Maoist agenda but SPA government now finds it stranded with less option but to capitulate under the pressure prior to the peace and settlement talks which has just opened. The other issue is that is of de-arming regime (DDR) before elections are held and that may prove to be trickiest yet. Maoist insists that de-arming must be complete, simultaneous with existing army but not before election. Many politicians opine that SPA may seek UN help to monitor and affect the DDR if Maosits agrees as and when peace talks progresses.

However, whatever could be the outcome of the peace talk it goes without saying that most difficult part that SPA government is going to face on the question of restructuring the army-which seems to be non-negotiable as far as Maoists are concerned- and imposing secularism in extremely devout Hindu and king is considered to be reincarnation of ‘Bishnu’ since reintroduced by late King Mahendra. These would definitely be the issues which may act as catalyst for virulent social upheaval in Nepal, as many puts it that it may happen in few months of time. On the other hand crack between two political forces i.e. SPA and CPN (M) seem to have started on various issues. Immediate removal of the CAS Chief of Army Staff) General Pyar Jung Thapa and his deputy Lt. General Rupmanga Katuwal as per commission recommendation, would not be easy for SPA government. This action taken in any hurry could well be interpreted as complete capitulation to the wishes of Maoists. That would not make SPA parties electioneering any easier. Similarly, restructuring army and sudden change of class composition with the inclusion of PLA members, would be most crucial to Nepal’s stability and survival of nascent democracy. Leaders hardly have experience of running a parliamentary democracy. This may prove to be biggest handicap in dealing with sensitive issues like restructuring Nepal Army. Other thorny issue would be the future of institution of king. Maoist would not compromise lees then republic and one confirm report suggests that Koirala has been approached by CPN(M) to be the first president should monarchy is abolished immediately - as much Maoist would like to see the palace turned into tourist destination –parallel to ‘Forbidden City in Beijing’ as one young Maoist conferred with me. Be it as it may, observers point out that removing present Chief at this critical stage and replacing with some one that CPN (M) would suggest, would be playing into the hands of Maoist much before that power is consolidated by the old guard politicians.

Meanwhile CPN (M) had formed three members team to engage in negotiation with the government consisting Krishna Bahadur Mahara, Dev Gurung and Dina Nath Sharma. The team had arrived Katmandu for the first time since they initiated the revolt. They have also formed a so-called ‘speaker team’ to go around the country side to propagate their policy for future of Nepal. What apparently visible is that CPN (M) is well ahead of SPA in planning and working out their priority. Talks have since started in Katmandu to prepare stage for summit meeting with Girija Prashad Koirala and once outlawed Pusdpa kamal Dhal better known as Parchanda.

However the future seems to be not as easy as politicians are presuming to be. Handling Maoist would not be easy as they seem to be would hardly deviate from their stated goal to achieve that they fought and died for last one decade. Politically Maoist has acquired ascendancy over corruption ridden political parties whom most Nepalis do not trust. To the schedule cast Nepalis previous governments including kings have served upper class Brahamins only. And they find SPA no exception to that. It is Maoist movement which has successfully exploited the social discrimination breaking down the layers in their parallel administration. CPN (M) not only broke the social barrier it made untouchable and lower cast women as powerful as men are considered in male dominated Nepali society. This is a new phenomenon in Nepal. As stated earlier that PLA’s 40% fighters are women from lower cast so is the rest of male members.

Having stated the present conditions and what I could read and analyzed from the views of prominent people, of the various discussion and available reports- is that the bigger test cases for SPA government would be in two particular areas, apart from constitutional future position of king as institution. These are, one, restructuring of the army, second, successful DDR before elections. Maoist would not like to surrender weapon but gives assurances of allowing observation. Maoists are not interested to join interim government after this government ids dissolve.

With all stated above it is highly likely that Nepal may witness virulent days ahead and the restructuring method of the army may prove to be catalyst in that realm. Century old hold of army by upper cast may not be easy to be diluted in that way Maoists have contemplated. DDR, if agreed, would pose enormous challenges unless otherwise it is regulated by international body. It seems that difficult days are ahead in Nepal unless both parties work out a middle course and move forward to take the Himalayan country into the path of democracy for which Nepalis have fought for decades.

Nepal being our near neighbour, we need to observe and analyze the future character of Nepal’s state structure. Nepal is not only our neighbour but economic partners in SAARC and BIMSTEC. The land locked country would be much keen to develop strategic relations with other South and South East Asian countries especially with Bangladesh. Being sandwiched between two Asian giant Nepal has been used and being considered by India the buffer between China and India. Nepal’s geo-strategic location puts great importance in determining Bangladesh’s geo-political frontier. It is important for its land route connection with China which could provide shorter trade route with China for Bangladesh.

Many would suggest that rise of Maos or Maoist take over in Nepal may not be palatable to Indian policy makers nor would easily be acceptable to the USA. On the other hand large Pakistani presence in Nepal is also seen as party to regional geo-political great game that seems to have been initiated. Nepal has always been a contested region between ‘empires’ and left it as it is. It may remain so but total Maoist take over – which they may- may not auger well for neghbouring countries, especially for India where over hundred districts are within the fold of Maoist movement and supported by ‘peoples’ war group’. We also fall within the CRZ established in our periphery particularly northern zone.

However, what I could foresee, that Nepal has to brave the possible social upheaval. While experiencing unprecedented social structural changes it would not be easier for large section of Nepalis to adjust with that change due to lack of experience of transformation. They would need help and compassion from world community to affect a peaceful restructuring their political and social life. We as good friend of Nepal, not being bogged down with strategic predicament, can and should offer to share our experiences both in terms of effective DDR through UN if needed by the people of Nepal and our experience in rural development and micro financing. What I would recommend that we should develop a pro-active policy with Nepal then prevailing reactive policy with immediate effect. In conclusion we wish that Nepalis would be able to pullout of the difficult situation that might come in their way to establish a true democratic equitable society that they have longed for. A peaceful progressive Nepal would be one of the keys for transforming South Asia into peaceful region.

(The writer is a free lance columnist, strategic, security and a defence analyst)

[akzaman]

CHINA-INDIA-US STRATEGIC TANGLE - CHALLENGE FOR BANGLADESH

Brigadier General M. Sakhawat Hussain (retd)

Introduction

For last three decades there have been continuous geo-strategic environmental changes in South and South East Asian regions. These changes have not only put weaker and smaller countries of the region in enormous difficulties to choose between development and defence. These changes had and still are proving to be most reckonable factor in determining intra and extra-regional relationship. These factors are now proven to be one of the reasons for internal strife. Sri Lanka is a case in point and now Nepal could provide such example in given time. One is not yet sure how ultimate events in Nepal would affect the entire region. In the current geo-strategic setting Nepal’s future may have a cataclysmic effect in the region, may bring two Nepal’s neighbouring giants i.e. China in the north and India in the south may bring into collision. Complete monarchical system collapse in Himalayan Kingdom could have dominion affect as far as Maoist movement on eastern part of South Asia. Emerging Nepali political situation may initiate a new dimension in Indo-Chinese relation which is already not so palatable in terms of even tactical relationship. Though relationship between two Asian neighbouring giants is better then ever before yet territorial disputes remain unresolved those could be causes of concern. China in occupation of large chunk of Indian territories in Aksai Chin and lays claim on the entire northern territory of Bramhaputra valley and these disputes would have lingering effect on any relation that may emerge on economic ground. In fact it is Sino-Indian strategic rivalry in South Asia and Indian Ocean its tributaries – Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal in particular- producing seismic effect on many littorals. This South Asian tangle also proving to be a huge factor for internal political dynamics and often proves to be a major regional factor for geo-political shift within and outside the region.

However, the fact is this tectonic shift in South Asian geo-politics and geo-strategy goes back to 1971 Bangladesh War of Liberation which made India - the sole power of the region defeating arch rival Pakistan desecrating its strategically located eastern province, now Bangladesh. Since then India never looked back to or romanticised with its Nehruvian non-aligned policy. By 1974 India demonstrated her will to shun Gandhian philosophy of Ahimsha, harbingered nuclear race in South Asia. Pakistan followed the suit. By 1998 South Asia’s geo-strategic environment had substantially changed with the mushroom that was created with explosions both the neighbour Indian and Pakistan had successfully conducted. These were defining moments that South Asian perilously observed. Since those events and at the back drop of 9/11 one could aghast to observe the strategic arms race in the region and that continues till date. India to be in the league of the big powers and to thwart the Chinese predominance in the Indian Oceanic region -- that India’s new breed of strategists consider to be the back water- broke ranks with non-aligned countries to forge strategic relationship with USA.

For long India desired to dominate the region but well appreciated that it cannot achieve its desired aim all by itself-at least in near future – Delhi would need substantial cooperation from USA and now that it found world’s only super power only too willing to share the Indian strategic perception. USA readily agreed to augment the Delhi’s military prowess to stand between Chinese intrusions in Indian Ocean through the backyards i.e. Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and now perhaps through Nepal if monarchy is totally done away with or monarch capitulates under pressure. All these countries have stronger ties with China in two cases strategic ties i.e. Pakistan, Myanmar and in case of Bangladesh relations little over tactical level. Three, out of four countries under discussion, i.e. Myanmar, Nepal and Pakistan, shares common boundary with both of these Asian Giants, China and India. Note that in recent development Nepal has re-established old road link with China, a 50 NM (Nautical Mile) distance from Kathmandu to Tibet (China) border.

China Factor in Indian Ocean
With the Chinese visible intrusion into the Indian Ocean both in the West and in the East, India perceives that Chinese endeavour is to envelope India and keep the Northern thrust open as the changed Nepal situation unfurls. From that predicament India’s strategic frontier has been drawn. India feels - rather claims - that historically Indian Ocean has been back pool for Indian navy to keep the intruders at bay. Yet India could hardly stop Chinese presence in the Ocean as this is considered to be the Chinese oil route from the Gulf through Malacca to Chinese Far East, life line for China. With ever increasing energy demand at home made China to make huge investment in that sector in Afro Asian countries though many of such countries are now going through either internal conflict or some kind of semi-colonialism. Point to note that 80% of total oil import is from the Gulf region and rest from Africa transported through the sea lane of Indian Ocean. Therefore, both Hormuz and Malacca Strait falls within the critical path of Chinese Sea Lane of Communications (SLOC). For long China has been working to shorten this distance and as well as took steps to establish much safer route from Gulf to main land China.

China perceives possible disruption in its sea lane of communication with intensified anti China Indo-US rhetoric. With the recent turn of world events, i.e. 9/11, USA found a natural ally in India. And ever since growth of strategic synergy between two, is viewed by Chinese analysts as growth of a proxy power to check perceptive Chinese military and strategic ingress in the region. In that realm Mr. Zhang Lijun, a member of China Institute of International Studies, expresses in his recent column written at the backdrop of US President’s South Asia visit in March, “ –-- most importantly, India is the best bet to restrict a future strong China, as per US regional strategy in Asia. The American media has said Bush’s India visit is as important as that of Richard Nixon’s trip to China in 1972. Nixon was then trying to get China to resist the Soviet Union. Today, Bush is using the same strategy to resist China” (Beijing Review: Vol. 49 No.11 March 16, 2006).

Sino-Pak Strategic Cooperation- ‘Energy Corridor’
In continuation to above context let us then analyse the Sino-Pak strategic relationships that according to both the countries, ‘withstood the test of the time’. Sino-Pak strategic relations earlier did take deep root with the opening of Kara-Koram Highway (KKH), connecting Chinese South Western province of Xinjiang, Uighur Autonomous Province and Arabian Sea through Pakistani port of Karachi and now with exclusive port of Gwadar, Baluchistan. In fact almost five decade old relation now deepens to an extent of strategic convolution with the commissioning of Gwadar port, approximately 300 km from world’s most contested water channel, Strait of Hormuz, Persian Gulf.( old name but easier to identify). Well laid KKH now connecting Gwadar, makes it most secured and convenient energy route for Beijing. In fact in Chinese terms this strategic opening as “Chinese energy corridor”. Gwadar is designed with refinery and oil and gas terminal. KKH also provides defined ‘pipe line route’ from Gwadar and possible gas pipeline from Iran via Pakistan to China. As a matter of fact, report suggests that a refinery has been setup to refine Middle Eastern crude for China and to be transported by tankers and pipeline. China had had huge investment in Iraq whose future is uncertain. Point also to note that china is the second largest investor in Iran. However, the energy corridor in discussion i.e. all along KKH, will not only transport Middle Eastern oil but this will facilitate oil from Africa as well. China is one of the largest investor in West and North African energy sector. In one estimate it is said that this route would be 20,000 km shorter than the route via Cape of Good Hope. Fact is that in case of African oil transportation this route would reduce 25 percent transport fees and time would reduce by over one month.

According to Chinese analysts, once fully operational, Gwadar would reinvigorate Chinese economy but the most important task would be to secure this crucial energy route which would prove life line for China in due course of time. Therefore, it would be of paramount importance for Beijing to keep its national interest protected with growing influence and developing strategic relationship with countries of the region. Stating the importance of Sino-Pak strategic growing synergy Mr. Ni Yanshuo writes, “for long time, energy security remains a large headache to China because of the fragile security environment in the Strait of Malacca “. It is evident that Sino-Pak strategic relationship now is more important to Beijing then Islamabad as Pakistan would be important link to ‘Chinese Energy Security’. Mr. Ni also writes about the importance of Sino-Pak strategic relationship, “ to China, Pakistan’s role is far beyond the energy corridor. It is also the sea channel connection between China and the Indian Ocean and land channel connecting China and Iran. Its unique geographical position connecting East Asia and West Asia and joining Indian Ocean and the hinterland of Asia also supplies a new channel for Chinese enterprises to go global” (Beijing Review: March 30, 2006 Vol: 49 No: 13). In fact the route is considered to be vital to Chinese national interest and no doubt that China then would like to protect its “corridor” from any kind of disruption and that would include sea lane to and from Gwadar that may include a Chinese naval presence in the region. Already US strategic analysts perceives that China has acquired a foothold in the region and Gwadar provides an excellent observation post. Thus Chinese presence within the striking distance of Hormuz makes both India and US sceptical of Chinese intention in any given conflict in the Middle East. It is worth noting Chinese stand on growing Iran-US impasse over nuclear issue. China is not in favour of imposing any sanction on Iran as that would amount to disruption flow of Iranian oil for China.

Pakistan’s Naval Build up in the Arabian Sea and in the Gulf
Pakistan - strategically located closer to Hormuz region world’s key oil route- attaches more importance to its sea lane of communications to and from Middle East and beyond. Pakistan’s strategic interest lies more in the west then east beyond Bangladesh. Thus Islamabad’s commitment to the East of Bangladesh and beyond is bare minimum baring aside the economic ties with Japan, though Musharraf had taken what can best be termed as a half hearted look East policy much to emulate Indian endeavour. Therefore, it is but natural that Pakistan’s strategic do not include Malacca nor it has the capacity to reach beyond its EEZ. What Pakistan has endeavoured in last decades to increase its influence in parts of Central Asia but that too suffered considerable reversal with the collapse of Taliban regime in Kabul.

However, Islamabad’s ostensible existing ties with Central Asia are also under challenge from India, evidently more so with the growing row between Kabul and Islamabad on security issues. India figures prominently in Afghan reconstruction apart from NATO countries. Delhi is engaged in infrastructural development and provided grant around six million US dollar. Amount may be meagre in terms of Afghanistan’s requirement but it indicates Delhi’s resolve to remain engaged in Central Asia through Afghanistan. On the other hand Indo-Iran relation is considered to be the key to India’s access to Central Asia. India has huge investment in Iranian energy sector. India’s energy demand has grown many folds and it depends on the Gulf and to some extent Iranian energy source. In fact proposed Iran-Pakistan- India pipeline was and still is dream project for boosting Indian economy.

On the contrary, Islamabad’s relation with Iran has been lukewarm since the Iranian revolution followed by Afghan Jihad. Iran was isolated during Afghan Jihad though Tehran hosted eight Mujahideen groups - commonly known as Tehran eight- who were fighting Soviet occupation without much of US help. Since then Islamabad’s land route access to Suez or to Red Sea or to Mediterranean could hardly develop trough Iran, though such cooperation existed for brief period of Pakistan’s first military ruler Ayub Khan. Ayub had initiated RCD (Pakistan, Iran and Turkey) at the height of cold war to keep soviets out of the region. It did not workout as was desired, Shah of Iran distanced himself from Kashmiri dispute blown into full-fledged war of 1965. Nevertheless, Pakistan’s quest for alternative route continued till Soviet collapse in Kabul but for brief period. 9/11 changed that strategic equation.

Pakistan - Central Asian communication – developed after Soviet withdrawal from Kabul – remains disrupted due to instable Afghanistan. It is therefore, Pakistan’s compulsion to keep its vital sea lane open and secured, particularly being with the outer perimeter of epi-centre i.e. Gulf region. With that aim in view Pakistan has also embark upon developing its naval power to face the challenge that principally from arch rival India.

Be it as it may, in current global scenario Pakistan do figure as key frontline state to global ‘war on terror’ with the fuss over Pakistan’s involvement in proliferation of nuclear technology, USA still finds Pakistan’s usefulness in confronting Islamists in the region and elsewhere in the world. Islamabad has taken the strategic advantage of its usefulness in US militarised foreign policy – now under sever reversal in Iraq. It is reported that Pakistan’s navy had taken up key role in Gulf as part of Coalition Maritime Security Campaign (CMSC). Pakistan navy ahs assumed the command. “Pakistan is the first country outside the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to lead such a cooperative effort against terrorism. Considering that the Pakistani naval forces are bound to receive more international attention because of this high-profile Mission” writes Fedrico Bordonaro in Asia Times on Line ( 28 April 06). The writer also high lights the recent development of Pakistan navy in cooperation with China. He writes in his article titled ‘Pakistan takes steps to strengthen its navy’ that in collaboration with China and France Islamabad is strengthening its navy with offensive power by adding submarine with technology transfer for home production yet Chinese collaboration remains vital in this sector. Mr. Fedrico Bordonaro further explains,” The Sino-Pakistani deal is significant both from a political and a strategic point of view. Politically, it marks a new stage in a long-standing strategic partnership, whereby the two Asian powers recently signed a "Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Good-Neighbourly Relations". The deal includes the joint production of the multi-role JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft for the air force and also acquisition of a guided-missile attack craft based on a Chinese design. In addition, it foresees cooperation in nuclear-power generation, as well as strategic infrastructure projects, such as the widening of the Karakorum Highway”.

Mr. Federico Bordonaro substantiates earlier discussed analysis on Pakistan’s predicament of its close association with US in the hunt of al-Qaida and Taliban in its own soil. He concludes, “Islamabad finds itself in a difficult strategic environment. The endurance of the Islamist radicalism and al-Qaeda's presence in the regions bordering Afghanistan is causing tension with Washington and is forcing the administration of President General Pervez Musharraf to reassess its national-security strategy. At the same time, India's rise as a great power means Pakistan cannot abandon its classical security priority, that is, to maintain a regional balance of power with New Delhi. Therefore, strategic cooperation with China and France to boost its own maritime power will continue to be in Islamabad's best interests” (‘Federico Bordonaro Asia Times Apr 28, 2006).

No doubt that Pakistan’s cooperation both with US and China would remain vital but out of two Pakistanis are more comfortable with China being next door neighbour to some extent sceptical of India’s rising power. As situation in Iraq deteriorates, Afghanistan remains unstable and Iran issue complicates in given time Pakistan would pushed take hard look at strategic relation with China and not so strategic relationship with USA. In all probability, Arabian Sea would witness flurry of strategic environmental changes in coming year and beyond.

Indian Ocean-Indian Naval Build-up
We have already discussed emergence of India the dominating power in South Asia in the backdrop of the historical military victory against arch rival enemy Pakistan in 1971 and since then India never looked back. Indian political leadership maintained clearly stated aim to ‘ be counted in league of big power nation’. In fact it became national obsession. While ascending to the ‘Rajib doctrine’ then prim-minister late Rajib Gandhi had said that India is a power who should naturally dominate the Indian Ocean that is regarded as back water of India. His doctrine called for ‘blue water navy’ to dominate from Malacca in the East to Hormuz and beyond. Rajib doctrine is one of the fundamental that Indian power projection tool i.e. navy is being built up as prim strategic force.

Be it as it may, before proceeding further one may to look at the current strategic thinking as was defined by then prim-minister Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee on November 1, 2003 while addressing ‘Combined Commanders Conference’. He said, “as we grow in international stature, our defence strategies should naturally reflect our political, economic and security concerns, extending well beyond the geographical confines of South Asia”. He further said and -- which indicates India’s willingness to work as US proxy in the region as both nations interest convolutes-- “ our security environment ranges from the Persian Gulf to Strait of Malacca across the Indian Ocean, includes Central Asia and Afghanistan in the North West, China in the North east and South East Asia. Our strategic thinking has also to extent to these horizons”.

Keeping the changed strategic ambiance and geo-strategic goal set, within given strategic frontier concept, Indian Armed Forces are under the process of restructuring to graduate from tactical to strategic force. In that Indian navy - one of the largest in the world - has planned to have minimum three aircraft carrier-based task forces with three to five marine expeditionary forces with added surveillance and logistic system. Though the restructuring may take number of years but weapon induction mainly from Israel, Russia and now from USA and improvement of logistic/base facilities have taken priority. In that the first and the biggest inclusive naval base – INS Kadamba, west coast 100 km south of Goa, been commissioned. The base within the first phase modernisation plan estimated cost US$ 8.13 billion. Situated at Karwar of Karnataka, Kadamba ‘ is being described as the biggest base of its kind in this side of the Suez canal’. It is also considered to be the Asia’s largest base which would be able to handle 22 ships including 44,000 –ton aircraft carrier ‘ Admiral Gorshkov’ ( INS Vikramaditay-also known as Chndra Gupta II, had ruled and influence over large part of South Asia), as well as locally built nuclear powered submarine. This would be the exclusive base purely under naval control unlike Mumbai in the west and Viskapatnam in the south east. It is said that this base would facilitate Indian navy to enhance its maritime surveillance capability, especially naval traffic. It may also be noted that north Arabian Sea is one of the densest maritime traffic area in the world with civil and naval traffic almost jamming Hormuz.

Fact is that an exclusive base Kadamba, away from immediate Pakistani attack in a conflict scenario, would also facilitate monitor Chinese naval presence in region and Gawadar-as has been stated elsewhere. Prominent Indian maritime pundits hold similar view. While discussing the strategic benefits, one of the prominent analysts Professor Lawarence Prabhakar of Madras Christian College and research fellow of maritime security at Institute fir Defence and Strategic Studies, said, “ China’s submarine, especially its nuclear attack submarines, would frequent Gwadar province of Baluchistan, (which is being described as China’s listening post in the Persian Gulf) in near future. Besides monitoring Chinese naval movements in these waters, India will have to keep an eye on Pakistan’s deployment of its newest submarines-the new Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) submarines, like French Scorpene”. With Karwar base in operation Indian naval Western Command might be shifted out of Mumbai. Shifting of the strategic command with nuclear assets is also a probability. Number of other analysts feels that complete project of the naval up lift plan would put ‘impetus on naval development on acquiring blue water capabilities’. Though India is yet to acquire the distinction of Blue water navy yet it has the capability of monitor Malacca Strait as much as like Hormuz. One should not lose the sight of the fact is that it was Rajib Gandhi who not only was the proponent of India’s power projection within the Ocean through its naal prowess as per his doctrine but he demonstrated with deploying rapid Action Force supported by navy in Maldives crisis in late 89’s. He initiated reinvigorating Indian navy to dominate Indian Ocean as professed by Kotillya ( Channyka) and Admiral Mahan.

Convergence of Indo-US strategic Interest
It is common knowledge that in recent years Indo-US relation has graduated into a full blown strategic partnership. US do not, at this stage, consider India inimical to its national or global interest. India is now viewed as a power that can compliment US effort to maintain US interest particularly in the Indian Ocean and Central Asian region. In fact this relationship certainly developed at the backdrop of growing Sino-US strategic discord in Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean region. While measuring Indo-US strategic relationship, one has to take note of Indo-US ‘civilian’ nuclear treaty - though yet to be ratified by US congress-as and when ratified by the US Congress, India could be the only country out of non-NPT signatory countries recipient of required nuclear fuel and other facilities - ostensibly for civilian use. In that case India would be first to receive such help even being one among three nations who are not the signatories of the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty). It is said that out of 22 Indian nuclear establishment (as reported) 8 are known to be military facility those would remain out of the preview of IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) inspection. Analysts suggests fuel received under treaty from NSG ( Nuclear Supply Group) would ease pressure from India’s uranium stock which then could be stockpiled and be used exclusively for military facility.

However to summarise, it is not only that India has started receiving help from US to upgrade its tactical and strategic weapon capability but with Washington’s approval Israel has almost replace Soviet Union in supplying hi-tech military hardware of US technology. These include both tactical and strategic weapon and surveillance system. Though there are little political opposition to Indo-US-Israel relation yet a significant section of Indian left leaning politicians are sceptical of Indo-US-Israel card which could be used against communist China. Many Indian views US policy world over is too hegemonic for a democracy like India to have strategic relationship but present governments intentions – to be more then a willing partner- were made clear with two recent joint air exercises in Bagdogra air base, West Bengal separately with USAF (US Air Force) and IAF (Israeli Air Force) without any resistance from Left Front, flag bearers of ‘non-aligned movement. Bagdogra, 6.7 nm (nautical mile) from Bangladesh border town, Tetulia, 266 nm from Lasha, Tibet (China) military town and 1,858 nm from Beijing is considered to be one of the most strategic bases to monitor southern China. These exercises did send strong signal to China of the perceptive Indo-US strategic convergence and the aim of such union. Aim was to demonstrate US’s willingness to help India grow into bigger then a regional power to stand up to China if need be.

Be it as it may, on the positives of much needed Indo-US relationship for India to be counted as world power, one of the leading security analysts, Dr. Subhash Kapila writes, “ it is imperative that all shades of political opinion in India and ‘the non-aligned Delusionists’ of India’s journalist and academic fraternity realise that (a) India’s national security interests demands that a US-India strategic partnership is imperative (b) India’s aspiration to be a key global player cannot be facilitated by non-aligned or attempts to create a multi-polar world ( Chinese approach) © India’s aspirations to be a key global player can be facilitated only by the United States”. He further writes, “Domestic opposition in India to India’s commitment of troops to Iraq was an illogical reaction of our ‘Non-alignment Delusionists’. The Indian prim-minister himself (Vajpayee) averred to this aspect in his conference by asserting that ‘ ….many in our country are still caught in a Cold War time wrap and strategic assumptions of an earlier era” (India Defines Her Strategic Frontier-An Analysis : Dr. Subhash Kapila : SAAG Dated 4 November 2003). One may not need to go in detail of Indian urge to correct the historical mistake that was committed by Neheruvian policy of Non-alignment prior to 1962 Sino-Indian clash, the traumatic wound that India still licks.

Sino-India-US Tangle in Bay of Bengal
Having discussed the efficacy of Indo-US strategic convergence and Indian interests in the Gulf and Arabian Sea, one needs to analyse emerging pattern of triangular power projection in Bay of Bengal Region and its effect on the regional countries, particularly on Bangladesh and Myanmar. To a great extent Indian strategic interest in Bay of Bengal littoral, is perceived to be much of strategic value then Arabian Sea. Reportedly, Indian Eastern Naval Command, now located in Visakhapatnam, has been in aggressive posture since 9/11 particularly to guard the Malacca Strait from perceived ‘marine terrorism’ by Islamic Militant of South and South East Asia. But at the backdrop it is Chinese presence in Bay of Bengal through Myanmar and possible collusion with Bangladesh that Indian security experts and policy makers are concerned of. Growing Indian naval activities in the eastern Indian Ocean could not go unnoticed as Indian naval doctrine suggests a secured Malacca strait is significantly important for India as life line to its economy. Having analysed stated extent of Indian strategic frontier, it is significant to watch over the military growth in Bay of Bengal.

In that above context, it would be interesting to note that prominent Indian maritime security experts suggest on Bangladesh’s geo-strategic location vis a vis Indian Naval Strategy in the region “ the first step of defence planning is to determine the most likely nations which may wage a war against our nation. In India’s case, these are Pakistan, China and Bangladesh in descending order. Of these Pakistan and Bangladesh have adjacent maritime boundaries. Bangladesh navy is mainly coast guard with a few frigates with no submarines. Thus our aging carrier Viraat ( Which is supposed to be replaced) and a few frigates with small reconnaissance and anti-ship warfare capable air-arm and two submarine would suffice to blockade and have complete domination over the waters of Bay of Bengal. Air and naval bases at Vishakhapatnam and Andaman island ( was damaged during Asian Tsunami) could be expanded and modernized to fulfil that role. A war with Bangladesh is remote possibility, but it is best to be prepared for a coming world, where oil (ENERGY) and water are likely to be reasons for future wars”. It is also essential to note how much important role that Bay of Bengal’s strategic value would play in the quest of Indian power projection vis a vis China. Indian analysts emphasising the interest in bay of Bengal explains, “ India has no territorial ambitions is currently interested in being a regional power with no present intentions beyond the Bay of Bengal, Indian Ocean ( we discussed) and sea lanes from Strait of Hormuz to the Strait of Malacca, through which traverse its own energy supplies and those of its potential allies ( less China) opponents ( Could it be China? China it is. Note Italics in brackets are mine ). These analysts further suggests, “ ------- unlikely though the scenario may be, in the event of a war with China, there must be sufficient naval power and assets to blockade the Strait of Malacca, the bottle neck of oil transit to China” (SAAG Paper 1436 Dated 31.06.05). One should also note that it is submarine with surface ship that either can lay a blockade or break it. . Point to note that distance between Vishakhapatnam and Port Balir, Andaman 772 NM and Chittagong to Vishakahpatnam 660 and to port Blair 300 miles, Sittwe, Myanmar is 166 NM (old Akyab).

US Presence in Indian Ocean
As far as US is concern it is highly unlikely that Washington, at any stage would downgrade the significance of the Indian Ocean. Rather it has reinforced its presence in Diego Garcia archipelago- ex British territory handed over to US military since 1971. Diego Garcia, which multiplies US logistic stamina for navy as well for strategic bombers, was utilised during the invasion of Afghanistan to launch massive air raids in support of operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ against Taliban al-Qaida positions.

The unique geographic location of the archipelago - 1,105 NM south west of Colombo, Sri-Lanka - is within striking distance the current epi-centre i.e. Hormuz which lies at 2613 NM north. Not only Hormuz, Diego Garcia enhances US strategic strike capability to all the major ports of the Arabian Sea in any given conflict situation and eases complex logistic supply in sustained operation. Geo-strategic location facilitates US to monitor Chinese oil route to and from west and central Africa passing around Cape of Good Hope. Point to note that Gwadar port, which would increasingly become strategic staging post for both Pakistan and China, is about 2,325 NM to the north and so is Iranian ports and most of the southern oil and nuclear facilities.

There has been in the past century concerted movements in South Asia in particular and non-align countries in general against the permanent US presence in that archipelago and indiscriminate removal of indigenous inhabitants. India was exponent of such move but all that changed since non-aligned movement died its own death. All along the cold war India had demanded ouster of all external forces from Indian Ocean and Sri-Lanka had been prim mover of the demand to establish nuclear free zone in Indian Ocean but that was not to be the case. Since then nuclearised India is breathing on the Sri-Lankan neck and India landed as the most important significant natural strategic ally of Washington. On the contrary, US to-day, has under its occupation Iraq with largest one time concentration of troops after Vietnam, aiming to have permanent foothold in the Middle East, its tactical presence in Pakistan, Afghanistan and strategic presence in Central Asia, makes Diego Garcia more important logistic and strategic support base away from continental USA. Now that both India, Pakistan are part of US strategic alliance for war against global terrorism and Sri-Lanka bleeding within, it is hardly unlikely that any of these South Asian countries are in any position to oppose US perpetual presence in Indian Ocean. It would rather be interesting to note that USA has desired for observer status in SAARC ever since there was a move to include China in that organisation. This would be a significant move for future and would rather be – for worse or for good - significant strategic twist for the region.

Sino-Myanmar Strategic Cooperation
As we have seen Chinese interest in Arabian Sea predominated by the energy security but in case of south and East Asia its’ economic, energy security and old territorial disputes makes Bay of Bengal region if not more but equally important to long standing strategic requirement. For decades China has developed a long tested strategic relationship with Myanmar. Myanmar is viewed by the security experts of Beijing as part of China’s soft belly. Myanmar provides easier access to Yangon through recently up graded Mandalay-Yangon road connecting Shewli, Myanmar border town to Kunming, capital of Yunnan province. This would also connect Sittwe ( Akyab) in the West Coast. One may note that Bangladesh had planned to linkup to Kunming through Myanmar and strongly suggests passage of proposed Asian Highway through Myanmar which would also facilitate shorter and direct connection with Kunming, Yunnan province of China.

China has developed, as part of upgrading Myanmar naval facilities both at Yangon and Sittwe- which could be used by frequent port calling Chinese navy though it is reported that China has at will access to both the ports and developed observation posts for signal intelligence (SIGINT) in Coco Island off the cost of Sittwe, 30 NM from India’s Andaman Island. Reportedly China built up this facility to monitor its missile testing. A deep sea port is under construction off Rakhain (Arakan) coast north of Andaman Island with Chinese assistance. On 18 April 2005 AFP reported that ‘China's planning ministry had approved an oil pipeline linking Myanmar's deep-water port of Sittwe to Kunming in the landlocked south-western Chinese province of Yunnan. The National Development and Reform Commission gave the green light to the project at the beginning of April.’ The long-expected pipeline would provide an alternative route for China's crude imports from the Middle East and Africa and help reduce its dependence on traffic through the Strait of Malacca. Construction is slated to begin this year. It could also serve as a conduit to transport crude to China's populous inland provinces of Yunnan and Sichuan and the Chongqing municipality. These developments are quite significance from the regional geo-political point of view.

Above development signifies the fact that Bay of Bengal has been well under Chinese consideration its shorter conduit to the south eastern states currently witnessing an economical transformation. It is therefore, beyond any doubt that Chinese policy makers are keen to dominate this region with their presence with the cooperation of the littoral countries i.e. mainly with cooperation from Bangladesh and Myanmar. For China relation with both these countries would be crucial in coming decade. Sino- US tangle is likely to increase in the region particularly over the energy issue and its transportation through countries-which according to the past record- has not given space to democratic practice and remained nonchalant on human right issue. US blame increasing Chinese huge energy appetite that chiefly driving the oil market upward. And to acquire its needed fuel from around the world China is supporting ‘rough countries’ encouraging these countries to continue violating human rights. Beijing considers US rhetoric is to lower Chinese image in Afro-Asian-Latino countries. However, in common Chinese perception is that it is US which is out slow china’s economic growth by denying or creating artificial crises in easy access to energy sources. Chinese security analysts do realise that to obviate both Indo-US and Indian naval growth, probable disruption of oil routes, Beijing needs to accelerate formation of ‘blue water navy’ by the end of first decade of twenty first century.

On the other hand India has an air and small naval base with listening post much down south in Car-Nicobar Island. Nicobar Island provides shorter distance to Malacca strait at 950 NM. On the contrary India is also developing deep sea port East of Andaman in Andaman Sea south of Sittwe ostensibly for shortening land route distance up to Hanoi as part of Delhi’s aggressive look East foreign policy. this move is seen largely to monitor Chinese ‘intrusion’ within the Indian sphere of influence which, according to Indian analysts is Chinese aggressive policy adoption to remain present in the Bay like that of Arabian Sea.

According to available reports, apart from earlier road linkage, China had proposed another road link to connect Sinkham for access to Irrawaddy River flowing through Yangon to Andaman Sea. If materialised it would ease Chinese goods to move through River barges on and off from Chinese ships. Important to note that as long as Chinese fear of the blockade of Malacca Strait would remain and final status of Taiwan is not determined tension between China and US would grow in Bay of Bengal region. Apart from Taiwan, China has maritime boundary dispute with Japan in East China Sea and with South Korea in South China Sea. US presence in all these strategically important areas makes China jumpy about the future of the Malacca Strait status. As of to-day Malacca strait as important lifeline for China as for rest of East Asian countries, therefore, to obviate discerning strategic set back China is compelled to develop alternative route as much it needs to its presence felt in the Bay of Bengal.

However, it is needless to suggest that due to the economic sanction on Myanmar’s military junta, China has been the main source and power to develop infrastructure, economic stat and military. Chinese investment in Myanmar’s energy sector has been huge, particularly in natural gas sectors. Over the years being single source country China enjoyed monopolistic upper-hand hand in Yangon. But with the twist of world events, Chinese influence in Myanmar now seriously being challenged by India as Delhi has been getting closer with the military junta dropping the vociferous support for democratic movement in that country. In recent presidential visit to Myanmar no protocol was extended to NLD (national League for Democracy) leader Aung Sung Su Ki, who once was considered to be icon of democratic struggle and used to be espoused by Indian government. It is also important to note India is second largest investor in Myanmar’s energy sector in-spite of US led western sanction to force democratic reform.

Be it as it may, like in the west i.e. Arabian Sea, Indian strategists feel that having completed the development Sino-Myanmar strategically important infrastructures, China would be in a position to encircle India from the East as well, as it has done in the west. It would be interesting to note what an Indian analyst Rahul Bedi wrote on this issue, “Pakistan and China were among the few countries to defy international opinion and forge close military ties with Yangon’s junta in 1988, cleverly complementing their strategy of encircling of India”. Based on this particular perception, Delhi views Sino-Bangladesh relation yet another step towards augmenting that Chinese strategic encirclement. Yet what writers like Rahul Bedi overlooks is the Indian deceitful foreign policy when it comes to countering Chinese growth in the region vis-à-vis US endeavour to keep its dominance through proxy.

Sino-Bangladesh Relation- Indian Perception
In Indian view unlike Myanmar Sino-Bangla relation is yet to forge at strategic level but it has the potential to convert present ‘tactical relationship’ into strategic one which would definitely have serious influence on Indo-Bangla relation. Be it as it may, existing Sino-Bangla military relationship – fact that this is tactical level relation- is viewed by Delhi as a sign of Chinese intrusion in Indian back water and closer shores of Bay of Bengal. Bangladesh provides alternative and shortest route to Kunming through Chittagong port. Bangladeshi proposal for Asian Highway via Chittagong through Myanmar, passing closer to Yunnan, is viewed to be as a strategic move by Bangladeshi incumbent government (2006) to bypass India. One has to look at the Indian proposal in that prism. Indian proposal of traversing the Highway through Indian North east then to Myanmar not only suggests a long and uncertain route for Bangladesh to adopt - which would for large portion would remain under Indian control - but that would allow Delhi to isolate and monitor Bangladesh’s China overture.

India feels that Bangladesh is already been China biased even in the field of commerce and trade. India feels that Chinese have already gained foothold in Bangladesh through close cooperation with military especially with Bangladesh navy. Delhi is also sceptical of bi-partisan approach towards Sino-Bangla relation. Delhi viewed Khaleda’s last visit to China - which had military cooperation as top agenda - with lots of scepticism. In Indian view of so called Sino-Bangla Defence Cooperation Agreement was ‘Chinese foothold as most intrusive external power in South Asia. In a long analysis Dr. Subhash Kapila writes that Sino-Bangla renewed military cooperation has provided China with (a) –strategic toe-hold on India’s Eastern Flank in Bangladesh (b) China’s strategic encirclement of India is complete © soon one would witness Chinese plan to develop Chittagong naval base on lines of Gwadar in Pakistan ( now that Bangladesh proposes a deep sea port and shifting existing naval base from the port India’s concern would increase in many fold) (d) China could get naval facility in Bangladesh.

In that same paper, mentioned above, Dr. Kapila spells out strategic implication for India of such developing relationship, (1) “China’s intrusiveness in South Asia gets further reinforced (2) Bangladesh’s enhanced military profile will have to be factored in India’s future military plans (3) India will now have to factor in a fourth strategic concern in its operational plans, namely China-Pakistan-Bangladesh military collusion in the context of any Indo-Pak or Sino-Indian conflict (4) China’s naval intrusions are facilitated by Bangladesh into the Bay of Bengal area (5) India’s north-east regions vulnerabilities ( especially the lines of communication) become more complicated (6) India’s IRBM ( Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile) deployments in North east against China will now need more securing. Dr. Kapila emphasises “ all above (these) concerns are realistic and one cannot be dismissive about them as conclusions of overactive imagination”.

In the above context, one must not lose sight that territorial dispute between India and China over the north of Bramhaputra valley, now part of Arunachal Pradesh, remains unresolved and North East India provides shortest route to put Beijing under Indian IRBM threat. Indian North East would be the key battle ground should Sino-India conflict breaks out in any given time. In that case North Bay of Bengal, closer to Bangladesh, would be the base for Indian SLBMs (Submarine Launched Ballistic missiles) targeting Chinese Missile Facilities.

It would not be out of place to mention that if one makes a deep sense of Indian perception of Chinese influence in the region, particularly in case of Bangladesh--seems to be geo-strategic nightmare for India—one would fathom the geo-strategic importance of a corridor or transit through Bangladesh. Implication of such passage through would be of huge military significance to Indian ambition and search for alternative to much constrained only access through northern JolpaiGuri - Shiliguri corridor. Transit through Bangladesh would facilitate India to segregate military and civilian passage in emergent situation or in a conflict situation with China as one understands the sublime menaing of Dr. Kapila’s dilemma. However, transit remains most important of the few Indian strategic requirements, particularly to counter Chinese influence within the region and in Bangladesh on particular. The strategic Indian requirements also include the demand for the use of Chittagong port.

Bangladesh in North East Indian Tangle
This brief paper would not be complete if North East India’s (NEI) six decades old conflict and its geo-strategic implication for Indian Ocean littoral in general and Bangladesh in particular is not understood. In fact the core of Indo-Bangla relation is much depended on India’s success or failure to pacify and integrate NEI where about 145 groups of separatists orgenisations are engaged in fight with India’s central authority. Much of Delhi’s failure to resolve what is essentially political issues, by employing force only in most cases, is blamed on its neighbours in Eastern periphery, particularly Bangladesh needs to be discussed. More so this discussion is essential as Dr. Subhash Kapila puts it in the context of Sino Bangla relation, “India’s north-east regions vulnerabilities ( especially the lines of communication) become more complicated”.

Be it as it may, to fathom the NEI tangle and its ongoing socio-politico-military complexity I would refer to a paper that was prepared by one of the renowned NEI expert Dr. Sanjay Hazarika. His paper was presented in South Asian seminar that we shared in Islamabad in February 2006. As of my initial remark Mr. Sanjoy’s paper interested me the most for few reasons. Firstly, the paper had reference of Bangladesh; secondly, paper in its entirety dealt with NEI current issues that some how Indian authority feels Bangladesh is involved in it. We are concerned with development in NEI as it touches our own security. Thirdly, for the reason that the subject was straight from a speaker whose credential as NEI expert is beyond any doubt and a local NE Indian therefore, the paper was not only diligent as authentic as it could be. He is an internationally acclaimed researcher currently involved in Delhi based ‘Centre for Policy Research’ at the same times he is columnist of The Statesman’ and former member of Indian Security Council. Fourthly, his paper preceded mine titled ‘Political Violence and Terrorism in South Asia: in Bangladeshi Perspective’ that also had the reference of continuous insinuation against Bangladesh by Delhi. Delhi particularly blames Bangladesh for perceptive allegations like sheltering NEI separatists and endeavouring to create religious extremism in Asom’s five Muslim majority districts.

Many prominent Indian ‘think tank’, supported by the government, continuously chastises government of Bangladesh for fomenting unrest in these districts with the help of illegal Bangladeshi Muslim settlers in collusion with Pakistan’s ISI with an ultimate aim of annexing or establishing separate Muslim state in the strategically important real estate. A mind boggling and self contradictory accusations that at times crosses parameter of logic. Bangladesh is not a power of any measure that it can support such luxurious mischief against a neighbour as giant as India is. On the contrary bombs had been falling on Bangladeshis and suicide squads threatened its own stability. Surprisingly most raw materials used by these terrorists were of Indian origin passed through impregnable Indian borders. These particular quarters of ‘think tank’ continuously propagate both within and outside India that Bangladesh is in unison with Pakistani intelligence ISI to unstable NEI ultimate aim to annex as part of it to realize greater Bangladesh. A perception could be as illogical and fallacious as it could be. These rhetoric changes gear with the change of ruling party in Dhaka. It is not so true for changes in Delhi. That sets out wrong signal to the Bangladeshis who happened to be divided in line with conflicting political ideology. In fact these few districts of Asom, those are mentioned again and again adjacent of Bangladesh had been Muslim majority area much before partition of India in 1947.Historically, Asom or Assam had been part of colonial Indian Bengal administration for long time and large migration did take place much before Assam was separated Bengal administration.

In that above context, though Mr. Sanjoy’s paper neither blamed Bangladesh directly nor for the increase in Muslim population in those areas as Mr. Jaideep Saikia and others did but he mentioned the contention of the Indian claim both for illegal migration and sheltering separatists. Interestingly, Mr. Sanjoy’s paper acknowledged the deep rooted insurgency in NEI mentioning them ‘separatists’ and separatists organizations instead of ‘terrorist’ or ‘terrorist organization’ as other Indian analysts would put it. He candidly admitted that the separatist movement in NEI is the oldest in the region and much more complicated then much hyped Kashmir issue. According to his paper, not only that NEI has divergent ethnical mix but almost every state is infested with small and large insurgents groups fighting Indian authority for decades. According to him there are 30 large groups in existence but as per Indian intelligence review there are 130 large and small groups are in operation. Some of these represent larger section of people who remains socio-politically deprived within the Indian Union. However, it is not number of organization that is of any paramount importance but the fact is almost every state is besieged with separatist elements challenging the presence of hundreds of thousands of security forces operating with impunity that violation of human right is rationalized as operational expediency.

Howsoever, Mr. Sanjoy projects the historical evidence that oldest and one of the longest fought separatist movement of South Asia is the ‘Nagalim Movement’ which still remains unresolved. In fact Naga movement is considered to be the mother of all insurgency in South Asia. Though the movement has gone through radical changes and transformation but still remains a prim concern of India as the movement has husbanded all other separatist organisation within that region. Naga Movement that started in 1929 for a separate homeland led by Dr. Angami Zapu Phizo and his NNC ( Naga National Council) still continues. Currently it is Nationalist Socialist Council for Nagaland [ NSCN (I-M)] led by Mr. Isak Chishi and T. Muhiva are the present forerunner of the fight though the other faction out of original organization, NSCN ( Khaplan), a pro agreement group has become less significant. It is in this ambit that expert like Sanjoy also agrees that Naga Movement is the mother of all separatist movements in NEI. Therefore, one is tempted to suggest that brief background of the Naga struggle is to be comprehended if one has to understand North East Indian tangle in which, for all geo-political reasons directly or indirectly, Bangladesh remains to be a factor. Indian historian and strategists while discussing Bangladesh’s liberation war categorically mentions that the very geo-strategic location of Bangladesh vis-à-vis NEI was one of the prim factor for India’s strategic decision to help liberate people of the then East Pakistan, now Bangladesh.

Naga rebellion started with the termination of World War I when the British authority made their intention clear that independent Naga Hills could be the integral part of colonial India. It was in 1929 that Naga’s first resented the administrative reform in which Nagalim (Greater Nagaland) was to be integrated violating 1845 accord. Naga leaders sent their appeal to ‘Simon Commission’ but that was ignored. Nagas living with the Hills rebelled under the leadership of Dr. Angami Zapu Phizo and established NNC ( Naga National Council). Dr, Phizo took up arms against British rule demanding independence and placed their long cherished demand of separate homeland as Nagas claimed to be have never been part of mainstream India in any spectre of life. But Cabinet commission, charged with partition of India, ignored the demand. It is alleged that cabinet commission was under the influence of Indian congress set aside Naga plea. On 19 May 1946 NNC modified their demand asking for ten years moratorium to settle the issue of independence through plebiscite, decision was kept pending for independent Indian government to dispose. It is said that though Mr. Gandhi considered Hill peoples demand but the post colonial Indian cabinet refused to concede Naga’s demand of independent homeland rather stationed troops to deal with possible insurrection. Humiliated and twice betrayed NNC established Naga National Army, Dr. Phizo as chief to continue armed struggle for national emancipation. Not only that Nagas were fighting the central authority but established an underground Federal Government of Nagaland (FGN) to administer Naga Hills.

However, the Naga freedom movement got new impetus after 1962 Sino-Indian war. Chinese communist party extended all possible help to NNC and NNA ( Naga National Army). On the other hand the then East Pakistan’s South Eastern region of Chittagong Hill Tracts became the hub of not only Naga but Mizo revolt who took to the arms in similar fashion to fight Indian authority. Mizo revolt was then led by Mr. Laldenga who followed the path of Phizo. It was common knowledge that then Dacca (now Dhaka) turned to be the point of ingress and egress for these rebels for outside contact.

The scenario changed after 1971 with the emergence of newly independent Bangladesh as then government flashed out these elements from the soil of new country and that had cataclysmic effect on the much hyped Naga and Mizo revolt. Phizo was arrested for a brief period but then released but he fled through then Dacca after the political change in 1975 in Bangladesh. Phizo stayed in Britain under political asylum and died in 1991. He never took the citizenship of India so did Isak-Muhiva faction leaders. On the other hand Mizo leader Laldenga also fled India settled in Britain. Mizo’s continued their fight till 1986 and settled for separate statehood within Indian union in 1987.

Though Mizo’s settled with Indian central government but Naga’s continued to fight notwithstanding 1975 Shillong accord which resulted into the split of NNC into NSCN ( Khaplan) and NSCN (I-M) as discussed earlier. Currently NSCN (I-M) is considered to be the most powerful of all insurgent group those are actively fighting the Indian authority in the NEI. As of today, NSCN (I-M) holding on to ceasefire with Indian troops and opened the door of negotiations with central authority for a possible political settlement. Many Indian analysts opine that pressure was brought onto Muhiva for settlement through dialogue by Christian Baptist Mission as they continue to have religious influence in the region. Coincidently, because if the Christian Missions access to the region in 18the century, aboriginal Nagas’, were converted to the faith of the rulers i.e. Christianity. So did Mizos. To day both Mizoram and Nagaland are preponderantly Christian dominated states.

Nevertheless, the fact is that long drawn Naga revolt had catalytic effect in other part of the NEI. Almost every state is now under intense insurgency particularly that of Asom and Naga movement is considered to be the mother of all insurgency in NEI as stated earlier too. It is now alleged by Indian policy makers that in same manner as that of pre-1971, these insurgents are finding refuse in Bangladesh and Dhaka is back in its old role providing window to the world for much of the Indian separatist leaders. In fact it is alleged that south eastern Bangladesh has become the corridor for armed smuggling into NEI and elsewhere. Two main insurgent groups, NSCN (I-M) and ULFA (United Liberation Front of Asom) are alleged to be involved these smugglings with the help of Bangladeshi illegal immigrants. Bangladesh remains as prim suspect of providing safe heaven to these insurgents groups, especially ULFA, a charge that the government in Dhaka had been persistent in denial. On the other hand except exasperated rhetoric, Indian authority could neither substantiate the claim nor availed any offer extended by the government of Bangladesh for open inspection of the alleged camp sites.

As stated earlier, though Mr. Sanjoy did not squarely blamed Bangladesh for unabated insurgency he rather called for sustained negotiation with all warring parties in NEI and to reduce tension. As matter of fact that NEI to-day is under indirect military rule which operates under Special Power Act (Military) with all possible impunity. Yet Indian government has been unable to have complete control over the situation.

The problem of the NEI is very much India’s own internal issue stemmed out from decades of neglect and failed to integrate with the mainstream India. But many of the Indian analysts would blame outsiders including neighbours particularly Bangladesh for multiple reasons. One such analyst is Mr. R. Upadhay. In his latest article North Eastern Violence An Overall View he writes “The unique geo-political situation of Northeast with long international border is vulnerable from the security point of view. Moreover, instigating hand of foreign enemies further complicated its problem. The British granted political asylum to Z. A. Phizo, the legendary Naga rebel and extended helping hand to Mizo insurgent Laldenga. Pakistan, China and Bangladesh on the other hand were supplying arms to various insurgent groups regularly. Baptist Christian Missionaries like Michel Scott meddled in tribal politics. These known misdeeds of foreign forces are enough proof to suggest that had the Indian establishment countered the evil designs of foreign adversaries effectively, the on going insurgency would not have persisted. Forced migration of Hindu refugees from East Pakistan reduced the aboriginal natives of Tripura to minority and Assamese also became scared of similar fate due to the politics of Muslim infiltration. Despite these developments the national leadership remained contended and paid little attention to study the problem dispassionately”. Mr. Upadhay’s last suggestion that of Muslim infiltration into Asom, is orchestration of persistent Indian propaganda against a small neighbouring country like Bangladesh. Many others like Mr. Upadhay would squarely blame failure of economic integration of NEI with rest of India on alleged illegal immigration from Bangladesh who are considered to be the chief source of discerning growth of fundamentalism.

On the contrary to Mr. Upadhay and other analysts what local expert like Mr. Hazarika opines, that provides more to real perspective of the issue, particularly of Assamese Muslim minority. He writes in ‘The Little Magazine-vol III issue 5&6’ article titled ‘Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society in Northeast’, “one cannot reflect on the issues before the Northeast without referring to briefly to the illegal migration and growth of fundamentalism. One is not talking about the sprouting growth of madrassas, but about the less visible radicalization of young men and women in marginal regions, untouched by development and what little economic growth is seen elsewhere in Assam. Shut out of the system, they are desperate for jobs and work and embittered by the failure of the governance. These people are Indians, along with some Bangladeshis. And it in these areas, the soft underbelly of eastern India where thousands of Bangladeshis move in and out every year, where the breeding of the irresponsible right wing of the other religious persuasion cannot be ruled out in the Assam Valley”. He then continues, “The sensitive issue whether al-Qaida camps exists in Bangladesh or not is no longer the point. The question is whether the Northeast can remain untouched by radicalism of ethnical kind. It cannot and not, especially given the high rates of immigration as well as seeming growth of the fundamentalist phenomenon”. Mr. Sanjoy then suggests, “ to meet these challenges three things are essential: the restoration of governance at its best fundamental and basic level, the creation of confidence that indigenous groups will not be reduced to a minority, and bringing antagonistic groups together in the process of peace-building through strong civil society movements”.

One perhaps cannot deny the fact that open border such as Indo-Bangla neither inviolable nor violated by illegal economic migrants but that cannot be the excuse for India’s failure in integration of NEI. But what one is alarmed is that Indian authority’s importunate denial of the fact that the ongoing NEI problem is stemmed out of decades of neglect and indifferent attitude of the succeeding governments in Delhi, who in all evidence, considers being the successor of colonial Indian ruler. It is therefore important issue in the context of geo-strategic environmental changes in Bay of Bengal.

Sino-Bangla relation US predicament as seen by Indian analyst
We have analysed in brief the China factor in South Asian geo-politics and Beijing effects in changing geo-strategic environment but analysis would remain incomplete unless viewed in the province of ‘Indo-US strategic partnership’ compass. Dr. Subhash Kapila makes a strong critical analysis perhaps for US policy maker’s attention. He argues that (1) China had earlier outflanked United States strategic interests in the Gulf region by its strategic nexus with Pakistan (2) China can now outflank United States strategic interests in South east Asia by reinforcing the defence cooperation with Bangladesh into a strategic nexus (3) China adds Bangladesh as an additional pressure point against US in South Asia in addition to Pakistan ( 4) China’s containment by US at some future date becomes complex with Pakistan and Bangladesh in a strategic nexus with China.

Dr. Kapila then urges, “The US needs to re-evaluate its strategic concerns in south Asia”. Meanwhile having taken note of Chinese growing influence in the region RAND Corporation’s 2001 report suggested, “ finally given proximity of this region (Bangladesh and Myanmar) to China, these countries would likely to be reluctant to become too closely aligned with US, in that event of heightened tensions”. But the reality is US has since reviewed its South Asia policy in which Bangladesh is in the watch list. US’s increasing presence in Bangladesh and its small but significant investment in energy sector and in energy exploration in Bay of Bengal and elsewhere, could be seen as some effort to counter Chinese ‘intrusion’. One must not lose sight that US companies are still interested in developing Chittagong second container and deep sea port. Though there is no substantial US military cooperation but of late US indicated its overriding interest in developing ‘anti-terror capability’. Recent emergence of so-called Islamists terrorism provides plethora of reasons to be present in some form or other. These are indicative of increased US interest in Bangladesh if not in strategic then in tactical significance.

Conclusion
I have tried to provide an overview of the strategic environmental changes in Indian Ocean –particularly in reference to Sino-India and Sino-US rivalry in which India is growing as a ‘proxy’ to US in the region. It was amply demonstrated very recently when for the first time that Indian navy escorted US commercial ship through Malacca Strait. Because of strategic location of Andaman and Nicobar isle and proximity with Malacca, India- but natural – considers to have legitimate right to watch over the development in that most important chock point connecting Indian and Pacific Ocean and for obvious reasons. The international sea lane – as claimed by India- overlaps Indian EEZ, thus Delhi legitimises its concern for Indian Ocean, eastern part on particular. In that for reasons discussed, China would be drawn in so would US being present in the Pacific should any conflict grow either out of maritime terrorism or tension between China and Taiwan which invariably involve USA. Nevertheless, what it seems from the Indian naval doctrine and development, that India is more concern with eastern part of the Indian Ocean i.e. Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea than Arabian Sea in the west.

With the changed geo-strategic equilibrium in nuclearised South Asia, Bangladesh plays a significant part in India’s regional geo-political ascendancy. Bangladesh is considered to be a wedge between volatile North East and rest of India. Dhaka’s growing relation with China is cause of concern to Indian analysts. These analysts argues that present military cooperation between two countries termed as to be in ‘a consolidation phase’ but has the ‘inbuilt potential of serious strategic implications’ and that Indians would like to make US believe that this potentiality would not be only concern for India but for US as well.

Therefore, Indian policy makers would consider taking all the measure both economically and diplomatically, to dissuade Dhaka from developing any strategic relation with Beijing. I would quote here what Rahul Bedi wrote in his article ‘India and China: Neighbourhood problem’ as concluding remark published in Asia Times January 17, 2003. He concludes, “ to neutralise China’s influence in Yangon, India was also in persuading Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand about five years ago to form an economic-cooperation group ( Is it BIMSTEC?). But little of significance has emerged from this condition”. BIMSTEC has taken some shape since then. From the brief study it is evident that Bay of Bengal is turning into an arena of rivalry between three principal contenders i.e. US and India apparently in one end and China in opposite end.

Bangladesh’s relationship with China is proven to be most important both in terms of economic and defence cooperation. On the other hand India being the immediate neighbour, one cannot ignore India’s scepticism but need to foster most friendly relation but that is not being the case. Indo-Bangla relation is dependent on resolving India’s strategic compulsion attached with the geo-strategic location of Bangladesh. Indian policy makers have to take into account of the sensitivity of Bangladesh and vice versa.

On the other hand growing Indo-US strategic relationship provides later with platform over the development in the region, directly or through proxy. From the past experience and the futuristic US policy, one cannot assume with certainty that Washington would fully trust India to handle China and that would rather complicate inter and extra regional relationship. Factual conclusion is US policy makers are as sceptical of rising Indian military myth as mindful as of China. In that the discerning situation that is likely to emerge in coming decade, Bangladesh would be faced with tough choice to format her strategic relations with regional and extra regional powers. In fact coming decade would be a testing time for Bangladesh, only country located on the top of the vortex of Bay of Bengal.

In conclusion I would like to recommend:

a. Bangladesh should develop a strategic relationship with China, both in economic and defence, keeping in view of national interest.
b. Must have a dynamic relation with USA and \not contradictory to the principal of Bangladeshi national core value.
c. Should have much more pro-active engagement with India being the most important neighbour.
d. Our relation with Myanmar is vital for national interest. Relation between has the scope to develop on strategic ground. We need to improve present level of relation and enhance level of cooperation.
e. Must maintain stronger relationship with rest of the SAARC countries.
f. It is evident that in any given conflict within the region Bangladesh would remain at the mercy of Indian naval blockade. In that eventuality, to maintain own interest in Bay of Bengal Bangladesh needs to improve its naval facility and modernise and equip navy for partial breakout in case of a blockade. Navy essentially needs to be equipped with submarine and support surface ships to keep sea lane open as far as possible.
g. Bangladesh must not be sucked into the perceptive conflict which may develop in or around Bay of Bengal region.
h. Need to consider far reaching affect on national interest, internal and external security before conceding any strategic concession made to neighbouring countries.


References

1. Asia Times January 17, 2003.

2. Beijing Review: Vol. 49 No.11 March 16, 2006 and . March 30, 2006 Vol: 49 No: 13.

3. India Defines Her Strategic Frontier-An Analysis: Dr. Subhash Kapila : SAAG Dated 4 November 2003).

4. SAAG Paper 1436 Dated 31.06.05

5. Numbers of previous articles written by the author on regional geo-strategic issues.

[akzaman]

Indian move to establish United India through United Bengal

Khodeza Begum*

Certain activities prejudicial to the national independence and territorial integrity of Bangladesh has drawn the attention of all conscious persons in and outside the country. A demand has been raised to re-establish an undivided subcontinent which was forcefully asserted at a press conference held in a restaurant in Dhaka on December 29, 1991 on this topic. 'Upamahadesh Punorujjibon Andolon' (movement for revival of the sub-continent) is the name of the outfit behind the organisation of this event. In a party later held on 31 December, 1991 and hosted by this same group, a speech was delivered by a Congress party scholar, especially brought in from India, who inaccurately suggested that none but Muhammad Ali Jinnah was responsible for the partition of India in 1947. The speech was intended to imbibe new thoughts into Bangladesh and South Asia seeking the rejection of the two-nation theory.

Afterwards a cover story was published in the weekly Bichinta magazine regarding the establishment of a social and political movement for the revival of a united subcontinent. In an interview, given by a leader of the UPA, it was indicated that their desire was to go back to the pre August-1947 scenario of a united India. It may be usefully mentioned here that a brochure published under the title of 'Ashamprodaik Upamohadesher Ishtehar' (communiqué of non-communal subcontinent) proposed to place defence, currency and some other state responsibilities under the disposal and coordination of the centre (presumably New Delhi). A map of India was printed on the cover page of this booklet where the surrounding countries were not clearly shown and were therefore not obviously discernible.

A similar seminar, arranged by the World Peace Council and its Bangladesh chapter, was later held in Dhaka under the slogan for a ‘new urge in the field of South Asian regional co-operation'. The political elites of the country participated in the seminar in which it had been earlier decided that the agenda of the discussion will be focussed principally on South Asian regional co-operation. Nevertheless, a Congress party leader, Mayaram Surgeon and others dwelled in their speeches on the proposal for a united India. Mayaram said, 'Why can't we establish a united state of the pre-1947configuration? We did not want separation. We were separated by the British design on the basis of religion. But now it is proved that division on the basis of religion can not exist. We want to return to pre-partition India'.

It would have been very difficult to hold a seminar explicitly in the name of a 'New urge to establish an undivided India', which was in reality the main theme of the seminar. With such an agenda, so expressly and overtly stated, it would have been near impossible to have obtained the assurance of the participation of the political leaders of the country. Discussion was, therefore, primarily concentrated on the issue of regional co-operation. Here it may be pertinent to mention a few things about the World Peace Council which was formed by the patronisation of the erstwhile Soviet Union and was basically a Soviet intelligence initiative (The daily Telegraph, 02 March, 1992).

Visiting Indian artistes, litterateurs, journalists and intellectuals to Bangladesh have taken part in various meetings and seminars and have been prone to giving extensive and wide ranging sermons and are now making unwarranted comments on the desirability of a reunited India and a reunited Bengal, which in the final analysis, amounts to very much the same thing. Some time back, Shib Narayan Ray, an Indian intellectual, spoke enthusiastically for an undivided Bengal. In an interview with a weekly he stated that both the parts of Bengal would be inevitably reunited. But he did not clarify on how both the parts of Bengal would be merged, nor did he say whether Indian administered Bengal well be freed from Indian subjugation to be united with Bangladesh or Bangladesh will be merged with an Indian ruled and administered West Bengal. Needless to say there is no difference in the slogans 'unification of West Bengal and Bangladesh', 'united Bengal', or 'revival of the sub-continent or an undivided India'.

Let us now analyse these developments from a historical point of view and perspective. The exponents of a united Bengal, undivided Bengal or an undivided India have blamed Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League for India's partition but historical research has shown that Nehru and the Congress party were solely responsible for the partition of 1947. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad has stated that the nationalistic spirit of the Congress party could not defy communal considerations in the selection of leaders which should have been on the basis of merit but instead they had to submit to the majority and minority sentiments of the people. Sardar Patel said that partition of India has to be accepted since it was the inevitable solution to this predicament. It was better to be separated on these lines than to quarrel each and everyday. (India Wins Freedom, Orient Longman, 1959, pages 19-20, 185 & 197). Many of these considerations are also found in the writings of Bikramadittya who discloses that Nehru agreed to accept the partition of India considering it as a proposal for an amicable settlement. Nehru and Congress had a deep-rooted conviction that the existence of Pakistan would be for a very short period of time. They thought that Pakistan will not be able to exist due to political, economic and social weakness. (Shadhinotar Ojana Katha, preface: page-10).

It was for this reason that Mahatma Gandhi, Nehru and the Congress party did not accept an undivided and sovereign Bengal as demanded under the Suhrawardy-Hashim-Sharat Bose plan. They made the division of Bengal an inevitable fact of history. Nehru in a letter written to Ashraf Chowdhury indicated that 'Bengal and Punjab will have to be divided if division of India becomes indisputable. Because only by making this division, we shall be able to establish undivided India again within the shortest possible time' (Jinnah and Gandhi - Sree R Majumder). The British hypocrisy was also an important factor in this context. When Mountbatten realised that India could not be kept united by any means, he chalked-out the plan of partition in such a way that the confronting parts may later be merged together again ( Mountbatten and the Partition of India-by Larry Collins & Dominique Lapier, Page 92-93).

This was why Sikkim had to be annexed and Indian soldiers were sent to Sri Lanka with Nepal and Bhutan also being destabilised. The assistance provided by India in the Bangladesh liberation war is a historical truth. But we also need to consider the intention of the Indian leaders. On 05 April, 1971, the chairman of India’s Institute of Defence Strategic Analysis, Sree Subramanian, who had a close relationship with the Nehru family, wrote in the daily National Herald: 'The crisis of East Bengal has brought such an opportunity to India which will never come in thousand years'. It was also necessary for India to neutralize Bengal for the interest of the strife-torn North-East India (War and Secession by Richard Sison & Leo Rose, page-207). During the liberation war, both the governments of India and Bangladesh signed a seven-point secret agreement in order to make Bangladesh dependent on India in all respects. (RAW and CIA in the Liberation War of Bangladesh, Masudul Haq, page:-92-93).

In clause three of the treaty it was enunciated that Bangladesh will have no army of its own. When the valiant freedom fighters were fighting with the marauding Pakistanis risking their lives, RAW formed a special force called the, 'Mujib Bahini' under General Sujon Singh Uban at Dehradun without any intimation to the exiled Bangladesh government in Kolkata (RAW and CIA in the Liberation War of Bangladesh, Masudul Haq, page, 96-97). In his book ''Phantoms of Chittagong' General Uban has also clearly illustrated the motives behind the creation of the Mujib Bahini. Many quarters opine that the now-defunct 25 year Friendship Treaty was nothing but a revised edition of that 7 point treaty. Clauses 08, 09 and 10 of this treaty indicate that the concept of defence system of Bangladesh and India are codified in one string. It means that defence policy of India and Bangladesh are reciprocal and complimentary. Similar attitude was echoed in the writings of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. She said both India and Bangladesh are complimentary to each other in terms of culture and economy. (Aspects of our Foreign Policy, page-100).

To be precise, India has a number of objectives in Bangladesh. These are:

* Deterring the gradual emergence of Bangladeshi nationalism and to maintain India's control over her economy and culture.
* Destroying the defence capability of Bangladesh due to its proximity to Marxist–ruled and Bengali-speaking West Bengal, Tripura and the secessionist northeast region.
* Obtaining transit through Bangladesh territory for direct access to the war torn northeast, use of the facilities of Chittagong port to reduce pressure on Calcutta and Haldia ports and free trade and import of gas.
* Installing a puppet government in Bangladesh and eventually launching an invasion to merge Bangladesh with India. The aggressive attitude of India was ventilated in the writings of Nehru, the prophet of India's expansionism. In his book 'Discovery of India ' he wrote: “India will inevitably exercise an important influence. India will also develop as the centre of economic and political activity in the Indian Ocean area. The small national state is doomed. It may survive as a culturally autonomous area but not as an independent political unit".

The same theory was echoed in the writings of Rabi Rikhi, India's renowned defence analyst. In his book, 'The War That Never Was' he writes: "India should at the earliest opportunity incorporate Pakistan into the Republic followed by all the territories that composed India before independence. The natural boundaries of India encompass the present-day states of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Our geo-strategic imperative requires a subordinate Sri Lanka, Burma and Bhutan, and a buffer Tibet and Afghanistan. No matter what the cost, we must start the process of reintegration. The later we put it off, the more the eventual cost. Once Pakistan returns to the fold, the other states will return at a fraction of the cost and effort. Reintegration can be conducted either peacefully or by war. In 1975, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was assassinated. Though Mrs. Indira Gandhi first considered intervention and Army alerted three divisions, in the end the government hesitated and the moment passed. The result: our chance to keep Bangladesh in our camp vanished. India would have been fully justified in intervening under the same doctrine that lets the Soviet Union intervene in Poland and Afghanistan and the Americans in Nicaragua and Grenada ". Later after the general election of 1991 in Bangladesh, the Ananda Bazar Patrika of 2 March 1991 commented that the people of Bangladesh should raise the demand to merge with India.

India undertook the following strategies to achieve her goal:
* Extensive intelligence activities of 'RAW' within Bangladesh in order to weaken and erode the independence and sovereignty of the nation. RAW's activities in Bangladesh have now reached a terrifying stage. It was alleged by an Indian leader Subramaniam Swamy (Janata Dal) that RAW was involved in the assassination of late President Ziaur Rahman (Sunday, 18--24 September, 1988). RAW has been deeply involved in the Chittagong Hill Tracts:

# 'The Chakma guerrillas closely assisted RAW operatives. They were assisted during and after the Liberation War. The Chakmas, after the change of government in 1975, contacted RAW. The Chakmas offered to infiltrate among the Mizo rebels and pass on information to the Indian Government in lieu of asylum. This offer was accepted (Inside RAW: The Story of India's Secret Service, Asoka Raina, Vikas Publishers, New Delhi, 1981, pp.86-87).
# 'In 1975, RAW was instructed to assist the Chakma rebels with arms, supplies, bases and training. Training was conducted in the border camps in Tripura but specialized training was imparted at Chakrata near Dehra Doon. Shantu Larma's Shanti Bahini members were flown to Chakrata and then sent back to Tripura to infiltrate into Chittagong Hill Tracts. A RAW office and its operatives at Agartala monitored the progress of the trainees. In 1976, the Shanti Bahini launched its first attack on the Bangladesh force. A new insurgency had been born and India's secret war in the hills of Bangladesh had begun (South Asia's Fractured Frontier, Binalaksmi Nepram, Mittal Publishers, New Delhi, 2002, pp-153).
# 'RAW was involved in training rebels of Chakma tribes and Shanti Bahini to carry out subversive activities in Bangladesh (RAW's role in Furthering India's Foreign Policy, The New Nation, Dhaka, 31 August 1994).
# The Indian intelligence had collaborated with the armed rebels of Chittagong Hill Tracts to destabilize the region (Indo-Bangladesh Relation, Motiur Rahman, Editor, Daily Prothom Alo, 10 December 2002).

India wants to encourage a pro-Indian culture in Bangladesh. The Indians are working very tactfully in different walks of life, including political, administrative, cultural arenas, journalists, students and the intellectuals. It should be mentioned here that an Indian daily (The Indian Express, 28 April 1992) in a report said: India's intelligence agency provided about Rs.5 crore to a Bangladeshi political party through the Calcutta office of RAW for election purposes. A former student leader who is known as a mysterious personality in the politics of Bangladesh, attended a seminar titled 'Political trend of South Asia' where he pledged to unite all the Bengali speaking people of Bangladesh, West Bengal, Assam and Tripura (Weekly Khoborer Kagoj, 23 May, 1991). India has also been trying to confuse the political consciousness of the rising middle class. India has launched a media campaign and cultural aggression through her satellite channels, video and print media against Bangladesh.

Analysing the foregoing we can say that united Bengal or greater Bengal will not, in any way, be an independent or sovereign entity rather it will be merely a province under India. United Bengal or greater Bengal is just another face of the revival of the sub-continent or united India dream. Now the question arises, if there is no border between Bangladesh and India or a pre-47 undivided India is established, then what was the necessity of the Bangladesh liberation war? All patriotic forces of Bangladesh will have to be more vigilant against any evil design prejudicial to our national independence and territorial integrity.

* Khodeza Begum is an assistant professor in political science, Girls Ideal Laboratory Institute, Dhaka

[akzaman]

Nepal: The Himalayan chaos & the unsung Indian involvement

By: Nishchal M.S. Basnyat (Harvard University, nbasnyat@fas.harvard.edu)

The Himalayan Kingdom of Nepal has once again found itself entangled in a political disaster. The present situation is reminiscent of the 1990 pro-democracy movement, which aimed to strip the power out of the hands of Late King Birendra’s autocratic Panchayat system. However, after a decade of “democracy” post 1990, Nepal only found itself with a grossly mismanaged government, unprecedented levels of corruption and an intensifying civil war. The situation has only worsened since. A once small and ill-equipped Maoist movement now controls a large part of rural Nepal, despite having a history of mass murder. Nepal is seeking change once again and this tension has already led to many historic changes. On February 1st 2005, King Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah, who had come into power amid the Royal Massacre controversy, dissolved the parliament and set himself a three year timeline to get the country back on track. His lofty ambitions were challenged by a “people’s movement” which forced him to step down from power, reinstate the parliament and let his fate be determined by the same group of politicians whom he had once accused of incompetence. Now this unique nation with a history of monarchy, an urge for democracy and an ever-growing thirst for communism is at a major fork on the road and must find the right chemistry to insure that this once peaceful and thriving country doesn’t become a failed state.

Among the obvious set of problems lies the unappreciated and unnoticed glitches in the Nepali system that has left the country in the state it is today. The long-term problems that this country has are not only causing the social and political instability but are also impeding on the chances for future prosperity. We are so caught up in trying to solve the day-to-day troubles in the nation that we have forgotten to plan ahead.

The Indian threat: We cannot fail to foresee the intensions of our so-called “bigger brother”. India, the major super-power in the region, indirectly dictates what happens in countries close by, and even a small change in policy can greatly stir and shake a fragile and small country like Nepal. With such sheer strength, this powerhouse has utilized its dominance to keep itself politically and economically dominant over others around it. Here, the role of India in Nepal will be looked at microscopically focusing on five main Indian threats to Nepal and the reader will be left to make the final judgment on India’s influence on this delicate nation.

Maoism and the Indian hand
“So, we went to Lucknow to meet the Maoist leaders. We walked and talked with them, openly. We strolled through the crowded streets and stepped into a small teashop, talked some more, and then we went back to their place. I was surprised to see that they weren’t worried the slightest about who they were and how much they were wanted by the Nepalese people”. These were the startling words from a late night conversation in Brussels with one of Nepal’s most prominent politicians. He was recalling how he met both leaders of the Nepalese Maoist Movement, Dr.Baburam Bhattarai and Prachanda, in India.

The answer to Nepal’s internal strife is so obvious we don’t see it. Albeit an overdone patriotic adage, India does hold the key to Nepal’s future, not only in terms of mainstream politics, but also with regards to the intensifying Maoist peril. While acknowledging the fact that the Nepalese Maoist movement is a deep-rooted, homegrown revolution that will take years to overcome, we must also confront ourselves with the palpable fact that India hasn’t stopped sprinkling salt on Nepal’s political wound.

There are significant ways India is indirectly aiding the revolution in Nepal. First, India is a safe haven for Nepalese Maoist Leaders. It is an irrefutable fact that India is harboring Nepal’s terrorists. The Royal Nepalese Government, including the Royal Nepalese Army, has repeatedly urged India to incarcerate the Maoist leaders. While India plays politics by promising to hunt down Nepal’s terrorists, Indian politicians and government officials meet secretly with high-ranking Maoists like Dr. Bhattarai (an incident that was highly publicized). The recent meeting in New Delhi between the political leaders and the Maoists, and also the meetings going on right now between NC, UML and Maoists in India, is yet another example of India purposely refusing to arrest Maoist Leaders.

Second, it is not difficult to track down and capture Maoist leaders. If our brilliant politicians like Girija Koirala and Madav Kumar Nepal can approach them with such ease, if our journalists and media houses have contacts with them, and if even foreign journalists have an effortless time finding them, are we to understand that an intelligence agency belonging to an emerging super power cannot hunt down Nepal’s Maoist leaders? Even a privately funded “bounty-hunting” team could track down the Maoist leaders in India. So, why not do so with a highly coordinated and well-funded intelligence service, such as that of India?

Third, where are the arms coming from? We would have to be too naïve to think that all of the weapons that the Maoists hold come from the post-battle lootings with the Royal Nepalese Army or Nepalese Police. They certainly don’t come from Bangladesh, Bhutan, Pakistan or Tibet. The long border we have with India is an “ammunition pump” for Nepal’s terrorist movement. We are not talking about smuggling minute amounts of pistols and bullets. These are massive amounts of weapons, large enough to equip thousands of Maoist foot soldiers. And then you might ponder over the question of who is selling them. The Indian Maoists and other such groups that are supporting Nepal’s Maoist revolution are far too weak to possess such resources. Think about, however, what happens to antiquated Indian army weapons. They are expensive to destroy and expensive to store, while profit can be made from selling these unwanted weapons. Consequently, I lean towards the idea that corrupt generals from notorious surrounding states like Bihar are secretly selling antediluvian and unusable arms to Nepalese Maoists. Previous research done by Nepalese journalists with the help of ex-Gorkha soldiers from India has revealed the astonishing link between splinter groups of the Indian army and Nepal’s Maoist movement. It even claims that factions of retired Indian Army officers are providing 3 to 4 day training “capsules” to Nepalese Maoist recruits.

Fourth, most of Nepal’s Maoist leaders are Indian-educated. How can we ever gauge the connections that a leader like Dr. Bhattarai must have garnered in the campuses of Jawaharlal Nehru University during his PHD years? How can we measure the amount of acquaintances that Chairman Prachanda had with groups like The People's War Group (PWG), the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) and the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) even before Nepal’s so-called “People’s War”? Today Nepal’s Maoist movement has joined the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM) and is being provided aid, security and arms by pro-Maoist parties in India. There are Indian fingerprints on Nepal’s insurgency since its very infancy.

Fifth, even after requests from the Nepalese government, India hasn’t handed Nepal many of the Maoist leaders arrested in India. The most shocking news came after the arrest of Mohan Vaidya alias ‘Kiran’ (one of the top five Nepalese Maoist leaders). He was granted the status of a ‘political prisoner’ by an Indian court, which will provide him leeway and facilities that other normal prisoners will not receive. How can Nepalese Maoist leaders, who have so much blood on their hands and are acknowledged by India as ‘terrorists’, still receive such flexibility in punishment?

Sixth, the Nepali population in India is adding fuel to this Maoist fire. The major organizations close to the Maoists that are active in India are the All India Nepali Unity Society, the All India Nepali Students’ Association, the All India Nepali Youth Association and the All India Ethnic Society. Even the once neutral Akhil Bharatiya Nepal Ekta Samaj (ABNES), established for the unity and betterment of the Nepali community in India, has been delving into dissident revolutionary activities. While the Indian government assures Nepal that it is doing its best to help, it turns a blind eye on open Maoist activities throughout the country. In the words of Prachanda during his speech for the Second National Conference of CPN (M) in February 2001, “…the success of the Nepalese People’s War and revolution cannot be imagined if Nepalese dwelling in India are separated from it…”

Seven, Indian Maoists have already infiltrated the Nepalese “People’s War”. During the Muga/Dhankuta attacks in 2004 where several high level Royal Nepalese Army Officers were killed, there were reports that Indian women were behind the beheadings. The Terai region has become a safe haven for Indian Maoists, similar to how Nepalese Maoists have found a safe haven in India.

So, now you must be wondering how India would benefit from perpetual turmoil in Nepal. Just think of the economic benefits. Remember companies like Kodak that moved their factories from Nepal to India? They did this primarily because Nepal was too unstable. Think about the divergence of tourism from Nepal to India, or the hindrance of tourists that have already traveled to India and who wished to visit Nepal. Think about Nepalese businessmen going to India for investment opportunities or poor Nepalese laborers that migrate to India looking for work. Think about the Multinationals that utilize cheap labor, for whom India is a far better business investment than Nepal because of the insurgency. Like it or not, India is cashing in on Nepal’s agony.

We must get past the “big brother, small brother” mentality we have regarding India, however, we must also recognize to what extent India has cheated us. While we burn tires on the streets of Kathmandu and parade for the name of democracy at home, we overlook the fact that India holds Nepal’s cure to terrorism. While a brother kills a brother at home, India facilitates those responsible for mass murder and heartless torture. It is true that, at home, we don’t even have a democracy. But in today’s Nepal, where guns speak louder than words, we have to think about the safety and security of the nation before we start protesting for democracy. This is not a call to divert blame from one faction to another. However, we are directing our anguish and aggravation towards the wrong path, and by doing so we are simply hurting ourselves and impeding any sort of development in the country.

At a time when we’re being cornered and attacked from all sides by the Maoists, it is important to keep in mind that it is still possible to win this war. However, we must be willing to confront our “big brother”. It is about time we grasp the extent to which India is crippling our nation.

While China and Pakistan feed the Royal Nepalese Army with fresh ammunition from one side, the Maoists are being fed by India from the other side. How long are we going to protest against ourselves? How long are we going to close down our own schools and our own shops?

While our “astute” Nepali Politicians journey to India for political blessings from the Indian government, Dr.Bhattarai will be giving his interview to the BBC Nepali Service from the comfort of Indian soil. While we read the grotesque news of more brothers being killed at home, we will switch on the TV and see Krishna Bahadur Mahara, the Maoist Spokesman, giving an interview to CNN, comfortably strolling through a University Park in India. How long are we going to be blind to the obvious? It’s time to put the clues together. The solution to Nepal’s grave difficulty is not with the King, nor is it with the political parties. In fact the answer doesn’t lie in the country at all. The true pragmatic solution to our misery lies somewhere across the border, in India.

Caste Politics
Being a predominantly Hindu society, Nepal as a country has suffered from its deep-rooted reliance on the caste system. Regardless of cheap political rhetoric promising to uplift those of lower and even untouchable castes the country has always been ruled by two major castes, both of which are the highest in Hinduism.

The Brahmins, known as the priests and teachers in a Hindu society have had the strongest influence in politics and bureaucracy. Most of the bureaucrats in the highest positions and the most influential political leaders are still predominantly Brahmin. As the late great Ganesh Man Singh, one of the democracy freedom fighters for Nepal, said “Democracy has brought nothing to the country but Brahmanism”. Even the Maoist party, whose philosophy is to bring such social change by putting those of lower caste in power are ironically ruled by Brahmins.

The Chettris, known as the warriors and emperors in a Hindu society, have always been the “rulers” in Nepali society. From the Kings of Nepal (the Shahs), the line of commander-in-chiefs (“Kazis”; predominantly Thapas and Basnets), to the Rana Regime that lasted 104 years, the chettris have rule the country with an iron fist. This caste is also dominant in the Army, so much so that only those of the highest Chettri clan have been the commander-in-chiefs of the army, which is the strongest organization in the country.

India’s strong Hindu based society has also led it to have a dominant caste based system. Like most Rajputs and maharajas were Chettris in India, the progression into politics was led by predominantly Brahmin families like the Nehrus and Gandhis. The Rajputs of India still have very strong connections with the Royal family in Nepal, especially the families of Jaipur and Gwalior. Similarly, the Congress parties of India and Nepal not only share the same political point of view but are also dominated by the same castes; Brahmin.

Although never mentioned in the media, it is about time the Nepali population realizes the strong caste influence that India plays in Nepal. It is about time the politicians and the so-called social reformists face the challenging task of integrating the entire Nepali population and not failing to bring about change once they achieve power. At the end it is crucial to remember that the country belongs to every single Nepali and not just those who are from the social elite. Without every brick in the house doing its job, the house will eventually collapse.

India’s influence in Nepal’s Businesses
The Marwaris of Nepal are the major business tycoons in the country. From the largest five star hotels to the smallest jewelry shops, their influence in Nepali business is deep-rooted. In fact, the richest businessman and arguably the richest man in Nepal, Mohan Gopal Khetan, is also of direct Indian decent and like many other Marwaris, migrated to Nepal for business. While we must give them the utmost credit for helping the Nepali economy and guiding Nepali businesses through times of economic turmoil, we must also acknowledge the enormous influence of the Marwaris and other Indian businessmen in Nepal. Because of their economic clout, this group of businessmen also hold political punch, a power they can easily utilize for Indian interests.

Religion: A political strategy
There are 900 million Hindus around the world and most of them reside in India. The fact that Nepal was the only Hindu kingdom on earth (which changed after parliamentary decisions on May, 2006) and the King of Nepal is the only Hindu king makes matters between India and Nepal more convoluted than meets the eye. In a country that, for the past few years, seems to be headed more and more towards a republic, Nepal’s royal family and those that support the institution of Monarchy seem to be using the religion card to safeguard this 237 year old institution. Hardcore religious groups in India and Hindu political parties, such as the BJP, claim that the King of Nepal, as the only Hindu king, is in fact the reincarnation of Lord Vishnu, as popular mythology dictates. This has created a strong attachment between such parties and the royalists of Nepal, who might see such religious Indian factions as a buffer against a republic. Parties like the BJP along with several Hindu organizations still want the King in power in Nepal for religious reasons, because of which the royalists in Nepal want parties like the BJP to gain power in India. Such selfish need from both sides of the boarder fosters a reciprocal relationship, where the pro-monarchy faction in Nepal is ready to take measures that favor those groups in India and vise-versa. Although the media has not explored such a treat yet, we cannot disregard even the most unpredictable options.

Humanitarian Blackmail
Nepal is a third-world country that cannot survive without foreign aid. While American aid makes up the greatest part of Nepal’s foreign aid revenue, India’s aid to Nepal is also very significant. India contributes to Nepal via direct monetary aid and also through military aid. Such aid is vital to Nepal and without this monetary assistance from superpowers like India Nepal would crumble within months. Along with the philanthropic feeling of giving, India also gains political clout over Nepal, which it has utilized a handful of times. When King Mahendra, the current King’s father, took over power in the early 1960s India stopped any monetary assistance to Nepal. In 1990, in the height of pro-democracy movements India implemented a blockade and reduced aid to force King Birendra, this King’s brother, to give up power. Similarly, on 1st February 2005, India took away aid after King Gyanendra took over power, stating that Nepal must follow a road of multi-party democracy and that monarchy was not the answer. The idea that India stood up for the democratic rights of the people of Nepal is laudable. However, in an impoverished country like Nepal, India can demand that Nepal be governed a certain way, and could threaten the country with the removal of aid. The aid coming from India, which is meant for the unfortunate, and poor in Nepal is vital regardless of whatever government is in power. Who is India to say what kind of government Nepal should have? Whether it is a monarchy, democracy or a communist state, the poor will remain poor. In this way political agendas can easily be hidden in the form of humanitarian aid, which India may utilize to blackmail a delicate country like Nepal for political purposes.

Domestic challenges: Nepal also faces three great-unnoticed challenges that are beyond the reach of India. Rather these problems have to be addressed by Nepal itself to upkeep its sovereignty and strength in the region.

Decentralize!
Geographic decentralization of resources is vital if this country is to achieve any prosperity in the long term. Nepal is a perfect example of what can go wrong when all the emphasis is given to one location, in this case the capital Kathmandu, and all other regions are forgotten. It is quite troublesome the fact that Kathmandu has not only the basic necessities but also all the luxuries that one could ask for even in a developed nation. Walking around certain areas of Kathmandu, one can see the privileged elite roaming around in their luxury cars, shopping in designer stores and carrying all the latest audio gear and posh accessories. Such is the reality of this third world country, the gap between the rich and the poor is widening. While the fortunate enjoy it all, a fifty-mile trip outside the capital will display the bleak realities of what state Nepal is really in. With no proper electricity, health services or educational institutions, the fundamental institutions needed are long overdue. Still, little thought has gone into improving the lives of those most in need. This is precisely the strength of the Maoist movement, which claims that the poor have been forgotten and left behind by the social elite in Nepal. And the incompetence and lack of care in this issue has caused a great deal of frustration and is the fuel behind the revolutionary Maoist fire.

Such decentralization of resources has caused two major problems in the country. First, there is a great imbalance in the educated population. Without educational institutions, the young village population is forced to look towards the cities for a proper education. Without legitimate workplaces, the job-minded group of youngsters is compelled to look towards the cities for any kind of work they can find. Such overwhelming internal migration from the villages towards Kathmandu leaves no hope for long term and balanced development in the country. Then there are those unable to migrate to the city for economic and other personal reasons. For generations this group will not be able to give their own kids the proper education required to earn a decent living, and the next generation will be the same and so one. In this way, those who were not fortunate or capable enough to leave the bleakness of their villages are victim to the ‘great cycle of endless poverty’.

For a country to prosper, there has to be equal development of the entire country, not just one city. With this is mind it is crucial for the government of Nepal to take this long overdue task of trying to diversify its resources for the long-term betterment of the country itself.

The brain drain and the great divide
As Nepal’s youth lines up along the passport lines and security checks at Tribhuwan International Airport with the hopes of living the cinematic “American dream”, they leave behind a country tattered and torn in political pandemonium. With heavyhearted patriotism they depart and ritualistically hang their Nepali flags in their college dorm rooms. Yet, the ambition of going back to Nepal and taking charge of their beloved homeland becomes only a distant priority once they taste the freedom, democracy, and hamburgers of the materialistically satisfying life abroad. Such is the perilous future of the nation; even with the Maoist insurgency, political turmoil, and economic crises resolved, the country faces another monumental obstacle: patriotic hypocrites.

As the trend of educating children outside the country increases, what happens if this minute population of youngsters who are wealthy, bright, and fortunate enough to go overseas doesn’t return? The result: something I like to call “the great divide”. A country where the educated elite are ready to point fingers at the government, but none of whom are ready to work for it. A nation where all the sophisticated citizens seem to know the solution to the country’s troubles, but no one is intrepid enough to return and work for five or six thousand rupees per month. What happened to all the patriotism? What happened to all the “Jai Nepal” rhetoric? In the face of self-satisfaction, a country’s cry seems trivial. The Nepalis that go abroad usually do so with a one-way ticket, only to return for brief visits. Unfortunately, these are also the same people that seem to have the loudest voices and seem to know all the answers to Nepal’s political friction.

Such brain drain will impair Nepal in ways unimaginable to us now. Think about our future government. No matter how many shrewd businessmen, erudite journalists, “well-informed” NGO-workers or caring human rights activists Nepal might have, for a country to prosper, we will need a strong government. For a strong government we need the best to actually work for the government. Who will be the future bureaucrats of the country? The era in the later half of the 20th century for Nepal when the best and the brightest were enthusiastic about a post in the government is over. The educated, capable and accomplished are no longer willing to work for the government for such nominal salaries. Instead, those who were unable to get jobs elsewhere or those who were the least competent will be running the show, further widening “the great divide” between the privileged few and the government and giving birth to an intellectual civil war in the near future.

As I make this case I often hear counter-arguments from nationalistic charlatans who claim that a flood of brainpower from Nepal to other countries will not affect Nepal. Some claim that in countries like India and China, where millions have gone abroad for work and study, there is not only development but these nations are already emerging super powers. Although it is easy to get carried away in such romantic optimism, pragmatically speaking, we cannot compare ourselves with these two giants simply because we share borders. Likewise, we cannot compare Nepal’s “human capital flight” with that of India or China. If millions of Indians go overseas for education and employment, millions who are equally as educated and capable will stay back home. As much competition as there is to get into the best American and European Universities, there is even greater competition to enter educational institutions like Beijing University or IIT. Such conditions foster motivation to stay at home, which Nepal lacks. India and China also enjoy a geographically decentralized reservoir of brainpower, whereas in Nepal only those from Kathmandu and a handful from other cities are privileged enough to receive the appropriate amount of education to go outside the country. Therefore, with every Nepali youngster that leaves the country, Nepal slides further into difficulty.

Of course there are those that do return to the country and much praise should go their way. But this is a minuscule number. Even for the nominal amount of bold youngsters that return with the readiness to work for their government, passing the primitive and strictly Nepali-based ‘lokseba’ government exams is an insurmountable task. The overwhelming population is made up of those with the determination and patriotism to return, but lack the initial step.

Although taking a complete U-turn from a brain drain is an evolutionary process and not revolutionary, there are two main approaches we can still take to head towards the right direction. As I criticize the young educated elite for not being true to their country, I also acknowledge the government’s errors. First, the archaic lokseba exams will have to be reformed and made less of a daunting task to those who were educated under the English based system. This is an effective way of reaching out to those that are actually willing to work for the government. Second, we must now adopt what is referred to as the ‘Taiwan method’. A couple of decades ago, Taiwan, in the midst of economic and political instability, called back a handful of Taiwanese Princeton University graduates and promised them the post of political and economic advisors. With full gusto they implemented novel yet pragmatic policies that were highly successful and helped to catapult Taiwan to what it is today. Nepal has far too many brilliant and determined youngsters for the country to be suffering like it is today.

The ‘Singapore method’ is another approach Nepal can adopt to lure in the country’s best while simultaneously reducing corruption in higher offices of power. In Singapore, at the height of corruption, the country implemented a unique strategy of paying its government workers, especially those in higher posts, very large salaries. This will not only provide a strong incentive for the best to join the government, but it will also alleviate the need for corruption within the government. Such innovative approaches are key, not only in enticing the young, but also in long-term development of the nation.

Regardless of government efforts, ultimately the choice belongs to this particular age group of twenty and thirty-year olds that can make the difference. This next generation has the toilsome task of repairing and renovating a country that was raped and dishonored by the self-satisfying generation that came before it. The next generation will be no different if it forgets its duty towards the troubled native soil. We might be poor, yet we have been blessed with a part of this world that is rich in a myriad of resources, natural, and now also intellectual. Both these resources must be utilized if the country is to get back up on its feet. There is only one thing that can set this country on a long-term path to prosperity: selflessness of the young. Most of these youngsters left the nation with the promise of returning, and as the nation dies a slow death, many have already forgotten their promise.

Separation of Bureaucracy and Politics
There are few countries in the world where bureaucracy is so intertwined with politics. A political change in the country will dictate which bureaucrats get appointed, which bureaucrats get promoted and which ones directly or indirectly get the boot. Before 1990, in the autocratic Panchayat (“royal”) government, bureaucrats that demanded democracy or bureaucrats that were anti-royalist were subject to expulsion from the government, demotions or were never promoted. The people of Nepal who hoped that after the democracy movement of 1990, this would change were utterly disappointed. Nepotism and favoritism mushroomed like never before, and democracy came not for the people but for the politicians and their families.

The example of the contrary that I always offer is that of India. Indian politicians might be unreliable and arguably some of the most corrupt in the world. Yet, India has managed to keep bureaucracy separated from politics, and although not fully successful, India has displayed that a country can prosper if bureaucracy is left to operate and grow on its own. In doing so India has managed to run a country with a billion people, unaffected by day-to-day political changes.

Nepal has always fallen behind because political changes have such a stronghold on bureaucracy. In a country like Nepal where the Prime Minister changes every six months, how far will we get if we have to reinvent the bureaucracy every time the government changes? We have already separated the Army from the King; the next logical step is to separate bureaucracy from politics.

A step forward
Today Nepal is at a crucial point in its history. The country has gone from a full-on Monarchy to a nation that is under the complete influence of political leaders and Maoists. We must be optimistic that things can get better, yet at the same time there is the ever-present danger that the situation will take a turn for the worst. Regardless of what short-term solutions the leaders choose to please the crowds on the streets, without long-term commitment to resolve the ills of Nepali society this country is bound to remain diseased forever. Along with the renovation of the nation, we must also think ahead so that the future generations of this troubled country do not suffer from the consequences of this generation’s lack of planning. Being in such a fragile state, Nepal is vulnerable to the manipulation of politically and economically stronger neighbors like India. Although we must work with this new great world super power and except the helping hand that it offers, we must move with caution and act in favor of our own national interests. We must remember that a strong Nepal will not only ensure the sovereignty of the country and prosperity for generations to come, but a strong Nepal will ultimately give strength to the entire sub-continent of South Asia.